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ABSTRACT 
Neil S. Oatsvall, Ph.D. 
Department of History, May 2013 
University of Kansas 
 
“Splitting Atoms, Fracturing Landscapes: Policymaking, Environmental Science, and the 
Nuclear Complex, 1945-1960” examines the implications of an expansive nuclear culture 
in the postwar United States. This dissertation probes the intersection of Cold War 
policymaking, environmental science, and the nuclear complex—a shorthand way of 
discussing the sum set of all nuclear technologies in conjunction with the societal 
structures and ideologies necessary to implement such technology. Studying a unified 
nuclear complex corrects for the limitations associated with studying all nuclear 
technologies as separate entities, something that has created fractured understandings of 
how splitting the atom affected both natural and human systems. 
 
This dissertation shows how U.S. policymakers in the early Cold War interacted with the 
environment and sought to fulfill their charge to protect the United States and its people 
while still attempting to ensure future national prosperity. Thus the consideration of an 
holistic nuclear complex better explains how humans, policy, technology, and the 
environment intermingled during the Cold War and profoundly affected not only the 
natural world, but also the human relationship to it. Weather, agriculture, geology and 
other natural factors have too long been absent from histories of nuclear technologies, 
and thus we have missed what splitting the atom truly meant. Ultimately, “Splitting 
Atoms, Fracturing Landscapes” prompts us to employ a more nuanced understanding of 
the interaction between human societies, governmental mandates to protect citizens and 
lands, and the natural world. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
 
In August 1958, Donald A. Pugnetti, Managing Editor of The Tri-City Herald 
(“The Voice of Southeastern Washington”), sent a letter to White House Press Secretary 
James Hagerty. The letter itself seems fairly inconsequential in hindsight, but worth 
noting is that it was printed on the back of a hand drawn map of the area surrounding the 
Hanford Atomic Works plant (see Figure 1).1 That map situated the Hanford plant in the 
midst of a variety of both industrial centers as well as natural and agricultural elements—
the Columbia and Snake Rivers, wheat farms, an apple orchard, etc. While it is possible 
that Pugnetti merely found a piece of scrap paper on which to type his letter, it seems 
more likely that the graphical representation meant something to him and helped convey 
a sense of how he thought about the area, especially the relationship between the Hanford 
Atomic Works plant and its surrounding environs.  
The map of Hanford also serves as an apt representation of the interconnectedness 
between the environment and the development of nuclear energy, even if such 
connections have frequently gone unnoticed by both scholars. Historians have done a fine 
job chronicling nuclear energy and its products on many grounds—political, cultural, 
military, just to name a few. Scholars have not been as successful, however, in evaluating 
how the interplay between environmental science and policymaking affected such nuclear 
developments. This oversight represents a significant lacuna in understanding nuclear 
history and the early Cold War and must be reconciled if we are to understand fully what 
nuclear fission meant at the time. 
                                                
1 DDEL, White House Central Files, General File, Box 1214, Folder 155, 1958, Letter from Donald A. 
Pugnetti to James Hagerty, 16 August 1958. 
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This dissertation looks at what I have termed the nuclear complex, scientific 
knowledge about the environment, and policymakers and argues that the environment and 
knowledge about it were pivotal forces in the nuclear complex’s development. It 
considers the environment to be the non-human natural world, including not just biotic 
entities like plants and animals but also abiotic phenomena such as winds, weather, and 
rocks. I use the term nuclear complex as a shorthand way of discussing the sum set of all 
nuclear technologies in conjunction with the societal structures and ideologies necessary 
to implement such technology. Historians have hitherto typically considered nuclear 
technologies like nuclear power reactors and nuclear weapons as separate entities, but 
until these are understood as different facets of the same gem we will not truly 
understand how those in power made decisions about the nuclear complex. Policymakers 
had to make decisions about each at the same time, often knowing that a choice on one 
might affect the other (if nothing else, when budgeting), while the environment, 
especially scientific understandings of it, played a significant, yet underappreciated role 
in those decisions.  
 To accomplish such an investigation, this study uses three principal questions to 
help guide its organization. All of these address the reality that creating the nuclear 
complex inherently produced interrelated policy dilemmas, scientific problems, and 
philosophical questions about the place of technology in our societies. Moreover, each 
question is unanswerable without placing it in the context of the non-human natural 
world. Scientific understandings mediated how policymakers understood the natural 
world, but fundamentally these decision makers had to grapple with complex 
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environmental systems and how those interacted with equally complex socio-political and 
military systems. 
First, what does it mean to protect a nation? Executive policymakers in the 
United States were fundamentally tasked with keeping the country and its citizens safe 
from harm. In the geopolitical context of the time, they perceived this to necessitate 
developing, maintaining, and improving a significant nuclear arsenal. Other nuclear 
technologies originated from the atomic bomb, and policymakers intended all of these to 
safeguard national interests in some way. But every nuclear technology also interacted 
with the natural world, sometimes to the detriment or at least potential detriment of 
human health. Thus the technologies that were intended to protect and improve the nation 
and the lives of its peoples in certain instances held the potential to cause great harm in 
others. Decision makers had to confront these realities when deciding, as was their 
charge, how best to protect the United States. 
 Second, what are the limits and capabilities of nuclear technology (or any 
technology, for that matter)? It is frequently difficult to discern exactly how a piece of 
technology will change human lives, but every inventor or scientist has some sort of hope 
for the technology he or she creates. No matter the intentions for nuclear technology, 
however, decision makers had to grapple with the realities such creations produced. Can 
a nuclear weapon keep a nation safe? Can nuclear energy help improve society in 
tangible ways? On the other hand, if nuclear technology could accomplish the goals set 
out for it, what unexpected outcomes did it also produce? Did those unexpected outcomes 
outweigh any real benefits produced by nuclear technologies? These questions are 
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difficult to pin down in hindsight, but were especially troublesome for policymakers to 
confront at the time. 
 Finally, how should scientists and policymakers manage the unknown? The 
contexts involved in this story—scientific, geopolitical, military, environmental, etc.—
are fluid and difficult to master in any situation. When combined with new technologies, 
replete with all the uncertainties involved in developing and implementing such 
innovations, how did decision makers utilize existing intellectual networks to make 
policy about the nuclear complex? The answer clearly involved interpreting scientific 
understandings about nuclear technology and the environment as best they could, but the 
truth is that a great many questions were difficult to answer. Policymakers used science—
environmental science in particular—to probe the unknown and best answer this study’s 
first two questions. How they did so can tell us more about the expansive nuclear culture 
in the postwar United States. Before continuing, laying out a few definitions can be a 
useful exercise. 
This dissertation is primarily about conceptions of the natural world and 
environmental science much more than it is the actual spaces in which nuclear science 
and environment interacted. Luckily, defining what constitutes environmental science is 
much easier than defining what the environment or natural world actually is. 
Environmental science is a broad range of disciplines that includes, but is not limited to 
ecology, biology, chemistry, geology, and meteorology. Physics are also important, but in 
the nuclear complex this discipline played a very different role, used more to find better 
ways to harness nuclear energy than to understand the surrounding world. The spaces and 
beings those disciplines study—the “environment”—can be difficult to define. As 
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William Cronon wrote, “‘nature’ is a human idea, with a long and complicated cultural 
history which has led different human beings to conceive of the natural world in very 
different ways.”2 For this dissertation, the environment is comprised of all natural 
features and creatures, all flora and fauna, along with the winds, waves, and earth. Some 
scholars have found it useful to distinguish between what is truly natural and a kind of 
“second nature” influenced and modified by humans. After humans detonated nuclear 
weapons, however, anthropogenic traces could be found in every ecosystem in the world, 
and thus trying to find a truly pristine environment since then has been impossible. In 
contrast, this dissertation eschews such distinctions and takes a less atomistic view. Using 
environment and natural world interchangeably, it considers the two to be the holistic set 
of non-human nature. 
It is also useful to define the major players in the early history of the nuclear 
complex, the policymakers or decision makers. Focusing on the executive branch, the 
dissertation principally considers two sets of decision makers: the AEC Commissioners 
(the Commission’s top level administrators) and officials in the White House, especially 
presidents Truman and Eisenhower.3 To delve into AEC policymaking, the dissertation 
uses not only AEC archival records, but especially employs the AEC’s reports to 
Congress. Thus AEC policymaking included both what the Commissioners talked about 
in private and what they wanted to express to the public through Congress. In the White 
House, while Truman and Eisenhower were the most important actors, executive 
                                                
2 William Cronon, “Foreword to the Paperback Edition,” in Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human 
Place in Nature, William Cronon, ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995, 1996), 20. 
3 On President Eisenhower’s place in the historiography, see, for example: Elmo Richardson, The 
Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower (Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1979); Anthony James 
Joes, “Eisenhower Revisionism: The Tide Comes In,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 3 
(Summer, 1985); Mary S. McAuliffe, “Eisenhower, the President,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 
68, No. 3 (Dec., 1981); Donald Alan Carter, “Eisenhower versus the Generals,” The Journal of Military 
History, Vol. 71, No. 4 (Oct., 2007) 
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policymaking involved not only many presidential advisors, but also the many people 
who expressed their thoughts and opinions in things like letters, telegrams, briefings, and 
position papers to the presidents. Presidential policymaking, therefore, can be as narrow 
as Truman and Eisenhower or as broad as the many people with whom those presidents 
interacted. Hence, while the dissertation limits its scope by studying two specific groups 
of policymakers, these groups could be and often were quite diverse. 
By taking an ecological approach to nuclear technology, research, and 
development and the incumbent policymaking, this dissertation revises our understanding 
of the presidencies of Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower, especially how 
administrators, including the AEC, thought about the environment and the nuclear 
complex. To support such a study, this dissertation principally examines nuclear testing, 
the fallout from that testing, nuclear test cessation talks during the Eisenhower era, 
atomic agriculture, and nuclear waste disposal. These topics not only demonstrate that the 
nuclear complex encompassed much more than nuclear weapons, but also allow for a 
broad consideration of how the environment and science about it affected nuclear 
complex policymaking. Those in power used environmental science to help make their 
decisions, and in doing so showed recognition both of how their decisions might affect 
the environment and for how they should modify their plans based on environmental 
realities, as these were understood. The environment mattered to nuclear complex 
policymakers, and both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations reflect a growing 
environmental awareness about nuclear science and how it could affect environmental 
welfare as well as human plans, desires, and wellbeing. 
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Early on in the development of the nuclear complex, defense officials remained 
fairly secretive on almost every facet of atomic energy. And yet, by the late 1940s even 
the public began considering the interaction between nuclear weapons and the 
environment. John Hersey’s Hiroshima (1946) caused people in the United States to 
consider the effects radiation might have on biological entities.4 Other evidence for early 
understandings about the environment and the nuclear complex is provided by 
Hollywood movies like Them! (1954), which portrayed a nightmare scenario of how 
radiation might affect ants and turn them into mutated terrors the size of Volkswagens 
through long-term radiation exposure.5 Moreover, historian Ralph Lutts has suggested 
that Rachel Carson’s seminal Silent Spring (1962) would not have had nearly the same 
effect on society had citizens not already been primed to think in distinctly ecological 
ways (especially about unseen forces) by concerns about radioactive fallout the previous 
decade.6 Clearly the environment mattered to the evolution of nuclear complex, even if 
most scholarship has not recognized it.  
 Even if scholars have not paid enough attention to the historical interactions 
between science, the natural world, and the nuclear complex, many good historical works 
do exist on various facets of the nuclear complex. Sixty years after the detonation of the 
first atomic bomb, historian Andrew Bacevich declared, “More than America’s matchless 
material abundance or even the diffusion of pop culture, the nation’s arsenal of high-tech 
                                                
4 Hersey’s work started as a single issue of the New Yorker, but soon became a monograph. John Hersey, 
Hiroshima (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1946, 1981) 
5 Them! was Warner Brothers’ highest grossing film of 1954 and a bona fide box office hit. William M. 
Tsutsui, “Looking Straight at Them! Understanding the Big Bug Movies of the 1950s,” Environmental 
History, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 (April 2007), 237. It should be noted that Tsutsui’s final argument is that these 
radioactive bug movies of the 1950s and early 1960s less represent fears of the nuclear complex, the Cold 
War, or humanity’s lack of control of nature, but instead are about how bugs can be scary and many people 
at the time were terrified of actual insect invasions as warned by many entomologists of the time. 
6 Ralph H. Lutts, “Chemical Fallout: Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, Radioactive Fallout, and the 
Environmental Movement,” Environmental Review: ER, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Autumn 1985), pp. 210-225. 
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weaponry and the soldiers who employ that arsenal have come to signify who we are and 
what we stand for.”7 If one were to believe Bacevich, nuclear weapons would then seem 
to characterize the nation’s culture more than any other technology under its control. And 
yet, historian Lawrence Keeley has argued that after World War II, the atomic bomb’s 
mushroom cloud symbolized the “newly discovered madness of war.”8 The two 
statements are not necessarily antithetical—nuclear weapons occupy a complicated place 
in the United States and have since humans first harnessed the power of the atom. For 
example, nuclear bombs both were instrumental in the United States’ prosecution of the 
Second World War and represented among the greatest horrors of that conflict—from the 
outset, the bomb could be anything from savior to horseman of the Apocalypse, from 
guardian angel to demonic terror, depending on one’s perspective. The historiography of 
the nuclear complex is just as varied as human reactions to that technology. 
 Nuclear weapons have, unsurprisingly, elicited more study than any other aspect 
of the nuclear complex, and not just because these cost the United States over six trillion 
dollars between 1943-1998.9 Culturally, the bomb shook the United States in ways that 
were as sweeping as they were unpredictable.10 Other histories have chronicled nuclear 
                                                
7 Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 1. 
8 Lawrence H. Keeley, War Before Civilization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 165. 
9 When adjusted for 1996 dollars, the total came to $5.821 trillion. Atomic Audit: The Costs and 
Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons since 1940, Stephen I. Schwartz, ed. (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institute Press, 1998) 
10 Paul Boyer asserted, “It is as though the Bomb has become one of those categories of Being, like Space 
and Time, that, according to Kant, are built into the very structure of our minds, giving shape and meaning 
to all our perceptions.” Paul Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the 
Dawn of the Atomic Age (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), xviii.  Whether atomic weapons have become 
a part of humans’ collective consciousness is debatable, but that the bombs have had incredible effects is 
not. In By the Bomb’s Early Light, Boyer first delved into the cultural effects of the bomb, and he continued 
that research into “intense and continuing impact on American consciousness and culture” of the Cold War 
and the nuclear arms race in Fallout. Paul Boyer, Fallout: A Historian Reflects on America’s Half-Century 
Encounter with Nuclear Weapons (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1998), xii. Robert Jacobs 
continued the conversation with The Dragon’s Tail and argued that stories were essential to understanding 
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weapons from the first detonation at Trinity to the bombing of Hiroshima, and also 
studied the lives of crucial figures in the nuclear complex, such as J. Robert 
Oppenheimer, sometimes called the father of the atomic bomb.11 Still other scholars have 
questioned the unexpected dangers of nuclear weapons and asked whether the bombs 
have exacted a physical price on human bodies.12 Yet few histories have evaluated the 
interaction between the environment and nuclear weapons, with most of those studies 
staying limited to the subject of nuclear fallout, which is as much of a human health issue 
as it is environmental.13 (This dissertation considers that human bodies are discrete from 
the natural world, even if surrounding environments have an important effect on human 
health.) The environment played a crucial role in both the development of the nuclear 
complex and how it affected humans. Even though historians have probed nearly every 
                                                                                                                                            
how nuclear weapons affected the nation. Since most people had never seen a bomb, it was these narratives 
that formed their opinions of the bomb. Robert A. Jacobs, The Dragon’s Tail: American’s Face the Atomic 
Age (Amherst and Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2010) 
11 Ferenc M. Szasz, The Day the Sun Rose Twice: The Story of the Trinity Nuclear Explosion, July 16, 1945 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1985); J. Samuel Walker, Prompt and Utter Destruction: 
Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1997, 2004); Kai Bird and Martin J. Sherwin, American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. 
Robert Oppenheimer (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005) 
12 Very critical of nuclear weapons and the people who tested them are: Phillip L. Fradkin, Fallout: An 
American Nuclear Tragedy (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1989); Richard L. Miller, Under the 
Cloud: The Decades of Nuclear Testing (New York: The Free Press, 1986) Barton Hacker took a much 
kinder view, claiming, “Those responsible for radiation safety in nuclear weapons testing under the 
auspices of the Atomic Energy Commission were competent, diligent, and cautious. They understood the 
hazards and took every precaution within their power to avoid injuring either test participants or 
bystanders. Testing, of course, meant taking risks, and safety could never be the highest priority. Those in 
charge sometimes made mistakes, but for the most part they managed to ensure that neither test participants 
nor bystanders suffered any apparent damage from fallout.” Barton C. Hacker, Elements of Controversy: 
The Atomic Energy Commission and Radiation Safety in Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1947-1974 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1994), 9. Debra Rosenthal has even probed the mindsets of those who work 
on nuclear weapons design. Debra Rosenthal, At the Heart of the Bomb: The Dangerous Allure of Weapons 
Work (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing, Inc., 1990) 
13 Some of the works that have probed the environmental issues are: Mark D. Merlin and Ricardo M. 
Gonzalez, “Environmental Impacts of Nuclear Testing in Remote Oceania, 1946-1996,” in Environmental 
Histories of the Cold War, J. R. McNeill and Corinna R. Unger, eds., (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010);. Lutts, “Chemical Fallout”; Also see, from the previous note, Fradkin, Fallout, Hacker, 
Elements of Controversy, and Miller, Under the Cloud. A work that examines both environmental and 
human health effects of nuclear weapons is: Nuclear Wastelands: A Global Guide to Nuclear Weapons 
Production and Its Health and Environmental Effects, Arjun Makhijani, Howard Hu, and Katherine Yih, 
eds. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995) 
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aspect of the nuclear complex, studies including the natural world as an historical actor 
represent a regrettable void of knowledge that should be filled in by careful thought and 
research. 
 Other aspects of the nuclear complex have not received the same attention by 
scholars. Studies of the history of nuclear power tend to focus more on what harnessing 
the atom for electricity can tell us about other aspects of humanity, such as how expertise 
plays a role in our societies, the rise of environmentalism, or what reactors demonstrate 
about humans’ relationships with technology.14 Scholarly works have also focused on 
how atomic energy helped develop scientific knowledge, especially modern ecological 
understandings that were founded on the research of brothers Eugene and Howard 
Odum.15 Other scholars have chronicled the ways the nuclear complex dramatically 
altered both the physical landscape of the U.S. West and also its culture.16  
 Nuclear historiography contains several important gaps, however, and this 
dissertation seeks to correct the limitations these have produced in scholars’ historical 
understanding of the nuclear complex. As stated above, the environment has not received 
the attention it deserves, most likely because most scholars have seen little need to 
chronicle what they assumed was merely wanton environmental destruction. More 
particularly, attitudes about and understandings of the environment by policymakers in 
the 1940s and 1950s are virtually ignored scholars. Without consideration of the 
                                                
14 Brian Balogh, Chain Reaction: Expert debate and public participation in American commercial nuclear 
power, 1945-1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Michael Bess, The Light-Green 
Society: Ecology and Technological Modernity in France, 1960-2000 (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2003), Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World 
War II (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998, 2009). 
15 See Chapter 6, “Ecology and the Atomic Age,” in Joel B. Hagen, An Entangled Bank: The Origins of 
Ecosystem Ecology (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1992) 
16 Dan O’Neill, The Firecracker Boys (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994); The Atomic West, Bruce 
Hevly and John M. Findlay, eds. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998) 
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interaction between the natural world and policymaking we cannot understand the 
nuclear complex because we will not understand the driving forces behind its 
development. Most importantly, the structure and focus of preceding works has been 
almost antithetical to the realities of an integrated nuclear complex. While writing a 
complete history of the nuclear complex in one book would be impossible, previous 
scholars have done little to acknowledge the interconnectedness of various nuclear 
technologies and processes.  
 A picture of the life cycle of radioactive ores can help illustrate the importance of 
taking a comprehensive and ecological approach to the nuclear complex (see Figure 2 for 
an AEC representation, even if flawed). The nuclear complex began with the 
procurement of nuclear ores through mining. Very similar to mining more traditional 
ores, this step would be useless without the means to process such rocks. In terms of the 
nuclear complex, the useful component of any mined ores only represented a fraction of 
the total extracted minerals (a 1949 estimate placed the ratio of uranium on the planet at 
roughly 6:1,000,000).17 Processing facilities turned that raw ore into useable fuel for 
implementation as both nuclear weapons and nuclear power production. Especially at 
these last two stages—processing and implementation—scientific research and 
development proved especially important, and advancing U.S. interests at these stages 
represented the bulk of what the AEC saw as its mission. Of course, each of these steps 
produced byproducts, some of which, such as radioisotope tracers, were usually produced 
intentionally and proved very useful in various research endeavors. Others, like 
                                                
17 Fifth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, January 1949, 5. The U.S. government 
worked hard to help facilitate mining efforts, too. For example, the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1950 to 
add hundreds of miles of roads to create access to uranium producing districts, particularly on the Colorado 
Plateau. As of mid-1952, workers laid 783 miles of roads for this purpose at a cost of $4,200,000 (around 
$5,360 per mile). Twelfth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, July 1952, 3. 
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radioactive fallout from bomb tests or waste products from reactors, were less desirable, 
frequently dangerous both to ecosystems and human health, and necessitated cleanup or 
mitigation efforts to protect the nation. At all levels, the AEC oversaw the nuclear 
complex, even if its gaze typically focused on the nuclear complex’s more charismatic 
elements, especially weapons and power development. 
Hence, while each aspect of the nuclear complex may have seemed to develop 
independently, the truth is that the steps were interconnected, especially since the same 
men made decisions about the different facets of nuclear research and development and 
frequently did so at the same meetings. Those in power knew that the purification and 
production of nuclear ores in factories were reliant upon mining operations, and that both 
of those were necessary to develop nuclear weapons or nuclear power. And both 
scientists and policymakers recognized that every operation produced nuclear waste, 
either contained or free in the environment, which required studying and understanding 
so that the nation could deal with it. Radioactive minerals are central to each step and 
connect it to the others. The inclusion of scientific understandings about the environment 
into the historical narrative thus forces scholars to reevaluate how we have studied 
seemingly disparate nuclear technologies. Moreover, the ways policymakers used 
knowledge about the environment in their deliberations further underscores that any 
study of nuclear technologies must recognize that these are part of a larger unified 
nuclear complex, the development of which especially depended on the natural world. 
Perhaps most influential in this development of a broad nuclear complex, however, was 
the creation of the Atomic Energy Commission. 
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 The first steps toward establishing the United States Atomic Energy Commission 
began in 1939 with the discovery of uranium fission by German chemists Otto Hahn and 
Fritz Strassman and early attempts by U.S. scientists to solicit funding from the federal 
government for nuclear research. War heightened such attempts, especially seen in the 
iconic letter from Albert Einstein to Franklin Roosevelt asking the President to look into 
ways “the element uranium may be turned into a new and important source of energy in 
the immediate future” and “to speed up the experimental work” currently being done at 
and funded by university laboratories.18 Roosevelt did follow Einstein’s advice for the 
most part and created the Manhattan Project, which was designed to produce the world’s 
first atomic bomb. To this end, in 1943, work started on significant nuclear processing 
and research plants at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and Hanford, Washington. This research 
led to the first nuclear bomb detonation, the Trinity test on 16 July 1945, as well as the 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan on 6 August and 9 August 1945 
respectively.  
 A mere day later, on 10 August 1945, Abe Fortas, the Acting Secretary of the 
Interior, sent a letter to President Harry Truman that emphasized how, even early on, 
policymakers recognized how many interconnected facets of the nuclear complex were 
important to the success of the others. That letter stated, “The recent use of radio-active 
mineral substances as an agency of destruction for war use and the strong possibility that 
they may be adapted to new and revolutionary uses in time of peace will undoubtedly 
                                                
18 HSTL, Atomic Bomb Collection, Box 1, Folder Franklin D. Roosevelt Library--Copies of 
Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and Albert Einstein [GHDC272], Letter from Albert 
Einstein to F.D. Roosevelt, 2 August 1939. Dr. Alexander Sachs actually delivered the letter to the White 
House on 11 October 1939, leading to FDR’s response a week later. HSTL, Atomic Bomb Collection, Box 
1, Folder Franklin D. Roosevelt Library--Copies of Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
Albert Einstein [GHDC272], Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Albert Einstein, 19 October 1939 
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result in an intense search for and acquisition of lands containing such substances.” 
Fortas thought that, because of this, such lands should not be permitted to fall into private 
hands in any way. The acting secretary then proposed that the President issue an 
executive order withdrawing all public lands containing such radioactive source materials 
from any sort of disposal availability to the public.19 A month later, President Truman 
signed executive order 9613 into existence, which withdrew all public lands and future 
lands of the United States that “contain deposits of radio-active mineral substances, and 
all deposits of such substances” from disposal under all public-land and mining laws.20 
Thus executive order 9613 highlighted two things: the U.S. nuclear program was highly 
dependent on radioactive ores, directly tying the fate of nuclear research to the land and 
the materials that could be mined from it, and the development of a nuclear complex of 
sweeping extent began to develop fairly early in the country’s nuclear program.21 
Moreover, the United States’ search for radioactive ores not only spread out the U.S. 
nuclear complex across most of the globe, particularly into Africa, but also diffused the 
environmental costs of it as well.22 
                                                
19 HSTL, White House Central Files, Confidential Files, Box 4, Folder Atomic bomb and energy aug 45 to 
nov 49, 2 of 2, Letter from Acting Secretary of the Interior to President, 10 August 1945, 1. 
20 HSTL, Papers of Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files, Box 193, Folder Atomic Bomb 1945, Executive 
Order 9613, Withdrawing and Reserving for the Use of the United States Lands Containing Radio-Active 
Mineral Substances, 13 September 1945. A later executive order, 9908, added a clause to all land sales 
conducted by the United States that reserved for the United States the mineral rights for all radioactive ores 
contained in such lands. HSTL, Papers of Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files, Box 194, Folder Atomic 
Energy, Executive Order 9908, 8 December 1947 
21 To emphasize the early and ever-increasing extent of mining in the nuclear complex during the studied 
period, two examples suffice: (1) As of mid-1952, workers had laid 783 miles of roads for the purpose of 
accessing radioactive ore deposits at a cost of $4,200,000 (around $5,360 per mile). Twelfth Semiannual 
Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, July 1952, 3. (2) When Eisenhower entered office, U.S. uranium 
procurement stood at 2,900 total tons each year (990 from the United States, 225 from Canada, and 1,685 
from overseas). When Ike left office, that tonnage stood at 34,580 per year (16,565 from the United States, 
13,445 from Canada, and 4,570 from overseas). 
22 To emphasize the importance of radioactive ores, in 1953, Commissioner Thomas E. Murray claimed in 
a commencement address, “To my mind (to paraphrase Churchill), never was so much owed by so many to 
such a small amount of material [uranium] – deployed in the defense of freedom – material which the 
world was unaware of, so short a time ago, as when you graduates were in grammar school.” DDEL, White 
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After World War II ended, the United States attempted to transition its nuclear 
program from the Manhattan Project into the postwar with the Atomic Energy Act of 
1946. Senator Brien McMahon introduced the bill in late 1945 and President Truman 
signed it into law on 1 August 1946 (the law went into effect on 1 January 1947). 
Principally, the Atomic Energy Act (also known as the McMahon Act) sought to 
establish civilian control of atomic energy in the United States and established the 
Atomic Energy Commission.23 Even with such a mission, though, the AEC remained 
devoted to and heavily influenced by the military for much of the Truman and 
Eisenhower presidencies. The official AEC history of the period from 1947-1952 
described how the nation transitioned from the secretive Manhattan Program, 
“completely isolated from the rest of American Life,” into the AEC of 1952 where 
“hundreds of nuclear scientists were receiving financial support from the Commission for 
research in their own laboratories, and private industry was beginning to take an active 
part in developing nuclear power.” Agency historians assert that, over the time period, an 
“inexorable shift [occurred] in the Commission’s aims from the idealistic, hopeful 
anticipation of the peaceful atom to the grim realization that for reasons of national 
security atomic energy would have to continue to bear the image of war.” In testament to 
that assertion, U.S. nuclear weapons research accelerated over Truman’s presidency 
(twenty-six of the thirty-one U.S. nuclear weapon tests from 1946-1952 occurred 
between 1951-1952). The U.S. nuclear program began with a focus on war as the 
                                                                                                                                            
House Central Files, Official File, Box 213, Folder 8, Commencement Address by Thomas E. Murray at 
Seattle University, Seattle, WA, 29 May 1953, 2. 
23 All citations from the previous paragraph, other than the Einstein-Roosevelt correspondence, can be 
found here: Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., The New World, 1939/1946: Volume I of a 
History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (University Park: The Pennsylvania University 
Press, 1962), 5-7. Full text of the McMahon Bill/Atomic Energy Act of 1946 can be found pages 714-722. 
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Manhattan Project and remained devoted to developing nuclear weapons on the eve of 
Eisenhower’s election.24 As further evidence of this fact, President Eisenhower even said 
on the campaign trail in 1952 that the first responsibility of the AEC remained, in his 
mind, to “improve the atomic arsenal.”25 
 Other evidence for the military focus of atomic decision makers is easily seen in 
nuclear power production. For example, the world’s first civilian nuclear power reactor, a 
60,000-kilowatt plant located in Shppingport, Pennsylvania, did not go online until 
1957.26 On the other hand, military nuclear reactors had progressed much more quickly, 
as President Truman blessed the keel laying of the USS Nautilus, the world’s first nuclear 
submarine, in 1952.27 The Nautilus’ maiden voyage occurred in January 1955, going 
25,000 miles its first year, and by July 1957 the submarine had traveled more than 62,000 
miles without refueling, over 36,000 of those submerged. A conventionally powered 
submarine would have required more than two million gallons of diesel fuel to 
accomplish such a feat—“enough to fill 217 tank cars making a train more than 1½ miles 
long.”28 Civilian nuclear reactors remained on a “horizon […] far away” for Truman’s 
                                                
24 The book contended the AEC Commissioners saw the nation’s nuclear arsenal as an “atomic shield” 
against the dangers of the world. This can be seen, for example, in the title of Chapter Fifteen—“Science: 
Shield of the Free World?” Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield, 1947/1952: Volume II 
of A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (University Park: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1969), xiii, xiv, 672-673. 
25 DDEL, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President, Ann Whitman File, Campaign Series, Box 6, Folder 
Atomic Energy, “General Principles Regarding Atomic Energy Development,” 1. 
26 Twenty-fourth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, July 1958, 79-80. 
27 Truman claimed, “Her engines will not burn oil, or coal. The heat in her boilers will be created by the 
same force that heats the sun – the energy released by atomic fission, the breaking-apart of the basic matter 
of the universe.” Moreover, he expressed hope for the future, saying, “This vessel is the forerunner of 
atomic-powered merchant ships and airplanes, of atomic power plants producing electricity for factories, 
farms and homes.” HSTL, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Official File, Box 1527, Folder OF 692-A Atomic 
Bomb, Address by President at the Keel Laying of the First Atomic Submarine at Groton, Connecticut, 14 
June 1952 
28 Nineteenth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, January 1956, 40. Twenty-second 
Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, July 1957, 48, 60. 
 
 17 
presidency with significant issues of cost in comparison to conventional power plants.29 
Military reactors, in comparison, progressed much more quickly.30 
 Over Eisenhower’s presidency similar trends concerning the military nature of the 
nuclear complex continued, but Eisenhower era officials did make more of an effort to 
find and implement peaceful uses of atomic energy. Previous efforts existed toward 
beating the atomic sword into a plowshare, but Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” program 
advanced such plans.31 In a speech before the United Nations in December 1953, 
Eisenhower asserted, “It is not enough to take this weapon out of the hands of the 
soldiers. It must be put into the hands of those who will know how to strip its military 
casing and adapt it to the arts of peace.”32 Moreover, both his work on establishing an 
International Atomic Energy Agency and talks about nuclear test cessation reinforce that, 
while he certainly was not dovish, Eisenhower did not intend for the United States to be 
                                                
29 HSTL, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Official File, Box 1529, Folder 692-B (Mar.-Sept. 1950), Remarks of 
Commissioner Gordon Dean at New York University, “Horizons for Atomic Energy,” 11 January 1950, 7. 
Fifteenth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, January 1954, 17. 
30 For another example of the time and research devoted to military reactors, see the work on nuclear-
powered aircraft. The project continued during most all of President Eisenhower’s term, even though, in 
April 1953, Secretary of Defense Charles Erwin Wilson ordered the program cancelled and subsequently 
called the nuclear plane a “shitepoke.” “Shitepoke” is a colloquial name for a heron, so called for their 
tendency to defecate when scared into flight. HSTL, Papers of David D. Lloyd, General Correspondence 
File, Box 4, Folder Atomic Energy Commission, Chronology on Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Program 
(ANP), 21 July 1959. Between 1946 and 1961, between 1946 and 1961, even with no viable airplane ever 
in sight, the U.S. military and Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) spent around a billion dollars on the 
project. When all the expenditures were calculated in 1996 dollars, the tally topped $7 billion. Atomic 
Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons since 1940, Stephen I. Schwartz, ed. 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 1998), 123. 
31 The idea that nuclear energy might be used in peaceful endeavors was not new to Eisenhower, of course. 
For example, in a late 1952 debate the United Kingdom‘s Minister of Works, David Eccles, coined the idea 
of “plutonium into plowshares.” DDEL, Papers as President, Ann Whitman File, Speech Series, Box 5, 
Folder United Nations Speech 8 Dec 1953 (2), Intelligence Report No. 6500, “Official Foreign Reactions to 
President Eisenhower’s Speech of December 8, 1953,” 2. Project Plowshare took its name from the Bible 
(New International Version translation) verse Micah 4:3, which reads, “He will judge between many 
peoples and will settle disputes for strong nations far and wide. They will beat their swords into plowshares 
and their spears into pruning hooks. Nation will not take up sword against nation, nor will they train for war 
anymore.” 
32 DDEL, Papers as President, Ann Whitman File, Speech Series, Box 5, Folder United Nations Speech 8 
Dec 1953 (1), “Atomic Power for Peace,” An Address by President Eisenhower before The General 
Assembly of the United Nations, 8 December 1953, 11.  
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entirely a war hawk with its nuclear program. And yet Eisenhower’s presidency remains 
complicated. Only a few months after Eisenhower’s 1953 address on Atoms for Peace the 
United States detonated an unexpectedly powerful, hugely destructive thermonuclear 
weapon in the Pacific that manifestly altered the world’s thoughts on the destructiveness 
of splitting the atom.33 Eisenhower-era policymakers may have ardently believed in 
discovering and promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy, but they also worked hard 
to improve the destructive potential of nuclear weapons.34  
 Since so much of the history of the nuclear complex is fundamentally about U.S. 
efforts at developing military technologies, supplementing previously described scholarly 
works is a recent proliferation of historical literature on warfare and the environment that 
more broadly provides an intellectual framework for this dissertation. Edmund Russell’s 
War and Nature prompted this explosion of study and argued for a coevolution of 
military and environmental factors over the twentieth century.35 Other works, like 
William Tsutsui’s “Landscapes in the Dark Valley” have more specifically probed the 
historical intersection of nuclear weapons, warfare, and the natural world.36 In general, 
                                                
33 On popular opinion and that massive thermonuclear test, the 1 March 1954 Castle Bravo test shot, see 
contemporary newspaper articles that described how a Japanese fishing vessel, the Lucky Dragon, got 
swept up in the radiation from that test and how, “In any event the story seems to prove that the destructive 
potential of the hydrogen bomb has not been exaggerated.” “The Unlucky Dragon,” The Washington Post 
and Times Herald, 19 March 1954, page 28 
34 Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic 
Energy Commission (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989) Some of the most impressive parts of 
the work are its nine appendices. These more than thirty pages range from giving lists of key AEC 
personnel to showing financial data, and also include flow charts on organization and the eight basic 
nuclear reactor systems developed. Pages 569-592. 
35 Edmund Russell, War and Nature: Fighting Humans and Insects with Chemicals from World War I to 
Silent Spring (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 
36 Wartime Japan often was called the “dark valley” (黒い谷間—kuroi tanima), “a time of extreme 
deprivation and suffering.” Tsutsui’s essay tried to come to grips with that idea and argued, “Gaining a 
fuller understanding of Japan’s complex and compelling wartime experience demands that closer attention 
be paid to the environmental policies, costs, and consequences of World War II.” William M. Tsutsui, 
“Landscapes in the Dark Valley: Toward an Environmental History of Wartime Japan,” in Natural Enemy, 
Natural Ally: Toward an Environmental History of War, edited by Richard P. Tucker and Edmund Russell, 
(Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 2004), 195-196. 
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historians have reminded scholars of something that generals and foot soldiers alike have 
known for millennia—the natural world matters in warfare and must be taken seriously 
when conducting military history. Moreover, these scholarly works well demonstrate that 
times of war provide particularly brilliant flashpoints for understanding the intersection 
of humans, societies, and the natural world.37 This dissertation adds to that literature by 
showing the importance of societal structures in the history of war and environment and 
attempting to broaden what that field studies. Before militaries ever get into the field, 
societies have made conscious decisions to organize their resources—human, natural, and 
economic—toward the purpose of making war (or at least being prepared to do so). We 
would be remiss if we did not study the processes by which that societal organization 
occurred and probe into the structures built for such purposes.  
 In addition to issues of policy, the nuclear complex, warfare, and the environment, 
this dissertation is also informed by questions about the nature of human interaction with 
technology. Official Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) historians Richard Hewlett and 
Oscar Anderson, Jr. claimed in 1962, “No other development in our lifetime has been 
fraught with such consequences for good or evil as has atomic fission.”38 Of course, like 
                                                
37 In addition, this dissertation is particularly influenced by several other works concerning historical 
dimensions of war and the environment, including the full volume of Tucker and Russell’s Natural Enemy, 
Natural Ally and also: J.R. McNeill, “Woods and Warfare in World History,” Environmental History, Vol. 
9, No. 3 (Jul. 2004); Lisa M. Brady, “The Wilderness of War: Nature and Strategy in the American Civil 
War.” Environmental History, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Jul., 2005); Chris Pearson, Scarred Landscapes: War and 
Nature in Vichy France (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); J. R. McNeill and Corinna R. Unger, eds., 
Environmental Histories of the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Chris Pearson, 
Peter Coates, and Tim Cole, eds., Militarized Landscapes: From Gettysburg to Salisbury Plain (New York: 
Continuum, 2010); Lisa M. Brady, War Upon the Land: Military Strategy and the Transformation of 
Southern Landscapes During the American Civil War (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2012) 
38 Hewlett and Anderson, Jr., The New World, 1939/1946, ix. Of course, Jacques Ellul claimed that atomic 
energy, atomic weapons in particular, were neither good nor evil, but instead “necessary” due to the fact 
that the technology existed. He wrote, “It was, then, necessary to pass through the period of research which 
culminated in the bomb before proceeding to its normal sequel, atomic motive power. The atomic-bomb 
period is a transitory, but unfortunately necessary, stage in the general evolution of this technique. In the 
interim period represented by the bomb, the professor, finding himself with so powerful an instrument, is 
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any piece of technology, the determination whether splitting the atom has been a force for 
good or a force for evil certainly is in the eye of the beholder. Technology is, in its 
essence, entangled with culture and society in ways not commonly understood. As early 
as 1934, scholar Lewis Mumford declared that understanding technology “is not merely a 
first step toward re-orienting our civilization: it is also a means toward understanding 
society and toward knowing ourselves.”39 Mumford’s most influential contribution has 
thus likely been his “insistence on technics as an expression of human personality.”40 
Mumford wrote before the creation of atomic weapons, and in light of such developments 
his proclamations can take on a very disheartening tone. No less optimistic, other authors 
have been much more circumspect about the place of technology in society, variously 
wondering whether machines have eroded moral values, dominated our decision making, 
or even run out of control and molded our societies.41 
                                                                                                                                            
led to use it. Why? Because everything which is technique is necessarily used as soon as it is available, 
without distinction of good or evil. This is the principal law of our age. We may quote here Jacques 
Soustelle’s well-known remark of May, 1960, in reference to the atomic bomb. It expresses the deep 
feeling of us all: ‘Since it was possible, it was necessary.’ Really a master phrase for all technical 
evolution.” Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, Trans. John Wilkinson (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 
1964), 98-99. 
39 Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1934), 6. Of 
course, reviewer Rosalind Williams said that, while she used to like Technics and Civilization, upon 
rereading the work she decided, “Flashes of brilliant insight were nearly obscured by billowing clouds of 
pompous oratory, unsupportable generalizations, and smug self-absorption.” Moreover, after learning 
something about Mumford’s personal life, she thought, “I can no longer read the passages in Technics and 
Civilization that run on and on about ‘life insurgent’ as the creative force in history without recalling that 
Mumford justified his affair with Catherine Bauer as a period of disequilibrium necessary for him to 
achieve a new synthesis in his own life.” Rosalind Williams, “Classics Revisited: Lewis Mumford’s 
Technics and Civilization,” Technology and Culture, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Jan., 2002), 139-140. 
40 Williams, “Classics Revisited,” 140. 
41 Jacques Ellul postulated some of these ideas in his seminal The Technological Society. He focused on 
“technique,” or “the totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency (for a given 
stage of development) in every field of human activity,” finding that we are bound by technology like 
primitive humans were by rites and taboos. In fact, we are conditioned by the “technological civilization,” 
living in a world where “the most dangerous form of determinism is the technological phenomenon.” Ellul, 
The Technological Society, xxv, xxix, xxiii. Langdon Winner continued these ruminations with three 
principal ideas: 1) technology is not a neutral tool; 2) humans become slaves to technology as they create 
societal structures to house this technology; 3) humans become adapted and adapt societies to technologies 
(not vice-versa). In this way, we humans lose control of our own tools and are variously dominated by 
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It is clear, however, that science, with technology among its products, is what 
humans make of it.42 Put succinctly, science and technology are interrelated, and the 
effects of technology typically are socially constructed and dependent on human 
decisions.43 Thus while Charles Perrow has claimed that some technologies are simply 
too dangerous too exist and will inevitably cause accidents, a better way to think about 
technology, especially atomic energy and its uses, is to consider these not to be dangerous 
in and of themselves, but instead only dangerous when humans themselves are.44 The 
nuclear complex provides some of the more spectacular examples of technology humans 
                                                                                                                                            
these. Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-Out-of-Control as a Theme in Political 
Thought (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977) 
42 Spencer Weart claimed that his book, Scientists in Power, was about “the relationship within society 
between knowledge and power,” and yet even if “Knowledge is power […] in our times the scientists who 
discover knowledge seldom control the power that results.” Spencer R. Weart, Scientists in Power 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), vii, 271. Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch elaborated on these 
ideas in The Golem and The Golem at Large. They said science is like the Jewish golem. Humans create 
science and it mostly follows our orders while growing a bit more powerful each day, but sometimes it can 
become a problem. They eventually decided that science “is not an evil creature but it is a little daft.” Harry 
Collins and Trevor Pinch, The Golem: What You Should Know About Science, Second Edition (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993, 1998), 1-2. In this way, technology is the practical result of science 
within a society. “But science cannot rescue technology from its doubts. The complexities of technology 
are the same as those that prevent science itself from delivering absolutes; an experimental apparatus is a 
piece of technology and, looked at closely, the conditions seem as wild inside the lab as outside.” Harry 
Collins and Trevor Pinch, The Golem at Large: What You Should Know About Technology (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 3. 
43 See Bijker’s Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs on “the interlaced character of hitherto separate domains 
such as technology and society.” Wiebe E. Bijker, Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs: Toward a Theory of 
Sociotechnical Change (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), ix. Also see Pacey’s Meaning in Technology, 
which argued that “a person’s ideals and values in relation to technology are an outcome of her or his sense 
of the purpose and meaning of life.” Arnold Pacey, Meaning in Technology (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), 
3. Moreover, whether a piece of technology “succeeds” or “fails” is not “inherent in hardware but 
constructed by contingent social conditions.” Kenneth Lipartito, “Picturephone and the Information Age: 
The Social Meaning of Failure,” Technology and Culture, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Jan. 2003), 52. 
44 Perrow argued, “As our technology expands, as our wars multiply, as we invade more and more of 
nature, we create systems—organizations, and the organization of organizations—that increase the risks for 
the operators, passengers, innocent bystanders, and for future generations.” He continued by saying that no 
matter how many safeguards we include, “there is a form of accident that is inevitable.” Charles Perrow, 
Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1984), 3. And yet, 
this tome on technology and risk assessment suffered from a flaw in conception, as Perrow ignored many 
technologies that are likely more dangerous over longer time periods—such as driving a car or eating food 
from a deep fat fryer—and instead focused on highly charismatic and exotic technologies such as nuclear 
power. Human life, in general, is a risky proposition, and while some technological systems may be so 
complex that they are ultimately somewhat likely to fail due to human error, a much greater percentage of 
automobile drivers will perish over their lifetimes than nuclear power users. 
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have created and thus serves as an excellent example to probe how technology interacts 
with human societies. This dissertation attempts to uncover more about how humans 
relate to the environment, technology, and each other.45  
 Chapter One looks at the interplay between U.S. nuclear testing and 
environmental science. It argues that knowledge about the natural world played an 
integral role in how those tests transpired, but has not been recognized as such. More 
importantly, testing nuclear weapons caused executive policymakers to think more 
deeply about the environment and forced them to better integrate the natural world into 
their plans. Policymakers at the time understood the importance of the environment to 
nuclear tests even if they would not have always articulated their thoughts that way. 
Instead, these men talked about their concern for the weather and how tests affected and 
were affected by meteorological phenomena. Other concerns focused on the environs 
surrounding testing sites, especially animals and fish in the area. Knowledge about the 
environment thus proved crucial in U.S. testing. Decision makers did not show a desire to 
protect the environment absolutely when testing, but their actions do demonstrate an 
understanding of the relationship between the natural world and scientific research within 
the context of nuclear research and development. 
 The second chapter considers nuclear fallout. Humans discovered the 
phenomenon of radioactive fallout after the world’s very first atomic blast at Trinity, but 
did not prove particularly concerned about it. The chapter shows that care and attention 
                                                
45 For more on the intersection of technology and the environment, sometimes called “Envirotech,” see: 
Martin Reuss and Stephen H. Cutcliffe, eds., The Illusory Boundary: Environment and Technology in 
History (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2010); Richard White, The Organic Machine: The 
Remaking of the Columbia River (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995); Edmund Russell, “The Garden in the 
Machine: Toward an Evolutionary History of Technology,” in Industrializing Organisms: Introducing 
Evolutionary History, ed. Susan R. Schrepfer and Philip Scranton (New York: Routledge, 2004) 
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did increase over time, though, especially after two particularly dirty nuclear bomb 
tests— the 1953 “Harry” test shot during Operation Upshot-Knothole and the 1954 
“Bravo” test shot during Operation Castle. As their considerations increased, so too did 
policymakers’ desires to control public understanding. The chapter contends that the 
ultimate lesson of nuclear fallout at this time, however, was that U.S. nuclear tests 
functioned as an integrated, massively uncontrolled, de facto experiment on the effects of 
radiation on ecosystems and human bodies. Officials did not recognize that experiment at 
the time. But by spewing radiation into the atmosphere, tracking the fallout as it came 
back down to the planet’s surface, and then studying the radiation’s effects after it 
entered ecosystems and human diets, policymakers nonetheless effectively sponsored 
such an investigation. In doing so, these unknowing experimenters greatly affected U.S. 
atomic policy and public responses to it. 
 Chapter Three looks at the culmination of events explored in the first two 
chapters—nuclear tests and the fallout these produced—and chronicles the international 
nuclear test cessation treaty talks conducted during the Eisenhower presidency. While the 
1963 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty that banned all tests in the atmosphere, outer space, 
and underwater is much better known, earlier talks proved critical to that agreement ever 
getting penned. Moreover, though the fact has gone mostly unnoticed, the environment 
and environmental science played crucial roles in these earlier talks. This chapter argues 
that worries about environmental contamination helped create a need for the talks, and 
the need for improved environmental knowledge became one of the primary negotiating 
strategies. Concerns about the natural world and knowledge about it thus mattered a great 
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deal in the talks, but have not been given their due notice by previous historians. This 
chapter seeks to correct that. 
 Chapter Four steps away from nuclear weapons of any sort and delves into how 
nuclear energy affected policymakers’ considerations of agriculture. In showing how 
decision makers understood the relationship between the atom and agriculture, the 
chapter argues that atomic agriculture proved important to top decision makers because it 
gave them a chance to prove that nuclear energy did not necessarily mean nuclear 
weapons. Officials believed that agriculture could function as a completely peaceful 
vehicle for nuclear developments, both improving the nation and helping to feed the 
world as part of the Green Revolution. Decision makers wanted the public to think of 
such technological progress as hope for the future and not the red horse rider of the 
Apocalypse.  
 The fifth and final chapter studies understandings about nuclear waste disposal 
practices. Seeking less to chronicle those methods and more to explain a way of thinking, 
the chapter shows that policymakers did indeed care about radiation from radioactive 
waste and the environments into which that waste went, but did so in a manner consistent 
with contemporary understandings and practices of waste disposal. Fundamentally, 
concern about radiation from waste products occurred only after a default position 
typically declared that radioactive waste should be put into the environment somehow. 
Decision makers tended to think about nuclear waste just like they did any other refuse, 
except with the added problem of radiation. While those in positions of power did work 
to balance human and environmental health with the need to get rid of radioactive waste, 
they did so within an older framework of thinking about garbage that they could not 
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change. Moreover, understanding how decision makers thought about nuclear waste 
provides a window into waste disposal more generally and highlights an “out of sight, out 
of mind” mentality that did not fit a newer nuclear paradigm. 
The conclusion, finally, revisits ideas about environmentalism, policymakers, and 
the nuclear complex. Once the reader reaches that point, however, it should already be 
clear that there is much more to the story of decision making about the environment and 
nuclear complex than has been told previously. It is easy to think that the environment 
and scientific understandings of it play little to no role in political and military decisions, 
but the nuclear complex shows that, at least in this case, such an interpretation is not 
accurate. Simply put, this dissertation, as part environmental history, part policy history, 
and part history of science and technology, charts a developing sensitivity to the 
intersection between the environment and the nuclear complex among mid-century U.S. 
policymakers. Environmental science was a crucial part of the nuclear complex during 
the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, especially in the minds of policymakers, 
and must be understood as such for us to best grasp what the nuclear complex meant for 
society then and today. 
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Chapter One 
Whether the Weather: 
Nuclear Testing and the Natural World 
 
“At the appointed time, there was a blinding flash lighting up the whole area brighter than 
the brightest daylight. A mountain range three miles from the observation point stood out 
in bold relief. Then came a tremendous sustained roar and a heavy pressure wave which 
knocked down two men outside the control center. Immediately thereafter, a huge multi-
colored surging cloud boiled to an altitude of over 40,000 feet. Clouds in its patch 
disappeared. Soon the shifting substratosphere winds dispersed the now grey mass.” 
 
 —U.S. War Department description of the first atomic bomb detonation1 
 
 
 At 5:30 in the morning on 16 July 1945, humans first harnessed the power of the 
atom in the form of a bomb. The test occurred at a “remote section” of the Alamogordo 
Air Base in New Mexico, well away from the public. One U.S. War Department press 
release described how, before the test, “Darkening heavens, pouring forth rain and 
lightning immediately up to the zero hour, heightened the drama.” That release also 
explained that the “ominous weather which had dogged the assembly of the bomb had a 
very sobering effect on the assembled experts whose work was accomplished amid 
lightning flashes and peals of thunder. The weather, unusual and upsetting, blocked out 
aerial observation of the test.” Thus, even though there was not “assurance of favorable 
weather,” the first atomic detonation occurred as scheduled.2 The actual test itself 
(Figures 3 and 4) presented a terrifyingly striking and yet fascinatingly horrible spectacle, 
as the War Department’s description attested.3 
                                                
1 HSTL, Papers of Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files, Box 174, Folder Atomic Bomb, Press Releases [1 
of 3], War Department Press Release on New Mexico Test Site, 3. 
2 Historian Ferenc Szasz even went as far to say, “If one examines the list of desired ideal weather 
conditions gathered from the group leaders and compares them with the actual conditions at the time of the 
July 16 shot, the contrast is striking.” Ferenc M. Szasz, The Day the Sun Rose Twice: The Story of the 
Trinity Nuclear Explosion, July 16, 1945 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1985), 77-78. 
3 HSTL, Papers of Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files, Box 174, Folder Atomic Bomb, Press Releases [1 
of 3], War Department Press Release on New Mexico Test Site, 1-3. 
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From the very outset, then, natural forces played a considerable role in U.S. 
nuclear tests. Historian Ferenc M. Szasz claimed that scientists turned the entire Los 
Alamos Trinity site into “a sprawling, open-air scientific laboratory,” melding science 
and environment into an indistinguishable mass.4 The official War Department public 
release described the blast in relation to the natural world, particularly mentioning the 
weather and the mountains as a natural setting. In fact, weather had been a significant 
factor in the tests because summer thunderstorms could come upon the site so quickly 
and unexpectedly. Jack M. Hubbard, the chief meteorologist for the project, described 
how the operation date was “set from above,” and after that it became necessary to tailor 
the experiment to the expected wind and weather conditions. Moreover, questions existed 
about whether a blast would produce rain or affect the winds.5 Future nuclear tests would 
also influence and be influenced by the natural world. 
 This chapter probes the connections between executive decision making, 
understandings of the natural world, and nuclear weapons tests. In doing so it shows how 
the testing process inculcated a greater awareness among policymakers of the 
interconnection between the environment, science about it, and nuclear weapons testing, 
forcing them to think more deeply about natural factors in the context of testing their 
nuclear bombs. While this did not create a modern environmentalist ethos within 
executive decision makers, the interplay between the environment, scientific research, 
and national security did coalesce into a program of nuclear research and development 
that forced policymakers to consider the natural world when making their plans. When 
the United States conducted atomic bomb trials, environmental conditions not only 
                                                
4 Szasz, The Day the Sun Rose Twice, 5. 
5 Szasz, The Day the Sun Rose Twice, 67-74. 
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affected how those tests transpired, but also helped shape the scientific and political 
understandings produced by testing. Geology, geography, prevailing winds, and other 
natural features played a role in site selection, and the evidence of the different ways 
bombs affected the lithosphere, hydrosphere, and atmosphere not only influenced 
knowledge production, but also how military and political policymakers perceived and 
processed that information. Weather and prevailing winds proved particularly important 
and affected determinations about when and how tests could take place. Testing also 
created anxieties that the tests themselves might affect meteorological phenomena. Other 
concerns centered on what the tests did to the surrounding flora and fauna, particularly 
mammals and fish in the area. In short, the history of how the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC) tested the United States’ nuclear arsenal demonstrates a connection 
between environmental science and nuclear bombs. Though historians have not noticed, 
U.S. nuclear testing is better understood when situated within an understanding of its 
relationship with the natural world and scientific understandings of it. 
U.S. atomic weapons testing is typically understood as nothing but an 
environmental menace, and scholars have frequently mistaken lack of concern for 
environmental wellbeing for lack of attention paid to the natural world. For example, 
Historians Mark D. Merlin and Ricardo M. Gonzalez claimed, “most, if not all, [U.S. 
tests in the Pacific Ocean] were initiated with explicit political intention, often with little 
regard for the ecological consequences.”6 But such assertions run contrary to significant 
                                                
6 Merlin and Gonzalez provide a catalog of both short and long-term, “direct and indirect atmospheric, 
geological, and ecological effects of nuclear testing in Remote Oceania.” These included obvious effects 
like atmospheric fallout and large bomb craters, but also lesser-known issues like how a large piece of coral 
reef broke off sometime between 1952-1958. Mark D. Merlin and Ricardo M. Gonzalez, “Environmental 
Impacts of Nuclear Testing in Remote Oceania, 1946-1996,” in Environmental Histories of the Cold War, 
J. R. McNeill and Corinna R. Unger, eds., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 167. 
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attention paid to environmental factors—meteorology, geology, ecology, biology, etc.—
of areas in which tests occurred. Merlin and Gonzalez, like many historians before them, 
made a judgment based on the fact that U.S. officials did not have values similar to them 
about how policymakers should have protected the natural world from nuclear tests. It is 
not that the United States, in their words, had “little regard for the ecological 
consequences.” To the contrary, U.S. policymakers certainly cared about how tests might 
affect local ecology—those policymakers just did not prioritize environmental or 
ecological health. This chapter fundamentally argues that understanding how executive 
decision makers incorporated environmental understandings into their testing plans may 
not reveal a desire to protect the natural world, but it does show that environmental 
knowledge affected U.S. testing plans and mediated how bureaucrats interpreted those 
tests. 
The natural world also played a significant role in producing the science 
understandings necessary for splitting the atom. Mark Fiege has argued that, before the 
United States ever detonated its first atomic bomb, atomic scientists held an “intense 
fascination with nature” that helped inspire them to produce the prerequisite knowledge 
necessary for creating the atomic bomb. Contrary to what popular opinion may be, Fiege 
claimed that this knowledge production was not merely “heartless men in white coats 
calculating on chalkboards and experimenting in laboratories.” Instead, the scientists who 
worked on the Manhattan Project held a reverence for nature and frequently spent time 
out in the natural world hiking and reflecting. Fiege chronicled how these men’s 
childhoods and adult experiences in the natural world heavily influenced and inspired 
their scientific research and demonstrated that “the nation’s atomic project, especially the 
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bomb, was deeply embedded in the human relationship to nature.”7 Connections between 
the bomb and the natural world did not end with the Manhattan Project, though, and 
instead continued throughout the history of the weapons, especially evident in U.S. 
testing.  
Somewhat of a paradox exists in the history of nuclear weapons—although the 
most well-known nuclear blasts occurred during World War II, the bulk of atomic 
weapon detonations occurred as tests during times of relative peace. By the time World 
War II ended, the United States had detonated the world’s second and third nuclear 
bombs.8 President Truman learned of the first of these from a telegram, which informed 
him that reports on the “Big bomb dropped on Hiroshima […] indicate complete success 
which was even more conspicuous than earlier test.”9 Of course, no matter how 
destructive these bombs were, they were not in actuality tests—the United States dropped 
these bombs as acts of war.10 In the succeeding years, the U.S. continued to test nuclear 
weapons to maintain and increase its nuclear superiority over the rest of the world, 
particularly the Soviet Union. The Soviets tested their first nuclear bomb in 1949, and 
                                                
7 Mark Fiege, “The Atomic Scientists, the Sense of Wonder, and the Bomb,” Environmental History, Vol. 
12, No. 3 (Jul. 2007), 578, 580, 584. 
8 On the decision to drop nuclear bombs on Japan, see Walker’s Prompt and Utter Destruction. Walker 
argues, “In fact, however, Truman never faced a categorical choice between the bomb and an invasion that 
would cost hundreds of thousands of American lives.” Instead, the book claims Truman had five 
fundamental considerations in using the atomic bomb in warfare: 1) a commitment to end the war as soon 
as possible; 2) the need to justify the effort and expense of making the bombs; 3) desire to achieve 
diplomatic edge in the growing rivalry with Soviets; 4) a lack of incentives to not use the bomb; 5) a hatred 
of Japanese and desire for vengeance. J. Samuel Walker, Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the 
Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997, 2004), 5, 92-
96. 
9 HSTL, Papers of George M. Elsey, Box 113, Telegram from Secretary of War to President, 6 August 
1945 
10 Some of the earliest appraisals of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki can be found 
here in the Strategic Bombing Survey. Most striking in it are the photographs of destruction wrought. 
HSTL, White House Central Files, Confidential Files, Box 4, Folder Atomic bomb and energy aug 45 to 
nov 49, 1 of 2, The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, 30 June 1946 
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after that U.S. testing became even more imperative from a military perspective.11 U.S. 
nuclear tests occurred primarily at two locations—in the U.S. Southwest, like the world’s 
first tests, and at Pacific Ocean locations near the Marshall Islands (about 2,000 miles 
southwest of Hawaii). Those tests in the Pacific Ocean caused issues in the United States 
before they were even conducted.  
Early concerns from about the United States’ first postwar tests were particularly 
manifested in fears of environmental damage. In November 1945, Congressman Schuyler 
Otis Bland (D-VA), chairman of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and 
Fisheries, sent a letter to President Truman expressing concern about possible 
environmental damage from planned tests both underwater and in the air above the 
Pacific (these tests eventually would be conducted in the summer of 1946 as Operation 
Crossroads). Bland worried that the experiments could carry “serious implications with 
regard to commercial fisheries” and destroy not only incredible amounts of fish, but 
perhaps whole fisheries. He continued, “Moreover, because of oceanic circulation the 
effects of any induced radioactivity might easily cause great harm to the aquatic 
resources over wide areas.” Therefore, Bland thought the War, State, and Navy 
Departments should contact the Department of the Interior to ensure that the selected 
testing locations would ensure as little damage as possible. He argued that Interior 
representatives should participate and view the effects of tests on marine life. Bland 
ended by saying that he could “see that an immense damage may be done if proper 
protection is not afforded the fisheries, and I sincerely trust that everything possible may 
                                                
11 As scholar Marek Thee has argued, “The history of the nuclear arms race is intimately interrelated with 
the systematic testing of nuclear weapons.” Marek Thee, “The Pursuit of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test 
Ban,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Mar., 1988), 15. 
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be done to protect the fisheries of the world.”12 Truman responded the next day with 
thanks for Bland’s letter, explaining that such tests were “only in the conversation stage 
so far.” The President also assured Bland that “every precaution will be taken if the 
experiment does take place to prevent any undue injuries to fish.”13 This statement, of 
course, makes us question exactly what sort of injuries the fish were due so that undue 
harm could be avoided. 
Beyond concerns expressed in an official capacity, outcries appeared from both 
the public and Congress in opposition to U.S. tests on environmental and moral grounds. 
One newspaper article, titled, “Smoke From Vesuvius,” suggested possible disaster by 
describing how, “the atomic volcano over which the world lives is rumbling and 
smouldering.”14 Others, like a Mrs. M. Conan, wrote to Truman fretting over the possible 
damage to fish and the possibility that an atomic blast at sea might produce a tidal 
wave.15 Many other critics worried less about potential harm to pelagic fishing and more 
about the ethical problems associated with using animals as test subjects during nuclear 
weapons testing. An example of that concern can be seen in a letter from Congressman 
Vaughn Gary (D-VA) to the President.16 No matter why they protested, it is clear that 
                                                
12 HSTL, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Official File, Box 1527, Folder 692-A MISCELLANEOUS (Apr.-
Oct. 1945), Letter Schuyler Otis Bland to Truman, 24 November 1945 
13 HSTL, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Official File, Box 1527, Folder 692-A MISCELLANEOUS (Apr.-
Oct. 1945), Letter Truman to Bland, 26 November 1945 
14 HSTL, Papers of Clark Clifford, Subject File, 1945-54, Box 1, Folder Atomic Energy--Newspaper 
clippings and Releases, “Smoke From Vesuvius,” Dayton News, 20 April 1948 
15 HSTL, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Official File, Box 1528, 692-A Miscellaneous (Jan.-Apr. 1946), 
Letter Mrs. M. Conan to Truman, 3 April 1946 Mrs. Conan’s letter also contained vicious anti-communist 
sentiment, saying, “America you can’t make a pet out of communism. You will get badly stung if you try 
it! Communism is the anti-Christ.” She held up God as the best way to defeat communist threats. 
16 All in HSTL, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Official File, Box 1528, Folder 692-A Miscellaneous (May-
Dec. 1946), see: Letter Vaughn Gary to President, 17 June 1946, Letter R. Maxwell Bradner to President, 2 
July 1946, Letter Rolf Kreitz to President, 2 July 1946, Letter Walter G. Gleassen to President, 9 July 1946. 
Several of these letters used explicitly religious reasoning for being against the use of animals during 
testing. Similar protestations against animals used during nuclear testing also occurred during the 
Eisenhower presidency. In particular, an article in the Denver Post about the AEC Division of Biology and 
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many U.S. citizens outside the executive branch expressed concerns to President Truman 
about how nuclear bomb tests would harm the surrounding biota and insisted that testing 
stop or be altered in order to minimize any possible damage. 
In July 1946, in spite of such protest directed at the President, the United States 
did conduct its first postwar nuclear tests when it detonated two bombs in the Pacific 
Ocean on the Bikini Atoll, a small lagoon in the Marshall Island chain and the namesake 
of bikini-style bathing suits.17 Testers intended for this series, Operation Crossroads, to 
help show what a nuclear blast would do to ships and their crews, and therefore had ships 
docked in the atoll’s lagoon, spread out at pre-determined distances. In addition to 
allowing the United States to conduct oceanic tests, Bikini also had the advantage of 
being several thousand miles away from the U.S. mainland. The first test of this 
Crossroads series, detonated on 1 July, was codenamed “Able” (Figures 5 and 6). By all 
accounts, this detonation went mostly as planned, other than going off 1,500-2,000 feet 
west of the assigned target. Its intensity “approached the best of the three previous atomic 
bombs,” and it went off at the planned altitude, a few hundred feet above the sea. Many 
of the ships surrounding the blast showed considerable damage. Exposed personnel on 
those ships (had there been any) would have experienced high casualties, but those 
sheltered “would not have been immediately incapacitated by burns alone” no matter 
what happened later from the lethal doses of radiation they would have received. The 
                                                                                                                                            
Medicine using dogs for experiments elicited a great many telegrams from Colorado. DDEL, White House 
Central Files, General File, Box 1213, Folder 155 1955, Various Telegrams, 26 April 1955 
17 One of the funnier stories to come out of these tests centers around a journalist who, seeing the tests at 
Bikini that summer, asked if he had the security clearance to write about how the mushroom cloud 
produced at Alamogordo had been purple. After an argument ensued about the actual color of the cloud (it 
had been white), one of the security clearance personnel reminded the journalist that he had been wearing 
purple sun glasses the day of that test at Alamogordo. HSTL, Dean G. Acheson Papers, Box 2, Folder 
Atomic Energy, 1947-1948, Control of Atomic Energy, Address by H. Thomas Austern at NYU on 20 
March 1948, Washington Square College Alumni, 1. 
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report on test Able said, “In general no significant unexpected phenomenon occurred, 
although the test was designed to cope with considerable variation from predictions. 
There was no large water wave formed. The radioactive residue dissipated in the manner 
expected. No damage occurred on Bikini Island, about three miles from the explosion 
center.” In general, the test went well enough that evaluators claimed, “the importance of 
large-scale research has been dramatically demonstrated.”18 
Operation Crossroads also had a second test, codenamed “Baker,” held on 25 July 
that did have unexpected environmental phenomena. Baker (Figures 7, 8, and 9) was an 
underwater shot that caused gigantic waves that, even 1,000 feet from the center of the 
detonation, were 80-100 feet in height. The bigger problem, however, was the incredible 
and unexpected radiation from the test. The preliminary report on the subject to President 
Truman said, “Great quantities of radioactive water descended upon the ships from the 
column or were thrown over them by waves.” Such “highly lethal radioactive water” 
made it unsafe for any inspection teams to board the moored ships for over half a week. 
Thus, beyond the ships physically destroyed by the blast (testers used a similar setup to 
the Able shot), the surviving ships were effectively scuttled while still afloat. Telling the 
President that it was “impossible to evaluate an atomic burst in terms of conventional 
explosives,” the report generally described the Baker test as incredibly destructive. It 
summed up the radiation contamination of the ships by saying these “became radioactive 
                                                
18 HSTL, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Official File, Box 1533, Folder 692-F The President's Committee to 
Observe the Atomic Bomb Tests, Press Release of Preliminary Report on 1 July 1946 Bikini Atoll tests, 11 
July 1946 The animals that many people protested proved paramount in determining the radiation damage 
that would have been suffered by ship crews, as “Measurements of radiation intensity and a study of 
animals exposed in ships show that the initial flash of principal lethal radiations, which are gamma-rays and 
neutrons, would have killed almost all personnel normally stationed aboard the ships centered around the 
air burst and many others at greater distances.” HSTL, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Official File, Box 1527, 
Folder OF 692-A Atomic Bomb, Preliminary Report Following the Second Atomic Bomb Test, 30 July 
1946, 1. 
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stoves, and would have burned all living things aboard them with invisible and painless 
but deadly radiation.”19 
These two tests show an evolving understanding about the relationship between 
testing atomic bombs and scientific knowledge about the environment. Atomic bomb 
tests were, at their core, scientific experiments. Thus while the first test, Able, likely 
spewed radioactive materials into the air, airborne contamination went mostly 
unmentioned in reports because the experiment was not designed to measure for such. 
The radioactive water from the Baker shot, on the other hand, occupied a central place in 
analyses because its effects were readily detected within the existing experimental 
framework attempting to test for radioactive contamination of the moored ships.  
Thus the different reactions to Able and Baker show the importance of 
environmental science to test evaluations. While evaluators might have been able to 
avoid talking about a radioactive column of air or minimize its effects in their reports 
because they did not detect it, a tidal wave of radioactive water proved too much to 
ignore, as the Committee to Observe the Atomic Bomb Tests estimated the radioactive 
watery spray covered 90% of the target array (docked ships and submarines surrounding 
the blast). The Committee asserted this was the equivalent to exposing the area to “many 
hundred tons of radium.” In addition, weather played an important role in judging 
experimental results. When evaluators deemed weather conditions for the Baker shot 
were “perfect,” they made a subjective judgment about the environment directly related 
to testing. In short, nuclear tests changed how testers evaluated the weather because tests 
caused experimenters to view meteorological reports through their aims and desires for 
                                                
19 HSTL, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Official File, Box 1527, Folder OF 692-A Atomic Bomb, Preliminary 
Report Following the Second Atomic Bomb Test, 30 July 1946, 2-3. 
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nuclear tests. In addition, had weather conditions not been “perfect,” any test results 
would have been mediated through the less than perfect weather evaluation. After 
Operation Crossroads concluded, the Committee looked at the possible effects of nuclear 
bombs, especially including the nuclear tidal wave the Baker shot produced, and 
concluded, “the Bikini tests strongly indicate that future wars employing atomic bombs 
may well destroy nations and change present standards of civilization.”20 In short, 
weather, water, and air were not merely the settings for nuclear weapons testing, but 
instead became the experimental mediums through which humans understood and 
evaluated the tests’ successes, failures, and possible impact on civilization and nations. 
Of course, even though the importance of environmental knowledge to these tests 
is clear in hindsight, it does not mean that evaluators thought of either the tests or their 
reports in environmentalist terms. Instead, the assessments judged the incredible waves of 
radioactive water to be an “impressive result” of the Baker test and not necessarily an 
environmental phenomenon—the wave was more a scientific product than part of the 
natural world. The final report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared that the tests at Bikini 
“provided data essential to future military planning, giving bases for the calculation of the 
conditions under which the maximum destructive effects of an atomic explosion will be 
obtained against various types of land and water targets and against living organisms.” 
Testers had used live animals as test subjects on the moored ships during the tests, but 
even if effects on animal biology comprised an important aspect of the tests evaluators 
thought of how they were affected purely in military terms. The animals on those ships 
                                                
20 HSTL, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Official File, Box 1533, Folder 692-F The President's Committee to 
Observe the Atomic Bomb Tests, Report Carl Hatch to President, 29 July 1946, 1-3. On the Crossroads 
tests, also see HSTL, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Official File, Box 1533, Folder 692-G Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Evaluation Board, Preliminary Report Following the Second Atomic Bomb Test 
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did not necessarily represent living things, but instead future bomb targets. Just as 
bombing pilots frequently talk about “the hit,” but not necessarily the destructive 
aftermath of their bombs, test evaluators proved more concerned with effects on targets 
than they were with the natural world and creatures in it. This held true, even if listed 
among the possible peacetime values of the more than 30,000 pages of “detailed technical 
reports” were “the data relating to nuclear physics, medical phases of radiation, including 
military aspects of radiological safety, and those relating to oceanography, meteorology, 
and marine and island biology and geology.”21 To evaluators, nuclear testing sites were 
not spaces where nuclear technology interacted with the environment. Instead, they were 
open-air testing laboratories.  
The AEC’s late-1940s establishment of “a proving ground in the Pacific for 
routine experiments and tests of atomic weapons” not only showed the importance of 
testing to the Commission, but also demonstrated how policymakers increasingly 
involved environmental knowledge in their decisions about nuclear tests. The 
Commission declared that tests “must be a routine part of any weapons program,” and the 
President later approved that statement for inclusion in an AEC report.22 The required 
characteristics for test locations melded geopolitical and environmental considerations. 
One summary listed those requirements: (1) protected anchorage 6 miles in diameter; (2) 
at least 300 miles from urban areas; (3) less than 1,000 miles from a B-29 base; (4) a 
region without “violent storms”; (5) “Predictable currents of known and great lateral and 
                                                
21 HSTL, Papers of Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files, Box 176, Folder Atomic Testing, Crossroads, 
The Evaluation of the Atomic Bomb as a Military Weapon: The Final Report of the Joint Chief’s of Staff 
Evaluation Board for Operation Crossroads, 30 June 1947, 16, 19-21. 
22 HSTL, White House Central Files, Confidential Files, Box 4, Folder Atomic bomb and energy aug 45 to 
nov 49, 2 of 2, Memo from D. E. Lilienthal to President, 18 July 1947; HSTL, White House Central Files, 
Confidential Files, Box 60, Folder Atomic Energy Commission, Cross Reference Sheet, re establishing a 
Proving Ground in the Pacific for routine experiments and tests of atomic weapons.” 19 July 1947 
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vertical dispersion. Good fast surface currents which avoid fishing areas, steamer lines 
and inhabited shores.”; (6) a certain minimum distance from continental U.S.; (7) an 
unpopulated area; (8) an area owned/controlled by U.S.; (9) a temperate tropical climate. 
In the end, as we know, planners decided on Bikini as the best area to fit into the 
qualifications. The resident “population [was] less than 200 and can be readily moved to 
another atoll” (whether they wanted to or not). And, in respect to Senator Bland’s wishes, 
the Department of Interior studied the location with respect to the effects tests there 
would have on fisheries.23 Thus long before any tests ever occurred, in choosing their 
ideal testing site, policymakers explicitly considered the natural world and how bomb 
testing would affect environment and vice versa. This does not mean that they were 
environmental activists or truly concerned about the effects of nuclear tests on 
ecosystems, but it does mean that natural systems and features weighed heavily on their 
minds and influenced their decisions. 
For larger tests, AEC higher-ups used environmental and scientific reasoning and 
eschewed Bikini Atoll in favor of establishing a permanent Pacific Proving Grounds at 
Eniwetok Atoll. The two locations are around 100 miles apart, both in the Marshall 
Islands chain. The AEC needed a “suitable” area to test bombs, and Eniwetok gained the 
nod because Bikini did not have the sufficient land surface to accommodate the 
instrumentation for proper scientific observations. Also, only 145 residents called 
Eniwetok home and “very important from a radiological standpoint, it is isolated and 
there are hundreds of miles of open seas in the direction in which winds might carry 
radioactive particles.” Thus Eniwetok’s natural features proved crucial for its selection. 
                                                
23 HSTL, Papers of Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files, Box 176, Folder Atomic Testing, Crossroads, 
Proposed Plan for Atomic Bomb Test Against Naval Targets 
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Not only did the Atoll provide enough land area, but it also held the geographic 
advantage of being far away from other peoples (its residents and their connection to their 
homeland were out of luck, though, in this health and safety calculus). A press release on 
Eniwetok’s selection even declared, “All test operations will be under laboratory control 
conditions,” meaning a few decisions and judgments on the Atoll’s natural features could 
turn Eniwetok, in the minds of U.S. policymakers, into a laboratory.24 
 The July 1950 semiannual report of the AEC showed the continued interaction 
between the natural world, testing, and environmental science. In 1948 the United States 
conducted a series of tests named Operation Sandstone at the Pacific Proving Grounds. 
Sandstone consisted of three nuclear test shots, and after each one, testers sent in tanks, 
remote-controlled from helicopters, to take soil samples for analysis. However, each time 
at least one tank bogged down in the soft soil and another one had to be sent in to do the 
first tank’s job. After nearly a week, soil radioactivity declined enough that teams could 
be sent in to recover the stalled tank without excessive radiation exposure.25 Those testing 
proved incredibly aware of the on-site radiation present after each nuclear blast, even if 
their primary concern certainly was about human health and not the condition of the 
environment. But even with concern for radiation, something as simple as soil density 
could throw off the plans of even the best-prepared evaluators.  
 In the fall of 1950, U.S. policymakers began discussions about conducting 
underground tests on Amchitka Island, located in the Aleutian chain, and these 
discussions further elucidate the connection between testing and the natural world. 
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Though tests at the site would not happen until well after the end of Truman’s presidency, 
discussions reached a critical enough stage that, on 30 October, Truman approved testing 
during fall 1951 at Amchitka.26 Previously, a study of the eight atomic bomb tests to that 
date provided the United States with a great deal of information on the effects of bombs 
detonated at heights from 100-2,000 feet in the air and also, in the case of the Baker shot 
during Operation Crossroads, underwater as well. Yet even with all this information it 
became clear that testing had given no indication of what happened during an 
underground test. If the United States needed a penetrating atomic weapon to attack 
“particularly well constructed or deep underground targets,” the data at hand would not 
be sufficient to construct such a device.27 U.S. decision makers therefore decided that the 
country should conduct such tests and fill in this knowledge gap.  
Site selection held particular importance in discussions of underground testing, 
and choosing a site for the test hinged on nine factors that combined issues of 
environment, politics, and logistics: safety, sovereignty, security, public relations, 
climate, geology, cost, accessibility, and size. While testers did not think that 
underground nuclear testing would be particularly dangerous (at least in comparison to 
other atomic tests), they still believed it should be done not in the United States, and that 
“Certain remote areas in Canada and other areas within the Commonwealth, such as 
Australia, offered some advantages.” These remote Canadian sites made the cut over 
many other sites; the Caribbean had too many people, the Pacific Proving Grounds at 
Eniwetok did not have the correct size or geology, and evaluators discarded many 
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Alaskan sites “because of inaccessibility, extreme climate, unsatisfactory geology and the 
considerable number of trappers and prospectors.”28 
In short, a combination of human factors, natural features, and geography 
intermingled to create the determining criteria for the site selection of this test. The 
selection of the eventual site on Amchitka shows this well, as “Careful consideration of 
the several isolated, uninhabited islands toward the outer end of the Aleutian Chain led to 
the determination that Amchitka Island is the only site that satisfies all of the established 
criteria to an acceptable degree.” Even though Amchitka was completely uninhabited 
(because the U.S. government had removed native inhabitants during WWII), the island 
had the infrastructure necessary for testing, leftover from WWII. Some factors grounded 
in the natural world worked against the site, though, such as the Department of the 
Interior’s strong desire to preserve indigenous wildlife and the island’s mostly “bad” 
climate. A selection memo further explained, “Rain and fog predominate in the summer 
and snow and high winds in the winter.” Such concerns could be worked around, 
however, as “For a short period in May and in a longer period in September and October, 
the weather can be expected to be moderate.” Hence even with a few environmental 
problems and security concerns because the island was so close to the Soviet Union, 
policymakers deemed Amchitka Island “the only site presently available that reasonably 
satisfies all the criteria established for the safe conduct of an underground and surface 
atomic test.” A report also noted that the airflow in the region from West to East meant 
that the USSR would not be able to detect the tests by radiological means. In this case, 
the site had prevailing winds working in its favor because national security was deemed 
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more important than reducing the radiation exposure of U.S. and allied citizens.29 In 
short, Amchitka, due to its geography and environment, represented the most ideal site 
for the United States’ proposed underground tests. 
 Site selection at Amchitka was, however, challenged by significant criticism 
emerging from the Department of Interior site due to concerns about wildlife protection. 
Dale E. Doty, Assistant Secretary of the Department of the Interior, wrote that he and his 
department protested using the island for testing because it represented “the principal 
concentration center for the total existing population of sea otter which had been brought 
to near extinction during Russian occupation of Alaska and which is now being restored 
and re-colonized over a part of its former range under the close protection by the Fish and 
Wildlife Service.” U.S. officials used the Amchitka herd for stock as part of the 
transplanting and management program, and though there were otters elsewhere, since 
the herd had only increased on Amchitka the value of the site was clear. This is not to say 
that Doty believed in purely preservationist ideals—he also argued that the value of each 
otter pelt would average around $1,000 each, with some topping $2,500, and therefore 
keeping the site viable for otters would produce “revenue to the Government, once the 
resource is restored to a production basis, [of] hundreds of thousands of dollars 
annually.”30 Like testing in general, concern for the environment did not necessarily 
mean a desire to protect it and the creatures in it from no harm. 
 Therefore, in Doty and the Interior Department’s opinions, testing would be bad 
for several reasons, all related to the otter population. First, testing personnel entering the 
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site “would undoubtedly provide opportunity for the molesting and killing of animals.” 
Also, obviously, since the beaches of the island were situated within the danger area of 
the test, the blast itself, along with “falling debris, flash, and possibly direct radiation,” 
caused a good chance of harming the animals. The potential for long-lived radiation also 
worried the Department of Interior. Thus, from the standpoint of the Interior’s 
responsibilities toward the sea otter and waterfowl populations, “it would hardly have 
been possible to have chosen a more objectionable area than Amchitka.” Doty argued that 
certain provisions needed to be incorporated into test programs if the operations ever 
proceeded. All laws needed to be followed to ensure “the maximum possible protection 
of the sea otter from poaching or from any unnecessary disturbance or molestation,” and 
also the Fish and Wildlife service needed money to trap and transfer many otters over the 
winter to safer areas. The later would be costly and require “considerable logistic 
support” from the U.S. military. Even considering all these precautions, Doty still 
believed that the tests should happen elsewhere, as Amchitka was the only place otters 
had recovered as well as they had.31 Policymakers noted these objections, but at the end 
of the discussion decided to go on with the test and merely to work with the Department 
of the Interior “to preserve the indigenous wild life inhabiting the island.”32 
 While managed otter populations alone could not deter those wanting to test on 
Amchitka, the area’s natural formations could. As the proposed fall 1951 testing date 
neared, reports surfaced that, though Amchitka still appeared to be the best possible site 
for the underground detonations, “detailed exploration of the site has revealed geological 
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conditions less favorable than preliminary surveys had indicated” that would reduce the 
accuracy of any data gained. This caused policymakers to rethink their plans and instead 
believe that perhaps a continental site might be better, as “More favorable geological and 
meteorological conditions are known to exist at several possible continental test sites than 
at Amchitka Island.” Ultimately, even though it was later used in a different test series, 
Amchitka was jettisoned for the Nevada Test Site with the recognition that a continental 
site would also clear up many logistics problems.33  
Thus the decision over testing on Amchitka Island shows a developing 
recognition of the importance of environmental factors and environmental science in the 
minds of AEC and White House decision makers. More importantly, it shows what they 
considered important. Less important were factors like sea otters or what might be 
perceived today as environmental health, at least in terms of what could be worked 
around and what could not. What was important, though, were aspects, both geological 
and broadly environmental, that might have influenced U.S. nuclear tests. Testers 
perceived the environment as a strength, for example, when the prevailing winds made it 
harder for the Soviet Union to detect and study the radioactive cloud a test might 
produce. But when scientific exploration uncovered unfavorable meteorological and 
geological conditions, these natural features caused the United States to scrap the island 
as a suitable site for testing. Thus the process of selecting Amchitka as an experimental 
test site shows how important certain (not all) environmental concerns could be to U.S. 
policymakers, even if they might not have used the explicitly environmentally conscious 
language that this dissertation does. 
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 After the Amchitka discussion, the AEC and other policymakers settled into a 
pattern where the most important environmental issues surrounding testing, recognized as 
environmental in nature or not, were radiation from blasts and interactions with the 
weather. Radiation damage on the natural world was, for the most part, downplayed by 
those in power. In the early 1950s, the AEC noted that high air burst weapons tests 
showed that residual radiation was not a problem at ground level, but on blasts close to 
the ground significant radiation contamination existed. Of course, since such detonations 
destroyed everything for at least a 300-400 yard radius, residual radiation was something 
of a moot point.34 Also, a March 1952 memo from the AEC to the White House claimed 
that upcoming tests might produce “some off-site radiation above normal levels, but far 
below levels harmful in any way to humans, animals or crops.”35 Yet one of the more 
interesting interplays between atomic weapons and the environment involved decisions 
and considerations about meteorological phenomena. 
 In the early 1950s, both the AEC and White House paid significant attention to 
how weather influenced atomic bomb tests and how those tests might affect the weather. 
Before and after any nuclear blast, testers made significant meteorological measurements 
to ensure that proper conditions existed for those tests. After one test, an Air Force 
“group of 2,400 made weather observations, and operated experimental aircraft including 
radar-directed ‘drones’ to collect observations in and near the radioactive clouds that 
follow atomic explosions.”36 In the aforementioned March 1952 memo, the AEC 
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representative said that precautions for preventing excessive radiation included “cloud 
tracking and sampling” by the Air Force and cooperation with around 100 Weather 
Service stations.37 These two pieces of data started to show the importance of weather to 
those testing atomic weapons, but do not fully show the true weight of meteorological 
effects on the process. 
 The January 1953 AEC report contained a great deal of focus on weather and 
atomic bomb tests. To begin, the report explained the precautions taken during weapons 
tests to prevent “hazard to the public from blast or fall-out.” To do this, the AEC 
constructed a national system to monitor “fall-out radioactivity.” One of the best ways 
both to prevent the spread of fallout as much as possible and gain accurate test results 
was to make sure that proper weather conditions existed before tests. Before each test, 
pre-detonation forecasts began 72 hours in advance. If those predictions were still 
favorable 24 hours before a scheduled test, the operational sequence began. If weather 
proved unfavorable, the test might be canceled. Since wind and rain were known to 
dramatically affect fallout distribution, the weather formed a crucial part of ensuring a 
test that was as safe as possible. The report also claimed that the “intensity of blast waves 
at any locality depends more upon various weather phenomena than upon the energy 
yield of the detonation.”38 Simply put, the weather was not just a secondary concern 
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when planning and conducting tests—it mattered a great deal to planners who wanted the 
tests to be as safe as possible and the data gathered from tests to be accurate. 
 For a time, significant concerns also existed about whether atomic detonations 
might have themselves on the weather.39 The 26 May 1953 meeting of the AEC 
commissioners contained discussion on the subject. Gordon Dean, chairman of the AEC 
at the time, questioned whether adverse weather conditions following detonations at 
Eniwetok could be attributed to those tests, as a report had claimed the bad weather 
“appeared to have been caused by the shots.” Photographs showed that heavy clouds and 
squalls developed after the test shots, along with a series of high altitude storms (around 
40,000 feet high). The committee eventually decided “weather conditions prior to the 
shot time were favorable to rain, and the large vertical disturbances caused by the blast 
seemed to have ‘triggered’ the storms which began at Eniwetok and spread north and 
west over an area of 250,000 square miles.” But they also commented that 
“meteorological experts” had not discerned “any relationship between the recent weather 
conditions throughout the U. S. and the Nevada tests.”40 Even though experts had not 
decided on a link between tests and weather, many in the public had. 
 Several letters from civilians can show how many in the public connected atomic 
bomb tests and meteorological phenomena. One letter to Sherman Adams, Eisenhower’s 
White House Chief of Staff, talked about the author’s “very dear friend,” a 74 year-old 
farmer. That farmer’s crops were six weeks late and he believed, “as many others do, that 
the atomic bomb is responsible for it.” The farmer wanted the blasts “postponed for a 
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while so the nation wouldn’t starve to death.”41 Another man, in a letter to James C. 
Haggerty, Eisenhower’s Press Secretary, claimed that tests needed to stop. This letter 
claimed that, “due to atmospheric changes due to the high explosives of the atomic 
weapons,” there now existed problems “with the atmospheric conditions in our country 
resulting in tornadoes where they have either never previously occurred, or – where 
tornadoes have previously been experienced – now being of unusual intensity.”42 While 
neither environmental science at the time or at present would support such assertions, the 
letters do demonstrate examples of public pressure exerted on White House policymakers 
over worries about a connection between the natural world and atomic bombs.  
 On 10 June 1953, the AEC commissioners again met to discuss the effects of 
nuclear tests on weather, particularly because of “numerous charges” in the press saying 
that tests at Nevada Proving Grounds had caused “unusual weather conditions in parts of 
the United States.”43 During previous tests at Eniwetok, weather conditions after tests had 
jibed with pre-test meteorological predictions. With the evidence presented, the 
Commissioners reckoned that the disturbances after several tests, which included “rain 
squalls over the ocean [and] small storms, but no winds of hurricane force,” might have 
been caused by blasts. A military representative, along with an UCLA-based scientist, 
claimed that there had been similar air circulations following tests in Nevada as at the 
                                                
41 The letter’s author also asked if Eisenhower could send his farmer friend a letter, as Eisenhower was the 
first present in forty-five years to not respond to the farmer’s letters. This would be “Just a gesture in the 
spirit of Democracy.” DDEL, White House Central Files, General File, Box 1213, Folder 155 Atomic 
Energy, 1952-53, Letter Bertram G. Frazier to Sherman Adams, 2 June 1953. 
42 DDEL, White House Central Files, General File, Box 1214, Folder 155-A, Atomic Bomb, Letter George 
R. Carr to James C. Haggerty, 9 June 1953 
43 Though this dissertation does not cite anything specifically, also see: Fourteenth Semiannual Report of 
the Atomic Energy Commission, July 1953, 53. One of the more intriguing resources for studying the 1,350 
square mile (860,000 acres) Nevada Proving Grounds has to be The Nevada Test Site. As the book claims 
in its preface, “While the nuclear genie popped out of his bottle at White Sands Proving Ground on July 16, 
1945, it may be said that he learned to dance at the Nevada Test Site.” The Nevada Test Site: A Guide to 
America’s Nuclear Proving Ground (Culver City: The Center for Land Use Interpretation, 1996), 7, 9. 
 
 49 
Pacific Proving Grounds, but the continental tests only caused disturbances for a few 
minutes and lacked sufficient moisture in the desert to create storm conditions. They 
continued, “No material in the bomb debris could cause rain or a tornado. It was possible 
for a tornado to be ‘triggered’ by external conditions, but it needed moisture as a fuel to 
become selfsustaining [sic].” Instead, the unusual number of tornadoes that spring “could 
be attributed to an unusual pressure condition forcing moist Gulf air across the U. S. at 
high level until it came in contact with a cold air mass coming down from Canada, and 
that by no mechanism known was it possible for the tornadoes to have been caused by the 
Nevada tests.” In the end, the commissioners decided that they needed to respond to 
public views, especially the charges that tests at the Nevada Proving Grounds had caused 
tornadoes.44 Scientific understandings about the relationship between bombs and weather 
may have assured the AEC Commissioners that nuclear weapons could not cause violent 
storms, but it did not convince everyone. 
No matter the official position, public perceptions of atomic bomb tests causing 
severe weather proved so strong that Representative Edith Nourse Rogers (R-MA) 
introduced a series of resolutions requesting that the AEC provide information about the 
connection between nuclear tests and the weather. Senator William Langer (R-ND), in a 
related move, offered a resolution that proposed that no further atomic tests could be held 
in the continental United States.45 The issue continued to be prominent for several years, 
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as the AEC held a conference in 1956 on “Possible Effects of Nuclear Explosions on 
Weather.”46 
 No matter the effects on weather, nuclear weapons tests perhaps became more 
important when Dwight Eisenhower assumed the presidency on 20 January 1953. As a 
staunch fiscal conservative, Eisenhower’s term showed him deeply committed to the 
responsible use of the nation’s financial resources. Of course, as the former leader of 
Allied forces during World War II, he also focused heavily on U.S. military commitments 
and issues of national security. To balance both financial and military considerations, 
Eisenhower devised a foreign policy plan called the “New Look.” This strategy sought to 
use strategic nuclear weapons in lieu of conventional military forces to deter the USSR 
and Soviet bloc countries from attacking the United States and its allies. In short, 
Eisenhower figured it to be cheaper to create a nuclear stockpile than to train, equip, feed, 
and supply a large standing army. Nuclear testing formed a crucial and necessary part of 
this “New Look” policy as improving and increasing the U.S. nuclear stockpile meant, 
under this logic, keeping the nation safe in the most cost efficient way.47 With this 
strategy in mind, under Eisenhower the United States continued previous research into 
atomic weapons and developed bombs of previously unfathomable power. 
The hydrogen bomb, a thermonuclear weapon that incorporated the fusion of 
atoms (not principally fission like previous atomic bombs), launched the world into the 
thermonuclear age and at the same time radically altered the scale of potential 
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environmental change from atomic weapons.48 Lewis Strauss, Chairman of the AEC, 
elucidated on the thermonuclear tests at President Eisenhower’s 31 March 1954 official 
press conference. Strauss had recently visited the Pacific Proving Grounds to view the 
second part of a series of tests of thermonuclear weapons. He explained that after the 
Soviets had detonated their first atomic bomb in August 1949, U.S. military higher-ups 
had decided that the United States could only maintain its nuclear superiority over the 
Soviet Union with either a significant quantitative edge in bombs or by developing 
something greater than existing fission weapons “by a degree of magnitude comparable 
to the difference between fission bombs and conventional bombs.” Therefore in 1950 
President Truman had asked the AEC to start making a hydrogen or fusion bomb—a 
thermonuclear bomb. The United States tested a prototype at Eniwetok in November 
1952 and the Soviets tested one in August 1953. On 1 March 1954, however, as part of 
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Operation Castle, the United States tested what was easily the biggest nuclear device the 
world had seen to that time.49  
 That 1 March shot, codenamed “Bravo,” ended up being several times more 
destructive than expected and produced significantly more fallout than anticipated. 
Strauss stressed that the test did not get out of control, and even when badgered by the 
media about whether other tests might, he responded, “I am informed by the scientists 
that [a test getting out of control] is impossible.”50 Further emphasizing that the test had 
not been out of control as suggested, Strauss argued that the AEC “has conducted the 
tests of its larger weapons away from the mainland so that the fall-out would occur in the 
ocean where it would be quickly dissipated both by dilution and by the rapid decay of 
most of the radioactivity which is of short duration.” This is why the United States 
conducted previous tests at Bikini in the Marshall Islands—it has good winds from 
February to April that would blow any fallout away from inhabited atolls. The biggest 
problem with the Castle Bravo test, however, was that it far exceeded any estimates of its 
power and did indeed smother with fallout both Marshall Island inhabitants and a passing 
Japanese fishing vessel, the Lucky Dragon 5 (called the “Fortunate Dragon” by 
Strauss).51 
 Strauss defended U.S. actions and downplayed any problems, environmental or 
otherwise, with the Bravo test. He explained that the public and press had the wrong idea 
about what these Pacific atolls were like. He said, “Each of these atolls is a large necklace 
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of coral reef surrounding a lagoon two to three hundreds of square miles in area, and at 
various points on the reef like beads on a string appear a multitude of little islands, some 
a few score acres in extent-others no more than sandpits,” and the U.S. used the “small, 
uninhabited, treeless sand bars” for experiments. He further explained, “The impression 
that an entire atoll or even large islands have been destroyed in these tests is erroneous. It 
would be more accurate to say a large sandspit or reef.”52  
 With his statement, Strauss also noted several other environmental phenomena 
worth mentioning. First, he again reinforced the importance of meteorology to tests when 
he discussed how, before each test shot, testers carefully surveyed the winds at all 
elevations up to many thousands of feet (because winds are not the same at every 
elevation). He also explained that testers conducted long-range weather forecasts because 
it takes days to do these measurements. Strauss also reluctantly admitted that, even 
though there was a warning area set before tests, sometimes humans did get caught in the 
danger zone of fallout, including the crew of the Lucky Dragon, the “natives,” and some 
weather personnel. And though the tests caused some increase in “background” radiation, 
this decreased rapidly and the stories about widespread contamination of tuna or other 
fish could not be substantiated. Instead, the only place anyone had found contaminated 
fish was in the hold of the Lucky Dragon and, of course, those near the test site. These 
fish near the test site, though, should not have concerned anyone, according to Strauss, 
because “at certain seasons of the year, almost all fish caught are normally poisonous as a 
result of feeding on certain seasonally prevalent micro-organisms, and the natives and our 
                                                
52 DDEL, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President, Ann Whitman File, Press Conference Series, Box 2, 
Folder Press Conference 31 March 1954, Statement by Lewis L. Strauss, 2. 
 
 54 
Task Force personnel do not eat them at such times.”53 This statement shows Strauss 
believed that since the only fish contaminated by radiation were not fit for human 
consumption anyway, they were presumably worthless by any measurement. No matter 
the negative consequences from the 1954 hydrogen bomb tests, the United States 
continued to test in the Pacific. 
 In late 1954, the Department of Defense and AEC began to plan a deep 
underwater nuclear test to be held between 15 April and 15 May 1955, somewhere 200-
600 miles south/southwest of San Diego, California. Robert Anderson, Secretary of 
Defense, told Eisenhower in a letter that the military intended to determine “the 
maximum range at which hull-splitting damage to a submerged submarine at a single 
depth can be assured.” The exact area in which the test would be conducted would “be 
determined more closely upon completion of special oceanographic studies now being 
carried out by the Scripps Institute of Oceanography and the Office of Naval Research.” 
Either way, the general area was “essentially free of fish which are of commercial 
importance,” so the idea was that no matter where they test occurred in the area it would 
not affect the fishing industry (not necessarily true, especially considering tuna’s 
ecological role as a top predator and thus their ability to bioaccumulate toxins). Also, 
officials assured Eisenhower the ocean current and wind patterns in the area would 
reduce “the possibilities of contamination due to migration of fission products through 
ocean or air currents.” Anderson tried to allay any worries about the spray of radioactive 
water over great distances, such as happened during the Crossroads Baker test, by 
assuring that conducting the test at a depth of around 2,000 feet meant that there would 
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be no significant water upheaval or wave formation. One problem, though, was that 
Mexican nationals would have to be evacuated from Guadalupe Island, about seventy-
five miles away from the intended test area.54 As in previous tests, understandings of the 
natural world and earth systems proved essential both in planning for tests and for 
allaying concerns about the tests’ potential harmful effects. Those understandings did not 
necessarily mean a desire to protect the landscapes and the creatures that inhabited these, 
however—Guadalupe Island, for example, was known for its endemic species and as one 
of the last safe havens for certain seals. Such statements might seem paradoxical, but 
would not have been so to AEC policymakers because, to them, not all environmental 
concerns were equally important in their charge to develop a nuclear arsenal that would 
presumably protect the United States. 
 On 15 March 1955, the AEC Commissioners met to discuss the upcoming 
underwater test, named Operation Wigwam, and showed clear thinking about 
environmental scientific understandings in their decisions. The AEC finalized the shot as 
a thirty-kiloton bomb detonated at a depth of 2,000 feet. Before anything else, the 
Commissioners first discussed the geography of the test area and reviewed the 
conclusions of studies on the seismic effects, ocean surface effects, and the airborne, 
waterborne, and organic contamination that could be expected to result from the test. And 
even though nobody could predict exactly what would happen with the underwater 
detonation, somehow the Commissioners were “certain that none of the effects of the test 
will constitute a threat to health or safety.” Importantly, Navy studies showed that the test 
site was “a marine desert avoided by fish and fishermen in which the ocean current drifts 
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south and the prevailing wind is from the north.” In short, the natural features of the area 
made the location ideal for an underwater atomic bomb detonation, and Strauss made a 
clear connection between oceanic and terrestrial deserts—both environments served little 
purpose to humans unless used as a partition to sequester bombs’ destructiveness from 
other, useful environments. The AEC then decided that the test would happen on 8 May 
1955, pending proper weather and ocean conditions.55 The actual test occurred about a 
week after that. The July 1955 semiannual AEC report declared, “the test involved no 
health hazard to mainland or island inhabitants or consumers of fish.”56 
 In general, after 1954, the issue of fallout and the radiation effects of weapons 
tests became more important, but not necessarily because of concerns about 
environmental health. In part, this is because the public began to be much more 
concerned about radioactive fallout, particularly after the Lucky Dragon incident. AEC 
Commissioner Lewis Strauss sent a letter to President Eisenhower in March 1955 about 
an upcoming test that would be conducted around 40,000 feet high. Strauss included an 
article titled, “Atomic Blast Six Miles Up To Test New Air Defense: Nuclear Warhead 
For Missiles Use To Be Tried Out Soon In Nevada.” Strauss thought the article was 
important because it would “prevent apprehension by observers of the high altitude test 
(40,000 feet) which will be seen for long distances.” The piece told its readers that even 
humans standing at ground level directly underneath the blast would only receive 1/100th 
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of a normal x-ray dose because the test would be so high up.57 No matter the assurances 
many civilians still felt nervous. 
 In spring 1956, a reporter questioned the President about why the United States 
continued to research the hydrogen bomb, prompting Eisenhower to discuss the 
interconnectedness of environmental science and atomic weapons research. The President 
responded that the nation went ahead with testing “not to make a bigger ‘bang,’ not to 
cause more destruction, [but instead] to find out ways and means in which you can limit 
it, make it useful in the defensive purposes of shooting against a fleet of airplanes coming 
over, to reduce ‘fall-out,’ to make it more a military weapon and less one just of mass 
destruction.” He closed by saying that the country knew how to make atomic bombs big, 
but that did not interest the United States anymore—making smaller bombs of reduced 
fallout did.58 Reducing fallout required improving scientific knowledge in both 
environmental sciences and physics, meaning that military requirements forged a stronger 
bond between scientific knowledge about these and weapons testing.  
The argument that the U.S. needed to test so that it could reduce fallout was 
common. The July 1956 semiannual AEC report discussed Operation Redwing that had 
occurred a few months prior. Redwing was a full-scale test series at Eniwetok aimed 
“toward development of defensive weapons.” The AEC planned such tests for earlier 
than they occurred, but had postponed these due to unfavorable weather in the interest of 
safety, especially after the 1954 Operation Castle Bravo shot. Monitoring the weather, 
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then, functioned as a safety precaution not only for the shot itself, but also for control of 
the resulting fallout. Other tests also had programs “to make measurement of 
radioactivity in sea water and in marine organisms is being conducted in the Pacific.” 
Testers sampled the surface water and at various depths, and also plankton and fish, with 
sampling extending “as far westward as radioactivity is detectable.” Radioactivity 
sampling also occurred as land and marine biological surveys on Eniwetok and Bikini 
Atolls and lagoons.59 
 No matter the studies or assurances, though, many in the public remained wary of 
the fallout threat from radioactive fallout. One letter to the President about harm to 
fishing industries from hydrogen bomb tests received a response quoting a statement by 
Lewis Strauss that claimed, “Our inspectors found no instance of radioactivity in any 
shipments of fish from Pacific waters.”60 Another letter asked the President to stop 
hydrogen bomb tests because these created strontium 90 that eventually made its way 
into the U.S. milk supply. The White House Chief of Staff, Sherman Adams, responded 
to this letter by assuring that the United States would keep testing and developing 
weapons because these would keep the nation safe in the long run.61 And a R. M. 
Tildesley caustically suggested that the President use the Nevada Proving Grounds as a 
vacation spot, arguing, “By setting out to make the biggest possible bomb to kill the most 
                                                
59 Twentieth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, July 1956, 8, 115. Also see: Twenty-
First Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, January 1957, 9-11. 
60 DDEL, White House Central Files, General File, Box 1215, Folder 155-B, Sept. to date 1956 (1), Letter 
Dorothy Leslie to the President, 21 October 1956 and Letter Howard Pyle to Dorothy Leslie, 30 October 
1956 
61 DDEL, White House Central Files, General File, Box 1215, Folder 155-B, Sept. to date 1956 (1), Letter 
Mrs. Mitchell Fine to President, 26 October 1956 and Letter Sherman Adams to Mrs. Mitchell Fine, 31 
October 1956 This letter from Lewis Strauss to President Eisenhower also stressed the need for testing to 
improve weapons for the “defense stockpile” and reducing fallout or radiation “contamination which might 
result from the spread of nuclear material from weapons involved in fire or accident.” DDEL, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Papers as President, Ann Whitman File, Administrative Series, Box 4, Folder Atomic Energy 
Commission 1955-56 (1), Letter Lewis Strauss to Eisenhower, 21 December 1956 
 
 59 
possible people, we seem to have scared the pants off ourselves. Now we are hoping for 
the age of the clean bomb.”62 
 A public statement by the President in October 1956 furthered the U.S. 
government’s public position that the nation’s citizenry should not worry about nuclear 
fallout from tests. Eisenhower reminded the public that fallout had been a known issue 
since the very first atomic test at Trinity, and that the AEC had been “continuously 
engaged in the study of the biological effect of radiation.” Reports on the subject were 
publicly available, and a 1956 findings of the National Academy of Sciences called 
biological damage from tests “essentially negligible.” Moreover, The National Academy 
of Sciences’ Committee on Meteorology determined “there was no evidence to indicate 
that climate has been in any way altered by past atomic and thermonuclear explosions.”63  
 One series of tests, Operation Plumbbob, can serve as a final example of how 
significant focus on the interaction between environmental science and nuclear 
detonations had emerged by the end of the Eisenhower presidency. Operation 
Plumbbob’s primary purpose was to increase scientific knowledge about nuclear tests, 
especially concerning fallout and the biomedical effects of tests. Thus while the tests did 
not focus exclusively on improving knowledge on nuclear testing and the environment, a 
great many sub-projects did have such a concentration. The project proposal claimed that 
the Plumbbob shots would “contribute significantly to the knowledge necessary for the 
improvement of our self-defense against enemy action in the event of war and the 
                                                
62 DDEL, White House Central Files, General File, Box 1215, Folder 155-B, Jan. – Aug. 1957 (2), Letter 
R.M. Tildesley to President, 29 June 1957 For other examples, see: DDEL, White House Central Files, 
General File, Box 1215, Folder 155-B, Jan. – Aug. 1957 (2), Petition from University of Washington 
students, 24 June 1957 and DDEL, White House Central Files, General File, Box 1215, Folder 155-B, Jan. 
– Aug. 1957 (2), Letter R.M. Tildesley to President, 29 June 1957 
63 DDEL, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President, Ann Whitman File, Administrative Series, Box 4, 
Folder Atomic Energy Commission 1955-56 (2), Statement by the President, 24 October 1956 
 
 60 
establishment of proper safeguards in peacetime applications of nuclear energy.” The test 
series included projects, among many others, on “Radio-Ecological Aspects of Nuclear 
Fallout,” intended to study “persistence of gross fission products” in the environment 
after fallout; “Biophysical Aspects of Fallout Phenomenology,” which studied “the 
physical and chemical characteristics of fallout materials”; and an inquiry into “the 
physical and chemical characteristics of fallout materials,” which made “fallout studies 
on raw agricultural products, such as exposed wheat dumps, corn and sugar cane stalks, 
and dried-fruit flats, to determine whether cleanup is possible, to recommend methods of 
protection, and to evaluate types of agricultural packaging.” 64 
 As in earlier tests, Plumbbob also showed a concern for how the test site 
environment might affect and be affected by a nuclear detonation. The 17 April 1957 
AEC Commissioners meeting included discussion of a “Special Shot” for Plumbbob that 
would be underground. This test presented two major problems—containment of the 
radiation and accurate measurement of the yield. Moreover, the Nevada Test Site had 
geological conditions that would help ensure that the test shot did not cause an 
earthquake. Fears existed that if an earthquake did happen at the same time that the AEC 
might be blamed for the natural occurrence, but if an earthquake did take place seismic 
readings could tell from where it originated. The Commissioners also discussed what 
would the likely effects of an underground firing be, and “the extent of absorption of 
                                                
64 Other projects also had a distinctly environmental or biological component. DDEL, John Stewart 
Bragdon Records, Miscellaneous File, Box 1, Folder Atomic Energy Commission, Operation Plumbbob 
Civil Effects Test Group Project Summaries, 1957, ii, 42, 43, 47. 
 
 61 
energy at a given geologic fault.” They reached the conclusion that very little energy 
could be transferred “through a fault from one structure to another.”65  
 When that underground test shot eventually occurred, it seemed to be a 
resounding success and demonstrated that policymakers had explicitly incorporated 
natural features into their tests. The Ranier Shot of Operation Plumbbob, fired on 19 
September 1957, was a 1.7-kiloton test blast in a tunnel in a mesa at the Nevada Test Site. 
Intended to “eliminate fall-out, be independent of weather, and eliminate other offsite 
effects,” evaluators declared after the test, “practically all radioactive fission products 
were trapped in highly insoluble fused silica, indicating very little likelihood of ground 
water contamination.” Thus even though three months later the test site still had elevated 
temperatures from the radiation (up to 194 degrees Fahrenheit), those testing thought the 
shot went so well “that devices 100 times as powerful as Ranier could be safely fired 
underground at the Site.”66 No matter the lasting radiation, the environment was not only 
the setting for the Ranier Shot, but also incorporated as a crucial element in planning the 
shot. 
 Once the dust settled on Plumbbob, the AEC had detonated twenty four nuclear 
devices and conducted six “safety experiments” on reducing fallout in the natural world 
at the Nevada Test Site, from 15 March to 12 October 1957. Two new testing techniques 
proved important—suspending bombs from balloons and detonating bombs deep 
underground. Using balloons prevented the atomic bomb’s resulting fireball from 
touching the ground and this supposedly dramatically lowered the amount of radioactive 
fallout. The January 1958 semiannual AEC report claimed that of the tests that used this 
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method, “none resulted in significant fallout in the test region.” The report described 
how, for the underground tests, “a tunnel was dug horizontally into a mesa and at its end 
was bent in almost a complete circle.” The testers placed a “device of known low yield” 
at the end of the tunnel, as this formation would seal off the main tunnel with rocks 
during the detonation so that no radiation might escape. The AEC declared, “The 
experiment’s objective of containing all radiation was achieved.”67 Preventing fallout had 
been a major area of the Plumbbob tests, and when combined with the attention paid to 
how the shots interacted with the natural world it is clear that the environment had come 
to play an integral role in how the United States and the AEC conceived of atomic bomb 
tests and their effects. The underground tests can also help emphasize another seeming 
paradox in U.S. nuclear testing and the environment—while one of the greatest benefits 
of underground nuclear tests was that these produced little to no atmospheric radioactive 
contamination or fallout, the stated purpose of such tests often was to improve 
environmental scientific knowledge. Policymakers in the AEC clearly privileged certain 
understandings of the natural world more than others, especially depending on how these 
did or did not support what the AEC perceived to be its mission and purpose within the 
U.S. government (environmental protection certainly was not). 
 Despite a lawsuit trying to end nuclear testing, a hunger strike by citizen activists 
at the AEC headquarters, and one man claiming that nuclear testing during a full moon 
might cause flooding, the United States government continued to have few public 
reservations about its own tests.68 The AEC claimed that weapons testing had the major 
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objectives of “improved weapons; smaller, more efficient, and more rugged strategic, 
tactical and defensive weapons; development of strategic, tactical and defensive weapons 
with greatly reduced radioactive fallout.”69 The implication with such a statement is 
clear: nuclear testing had only gotten safer and produced less fallout so the public should 
not worry about it. But nonetheless, when asked about seeing an actual atomic bomb test, 
President Eisenhower replied at one press conference, “They won’t allow me.” After the 
laughter died down, he elaborated, “I have seen all the weapons, I just haven’t been 
allowed to go to the tests.”70 The bombs may have been safe hypothetically or in public 
statements, but were not safe enough when the President’s wellbeing was on the line. Of 
course, the tests never were entirely safe, even with precautions. After one test series, 
Operation Hardtack, one memo stated, “the land area of the Bikini and Eniwetok Atolls, 
the water area of their lagoons, and the adjacent areas within three miles to seaward of 
the atolls and the overlying airspace will remain closed to vessels and aircraft which do 
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not have specific clearance.”71 The craft that did have clearance likely focused on 
conducting surveys “to measure radioactivity in sea water and marine organisms.”72 Tests 
produced significant worldwide radioactive fallout, and this increased as more nations 
detonated more bombs over time, leading to concern at the highest governmental levels 
for the environmental problems of testing. 
 On 31 October 1958, the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union 
entered into nuclear test cessation talks in an attempt to achieve a full ban of all nuclear 
weapons tests by signing nations (the focus of Chapter Three). This marked a pivotal 
moment in nuclear testing for the entire world, but it must be noted that the talks began 
only after the United States finished its Hardtack test series. Initially planned to end in 
July 1958, the actual series did not end until much later due to weather concerns—safety 
concerns hinged on weather conditions, further emphasizing the natural world’s effects 
on human plans.73 At that point, U.S. tests ceased for a time as part of an agreement to 
work toward a treaty ban (even though these early talks would eventually not produce a 
signed treaty and the United States would again start testing during the Kennedy 
administration). But before tests stopped on that Halloween day, scientific knowledge 
about the environment thus weighed heavily on the minds of policymakers when it came 
to U.S. nuclear testing during the Truman and Eisenhower presidencies, so much so that 
decision makers frequently labeled individual test shots and sometimes entire test series 
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with names that evoked environmental imagery.74 Recognizing this inculcation is 
important, even if the actions of U.S. policymakers did not reflect a desire to prevent the 
environmental destruction caused by the tests they approved. 
 Whether it was concern for how the weather might affect a test (or be affected by 
a test) or for the otters and geology of Amchitka Island, decision makers showed time and 
again that scientific conceptions of the natural world mattered in their decision-making 
processes.75 Of course, this is not to say that consideration meant environmentalist 
sentiment—far from it. For example, policymakers saw little paradox in dismissing 
concern for Amchitka’s otters while at the same time cancelling the test series because 
other environmental features—geological elements—did not fit their testing 
requirements. Thus, no matter the frequent lack of concern for environmental welfare, the 
actions and decisions of policymakers reflect that they proved deeply conscious of the 
ramifications of their choices on the environment and how those spaces and their 
inhabitants might change plans for nuclear testing. Moreover, as time passed, the tests 
helped policymakers in both the White House and AEC develop an increasing awareness 
about the natural world, especially in relation to bomb tests. Simply put, the environment 
and environmental science mattered in U.S. nuclear tests and those in power understood a 
connection between nuclear weapons testing and the environment, and they worked these 
scientific understandings into decisions and policies. It is past time that we recognize that 
the nexus of nuclear weapons and the natural world operated as a two-way street, with 
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scientific environmental knowledge affecting atomic tests just as much or more as tests 
altered the natural world. 
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Chapter Two 
Fallout over Fallout: 
De Facto Experiments on Radiation, the Environment, and Human Health 
 
 The 1951 Office of Civil Defense film Duck and Cover has been analyzed time 
and again by scholars for what it says about 1950s nuclear culture in the United States. 
The film shows an incredibly alert turtle—Bert—who always has his shell to keep him 
safe, along with a helmet and dapper bow tie. The film compared an atomic bomb blast to 
other dangers civilians dealt with and understood, like fires and automobile accidents. 
Then, with Bert as an example, the short film told school children if a nuclear attack 
occurred they should duck under their desk and cover up to avoid the dangerous nuclear 
blast, flash and any resulting broken glass. Toward the end of the film, the narrator 
proclaimed, “Duck and cover! That’s the first thing to do—duck and cover. The next 
important thing to do after that is to stay covered until the danger is over.”1 
 However, one problem with nuclear bombs, distinguishing these from 
conventional explosives, is that nuclear bombs produce countless radioactive particles 
that can have effects long after the actual explosion—radioactive fallout. These 
radioactive fallout pieces are never very big individually and frequently looked more like 
dust than anything. And yet as humans came to know, this dust could be deadly and 
affect much larger areas than the initial bomb blast ever could. Over a long time period of 
time fallout can even spread out to cover the entire earth. While fallout cannot tear down 
buildings or destroy harbored ships, its effects on biological entities can be harsh, 
including skin burns, cancers, and in severe cases death. Thus Duck and Cover was not 
entirely truthful with school children when the film told them they should stay covered 
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until the danger ended, as radioactive fallout could cause problems for years after any 
atomic blast. 
The United States and its policymakers learned about the perils of radioactive 
fallout from the world’s very first atomic detonation at Trinity, but this does not mean 
that those men paid a terrible amount of care to the subject.2 The first fallout studies 
began “with a reconnaissance survey of soil, animals and vegetation,” initially limited to 
areas near detonation sites. The AEC used planes to trace any wind drift of radioactive 
clouds formed after tests until that radioactivity dispersed.3 However, as Bert the Turtle’s 
cinematic debut in 1951 shows, the Truman administration did not have nearly as 
sophisticated an understanding of fallout as later peoples would come to possess.  
 This chapter delves into how the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and 
executive branch learned about and dealt with fallout during the early Cold War, both in 
their testing plans and the public relations arena. Fallout played a much bigger role in 
decision making about the nuclear complex during Eisenhower’s presidency than it did 
during Truman’s. This happened in large part because seminal events during 
Eisenhower’s term forced policymakers to incorporate scientific knowledge about 
radioactive fallout and the environment much more carefully into their plans and 
deliberations than they had before. Mostly because nothing prompted them to, Truman-
era administrators proved much less sensitive to the ecological and health dangers posed 
by fallout. However, two nuclear weapon tests during the Eisenhower’s first term—the 
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1953 “Harry” test shot during Operation Upshot-Knothole and the 1954 “Bravo” test shot 
during Operation Castle—particularly awakened U.S. decision makers to the frightening 
possibilities of nuclear fallout. During Eisenhower’s presidency, nuclear fallout thus 
became much more important to policymakers and concern over fallout, as Chapter Three 
will show, even helped birth nuclear test cessation treaty talks. Worries about radioactive 
fallout from nuclear tests also played an increasingly significant role in the development 
of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, as U.S. policymakers had to balance protecting the nation 
from fallout while still developing nuclear weapons to keep the country safe from foreign 
enemies.  
 Less obvious, but in some ways more important for understanding radioactive 
fallout’s effects on the United States and the nuclear complex, U.S. nuclear tests 
unintentionally coalesced into a massive, uncontrolled experiment on interactions 
between radiation, ecosystems, and human bodies. Directly injecting radiation into 
human bodies to test its effects proved impossible due to ethical and scientific concerns. 
Thus while U.S. scientists knew roughly the potential dangers of radioactive fallout, they 
had never conducted any specific experiments to determine its exact results. Even as the 
AEC espoused concerns over and reassurances about human health, the Commission’s 
nuclear tests put radiation into ecosystems and human bodies with no real idea of exactly 
what that radioactivity’s effects would be. This de facto experiment did not follow the 
scientific method and had no control group, but it still functioned very similarly to the 
radioisotope tracer studies that were at the same time birthing understandings of 
ecosystem ecology. As Chapter Four will explain with a focus on agriculture, 
radioisotope tracers allowed researchers to trace the flow of elements through biological 
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processes and opened up incredible new opportunities for research about the natural 
world. Thus at the same time U.S. testers worked extremely hard to be precise with their 
scientific experiments about nuclear weapons, they inadvertently conducted an 
experiment that was at times just as dangerous as those bombs, but had no formal 
oversight. Spewing massive amounts of radiation into the atmosphere, in effect, acted as 
an investigation into the effects of radioactive fallout on human health through 
environmental contact. 
 While common people and the U.S. government may have known about fallout 
radiation much earlier, many of the most important historical works on the subject did not 
appear until the 1980s. Ralph Lutts argued that Rachel Carson’s seminal environmentalist 
work Silent Spring made sense to peoples of the 1960s because talk about radiation from 
1950s nuclear fallout had conditioned them to fear forces that could not be seen or sensed 
but still have incredibly deleterious effects.4 Richard Miller, in Under the Cloud, 
reminded readers that everyone, no matter where they lived, faced dangers from nuclear 
testing. He argued, “the shadow of the atomic cloud was shared by not only [peoples and 
places close to tests], but by most cities and towns across the country. Like the soldiers 
maneuvering in the desert, every person alive during the 1950s and 1960s lived under the 
atomic cloud.”5 Some of the best works on the subject of fallout have probed the cultural 
dimensions of that phenomenon, such as Paul Boyer’s Fallout and Robert Jacobs’ The 
Dragon’s Tail.6 Others have varyingly argued that the U.S. government either betrayed 
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5 Richard L. Miller, Under the Cloud: The Decades of Nuclear Testing (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 
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its people and harmed them with tests or that it held an exemplary safety record and did 
the absolute best it could.7 What is clear, however, is that not enough work has been done 
on understanding how policymakers understood, or did not understand, the connections 
between fallout, environmental science, and human bodies. While scholars have 
understood that decisions about nuclear weapons testing and policy have could affect the 
natural world and human bodies, there has yet to be an historical analysis of how 
environmental science affected executive policymaking. Governmental knowledge and 
policy about fallout developed and evolved over time particularly in relationship to the 
Upshot-Knothole Harry shot and the Operation Castle Bravo shot. Perhaps even more 
important to that knowledge and policy development, however was the massive, 
uncontrolled scientific experimentation on the planet’s environments and peoples through 
nuclear fallout. 
 While planners showed concern about local radioactivity and its effects on the 
environs even from early nuclear blasts, it was not a great deal of concern. The AEC did 
fund research into the breeding records of cattle exposed to radiation by the first atomic 
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bomb, Trinity, in July 1945. Policymakers further acted on this concern for how radiation 
affects domesticated animals by funding “surveys” in 1948 around tests at Bikini Atoll 
and in New Mexico. The medical scientists and biologists conducting those assessments 
focused on “the immediate victims in the plant and animal kingdoms” and determining 
which species were “highly vulnerable” or “more resistant” to radiation, particularly as 
part of the fascination with the effects of nuclear weapons as still newfound sources of 
scientific wonder. And yet, for all the concern about damages, the official AEC report to 
Congress on the last six months of 1948 downplayed the dangers of radiation. That report 
claimed, “Just as interesting as these immediate and striking effects, however, […] Data 
already available indicate that there are no appreciable hazards of external radiation for 
men or livestock at the New Mexico bomb site outside of the fenced area of several 
hundred acres surrounding the actual place of explosion.”8 Later inspections would 
challenge those conclusions, but at that time fallout did not represent a particular concern 
for those testing, even if they proved conscious of it. Moreover, those people thought 
they had radioactive fallout mostly under control and confined only to the predetermined 
bombsite. Future claims also stressed that blasts did not cause much long-term radiation 
damage and, by mentioning that the first radiation injury occurred in 1896 from an X-ray, 
made sure that readers knew radiation certainly existed outside of atomic bombs and was 
not a new, terrifying problem for the scientific community.9 
 Truman-era policymakers thus frequently worked hard to downplay any concerns 
about fallout radiation, at times even going so far as to eschew tracking radioactive 
                                                
8 Fifth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, January 1949, 92-93. 
9 Sixth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, July 1949, 54. The report also detailed the 
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clouds produced by nuclear testing for fear of causing public panic. For example, in June 
1951 Herbert Scoville, Chief of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, counseled a 
civil defense aviation representative that aircraft would not be needed to track radioactive 
bomb clouds “in order to warn civil populations of possible radioactive hazards.” 
Scoville claimed that, in the case of an air burst bomb, plane tracking would be “an 
unnecessary complication in the civil defense picture” both in the risk to which it would 
expose the crew and the panic its reports might create on the ground. In any detonation 
“where serious contamination might occur,” the letter claimed that fallout would be local 
and then go downwind.10  
 One of the first clues that fallout might be a more significant problem than 
previously believed came in 1951 from environmental sampling nearly three thousand 
miles away from any nuclear bomb tests the United States had ever conducted. In 1951, 
rain samples taken in the northeastern United States showed traces of fallout from tests in 
Nevada from earlier that same year. This meant that fallout did not stay locally contained 
as previously believed. It was one thing to dump radiation over a relatively unpopulated 
Nevada, but when that fallout appeared over highly populated areas on the East Coast it 
was another. After that revelation, fallout monitoring increased with a sampling network 
established at the Eniwetok proving ground later that year and a mobile, two-person 
monitoring station 200-500 miles from the Nevada testing site in 1952. In conjunction 
with the Weather Bureau (a working relationship that would continue to intensify), the 
AEC also set up over a hundred fixed monitoring stations.11 
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 In general, most of the concerns about fallout during the Truman administration 
eschewed environmental understandings and focused heavily on the effects that radiation 
would have on human bodies, especially evident in Project Sunshine. Sunshine, a 
recurring research series, focused on fallout and how it affected human bodies. The 
earliest research tended to center on strontium 90 (Sr90)—the fallout product most likely 
to affect human health—and deposits of it in human bones after atomic tests.12 This 
research frequently avoided studying the environment in favor of concentrating on human 
health, later research, especially during the Eisenhower era, looked more closely at how 
Sr90 entered the human body and especially considered the environmental connections 
involved. For radioactive fallout to enter human bones, it would first need to be ingested 
as part of the body’s diet. Since Sr90 most closely resembled calcium (this is why it 
frequently ended up in human bones), the ways humans ingested calcium received close 
attention during Sunshine studies. AEC records on Sunshine show that by the beginning 
of the Eisenhower Presidency, researchers started to turn their attention to dairy products 
like milk and cheese, but also the natural products that make up milk cows’ feed like 
clover and oats.13 
 Hence while focus on fallout had begun to increase by the time Eisenhower 
succeeded Truman as President of the United States, it had not ascended to anywhere 
near the heights it would reach within the next decade. Previously, there had been 
relatively few reasons for policymakers to fear fallout as an incredibly menacing force. 
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Finding fallout radiation in New England or Sr90 in agricultural products troubled many 
people, both experts and civilians. But unlike the hazards that would confront the nation 
during Eisenhower’s first two years in office, Truman never had to deal with any massive 
events that both endangered huge swaths of peoples and brought fallout to the direct 
attention of the nation’s citizenry. The first of those powerfully destructive nuclear tests 
occurred when Eisenhower had held the office of President for less than half a year. 
 During the spring and early summer of 1953, the United States conducted a test 
series at the Nevada Test Site called “Upshot-Knothole” that created significant fallout 
problems and first began to heighten policymakers’ sensitivity to fallout. The 19 May test 
shot in that series, named “Harry” (some would later call it “Dirty Harry”), produced 
some of the most dramatic fallout radiation the United States has ever seen. The 21 May 
meeting of the AEC Commissioners discussed the fallout from that shot and initially 
deemed that, because of precautions like advising townspeople downwind of the blast to 
remain indoors from 9am until noon, no person exceeded the maximum permissible 
thirteen-week dose of radiation. The radiation cloud moved from the Nevada Test Site 
toward the St. George, Utah area and eventually out to the Gulf of Mexico (where 
presumably it did not matter anymore).14 Though they did not know it at the time, the 
people downwind of the Harry test shot unwittingly became involved in the AEC’s 
uncontrolled experiment into human health and the environment. 
 After erroneously assuring themselves that likely no persons had been seriously 
injured from the fallout, the Commissioners then moved to discuss the safeguards in 
place before all tests to minimize fallout contamination risks, showing they did 
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previously have some idea about the dangers of radioactive fallout. As Chapter One 
showed, weather proved particularly important in minimizing fallout, but the 
Commissioners pointed out that reducing local fallout risks did not always ensure the 
reduction of long-range fallout, and thus the two had to be balanced. Three weather 
conditions proved particularly important for shots at the Nevada Test Site, and testers 
tried never to detonate nuclear weapons when the winds 30,000-45,000 feet high blew in 
the direction of the St. George-Bunkersville area; “a vertical wind shear [was] present 
which would focus the blast on Las Vegas”; or if the immediate forecast called for rain. 
The Commissioners emphasized, “Weather forecasts, both long-range and local, are 
reviewed until half an hour before the shot and if, at any time, these criteria are not met, 
the shot is postponed.” And yet, even with such precautions an element of luck existed, as 
unpredicted local thunderstorms were always possible. Rain after a test could dump 
tremendous amounts of radiation in a localized area, and the Commissioners assured 
themselves that small towns could be evacuated, if needed, and citizens in larger towns 
could be advised to stay inside. Thus, while there were no firm, written guidelines for 
when testing could occur, the above rules always had been followed, meaning tests had 
been and should be safe.15 
 Despite assurances of safety, however, the AEC continued to have problems with 
the fallout from “Dirty Harry.” Some farmers claimed that the Upshot-Knothole test 
series caused livestock deaths and injuries to the survivors, allegations the AEC 
immediately investigated. One farmer alleged that some of his cattle died of radioactivity, 
but State of Nevada veterinarians determined the cause of death was malnutrition. Other 
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nearby cattle died after drinking from a waterhole, with allegations that they had died 
from radioactive water, but “an analysis of the waterhole showed less than a maximum 
permissible concentration.” What the AEC could not explain away, though, was that 
some livestock showed radiation burns, and perhaps as much as ten percent of the nearby 
10,000 sheep died sometime after from then undetermined causes. Some of the nearby 
farmers, therefore, wanted to get out of the area or have the AEC buy their livestock—
one man even wanted the Commission to buy his mining site. Naturally, this caused the 
AEC to worry about public relations, as some people “in the vicinity of the Nevada 
Proving Ground no longer had faith in the AEC.” To counteract this, the AEC placed 
great importance on “choosing, for an objective presentation of the AEC ‘case’, men who 
would enjoy the full confidence of the public.”16 
 A week later, the AEC Commissioners again discussed fallout problems from 
Upshot-Knothole, but their discussions evinced a clear emphasis on the liability the 
Commission might suffer and not an understanding of the interconnectedness between 
the environment and human health. The Commissioners considered involving specialists 
from agricultural colleges to help investigate animal deaths as “a matter of urgency.” 
They also again discussed the sheep that had died near the proving grounds and 
confusingly reported their deaths “had not been caused by radiation; however, since the 
animals might have suffered some radiation injury it is possible that this was a 
contributing factor in their deaths.” An exhaustive investigation into their deaths needed 
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to be conducted, though, to determine exactly what did kill the ungulates.17 Issues still 
existed with the public, though, and with good reason.18 No matter how much the AEC 
asserted that peoples who had stayed inside were fine and that the Commission’s atomic 
bombs did not cause animal deaths, the public did not always believe the Commission 
and with good reason. 
 Though it took until 1984 for a judge to render the final opinion in Irene Allen vs. 
The United States (Allen et al. v. U.S. Government, 1979), a federal court eventually 
determined that fallout from nuclear tests caused cancer in some “downwinders,” as the 
people downwind of the tests came to be called. Environmentalist-journalist Philip 
Fradkin wrote that those who suffered had been unusually patriotic and innocent, saying 
their biggest problem was, “They trusted. That was their downfall.” For Fradkin, the most 
serious breach in the whole affair was that the U.S. government, including the AEC, did 
not do more to warn the public about fallout dangers and how to protect their bodies. He 
wrote, “At one end of the scale of injustice, this breach of faith could be viewed as an act 
of sustained stupidity, while at the other it resembled a perfidious act carried out by a 
government against its own people.”19 On the other hand, unless the AEC Commissioners 
planned in advance to be deceitful during their meetings discussed above, it is at least 
possible that the AEC truly did not know the extent of the damage their tests might cause. 
Since there is indeed a difference between ignorance and stupidity, perhaps the AEC’s 
actions represent neither stupidity nor treachery and should not be placed on a scale of 
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injustice at all—it is possible the U.S. government simply did not know enough to protect 
its citizens. 
 Where the Harry shot of Operation Upshot-Knothole began to alert the United 
States public to the danger fallout radiation could have, the 1 March 1954 thermonuclear 
blast of Operation Castle’s Bravo shot on the Bikini Atoll, as Chapter One described, 
clued in the entire world to the possible dangers. That Bravo (Figure 12) shot was much 
larger than expected and spewed radioactive fallout over huge stretches of the Pacific 
Ocean. AEC Commissioner Lewis Strauss tried very hard to downplay any problems 
publicly, but a 12 May 1954 meeting of the AEC Commissioners reviewed “at length” 
the status of problems from fallout from Pacific test operations. That review decided it 
was “undesirable” for the “inhabitants of Rongulap atoll [sic]” to go back to island for a 
year.20 The Commissioners decided that even though the Marshall Islanders were in 
“satisfactory condition,” they would still need a suitable home. In addition to these 
islanders, a Japanese fishing vessel, the Lucky Dragon, also “received considerable fall-
out in the test area.” Not only did these fishermen suffer from radiation poisoning, but the 
tests also caused worries about tuna contamination. Just as with the downwinders, these 
people too became part of the U.S. government’s uncontrolled experiment into radiation, 
human health, and the environment. The report to the Commissioners noted, “Japanese 
anxiety about the possible consequences of contamination had been caused in part, at 
least, by the prospect of the cancellation of orders placed by American firms.”21 Concerns 
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about radioactive fish contaminated by this thermonuclear blast continued to be a 
problem for the United States. 
 An exchange of letters about fallout damage from the Bravo test can help 
illuminate the United States’ position on the subject, showing an intense desire to 
downplay any wrongdoing while still being incredibly concerned about national safety. 
Jane Nishiwaki, a woman from the United States married to a Japanese biophysicist, 
expressed grave concerns in a missive to the President in late April 1954. John Bugher, 
Director of the AEC Division of Biology and Medicine responded to her on 1 June. 
Bugher forwarded his response to Sherman Adams, Assistant to the President on that 
same day and described Nishiwaki as a potential communist or communist sympathizer 
teaching at a mission school in Osaka, Japan. Bugher declared to Adams that he had to be 
very careful with his response, because anything he told her might end up in Communist 
hands. He did say, however that “the attachment to her letter, prepared by her husband, 
contains valuable technical information concerning the Japanese fishing ship which 
information we have been unable to obtain from the Japanese authorities in Tokyo.”22 
Thus Bugher well showed that issues of national security were paramount when dealing 
with concerns about radioactive fallout, but that the desire for knowledge meant 
communicating with Nishiwaki seemed like a good idea. 
 In Bugher’s response to Nishiwaki, he tried to downplay most of her concerns 
about the damage of radioactive fallout from U.S. tests and emphasized U.S. control (of 
course, overt denial of a problem implies recognition that the problem may exist). The 
Biology and Medicine Director said that some of Nishiwaki’s fears were unfounded, such 
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as the fear that radiation might kill anyone. Bugher proclaimed that no one had died, and 
“As far as the patients who have been under American care are concerned, I can state that 
there is no serious permanent injury.” He said the Japanese patients seemed fine as well 
(these statements proved overly optimistic as deaths and severe illnesses would occur). 
Bugher’s response to Nishiwaki also downplayed the problem of contaminated fish, 
claiming that only the fish of the Fukuryu Maru (Lucky Dragon) had been contaminated, 
and none of those fish entered ports in Japan, Hawaii, or the United States. He continued, 
“I understand that a few cargoes of fish in Japan were found to have detectable but 
hygienically insignificant amounts of contamination.” Inspections found traces of 
radioactivity in two fish, but the levels in these “were substantially below that which 
would be important from a health standpoint. This, of course, does not minimize the 
importance of the very substantial market disturbance which occurred through fear rather 
than because of an actual radio-contamination danger.”23 This statement did minimize, 
however, any concerns about radioactive fish from dangerous radioactive fallout by 
asserting that only unfounded fears could cause market disruptions. 
 Bugher’s most interesting assertion, however, downplayed the power of any U.S. 
bombs before the power of the natural world. He wrote, “Something of a proper 
perspective in these matters is given by the sad news of the loss of hundreds of fishermen 
and dozens of ships in the recent storm off northern Japan. Impressive as these man-made 
nuclear detonations may be, they are dwarfed by the frequently occurring manifestations 
of nature.” Whereas most of Bugher’s letter to Nishiwaki diminished the power nature 
had to affect human bodies (by carrying radioactive fallout), at this point the Director 
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accentuated the natural world’s power. While the United States, per Bugher’s comments, 
had well controlled the environment when it came to something like radioactive fish, 
humans certainly were powerless to stop something as mighty as an ocean storm. Bugher 
intended this statement to make U.S. thermonuclear bombs, even ones that were twice as 
powerful as anticipated and caused significant problems with the radioactive fallout 
produced, pale in comparison to natural occurrences completely out of human control. 
Thus Bugher’s response to Nishiwaki treaded a fine line between asserting the United 
States’ control of the situation and diminishing any power the nation (or any humans) 
had. He closed by reaffirming the need for nuclear tests, though, saying, “Finally, I am 
sure you will agree that devastating general war and tremendous suffering can be 
prevented only by keeping the free world overwhelmingly strong. To this end, personal 
inconvenience and some risks must at times be accepted by everyone of us.”24 What 
constitutes acceptable “personal inconvenience and some risks,” of course, varies from 
person to person. 
 The July 1954 Semiannual AEC Report to Congress further elaborated on the 
problems stemming from the recent U.S. bomb tests, vacillating between accepting blame 
for the troubles and downplaying those issues. The report acknowledged that tests 
exposed both the Marshall Islanders and crew of the Fukuryu Maru to fallout radiation. It 
contradicted Japanese press reports of grossly contaminated fish, though, claiming, 
“Informed scientific opinion, borne out by recent continuous monitoring by the Federal 
Food and Drug Administration of tuna fish coming to the west coast from the Pacific 
fishing grounds, and further supported by several years’ results of AEC marine biological 
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studies, provides no basis for alarm as to the consumption of tuna caught in the Pacific.” 
With this explanation, however, the report also admitted that after nuclear tests 
“radioactive debris is distributed by normal air currents over large areas and with 
sufficiently sensitive instruments may be found to encircle the globe.” This meant that 
surely some of the radioactive fallout ended up over the continental United States and 
indeed many commercial fisheries worldwide.25 Nonetheless, concerns about radioactive 
fallout affecting living organisms, such as a July 1954 report from Formosa that “fish 
which have acquired slight radioactivity had been caught not far from the island,” 
continued to vex the AEC and its public relations, no matter if tests found such fish “well 
within acceptable limits.”26 
 Correspondence between Dean Rusk and President Eisenhower in early 1955 
highlights that both the public and the U.S. government took fallout radiation very 
seriously after the Upshot-Knothole Harry and Castle Bravo shots. The future Secretary 
of State, then President of the Rockefeller Foundation, wrote to the President on 23 
February to say that at a recent Rockefeller board meeting “there was an extended and 
sober discussion of a matter of deep concern to you and to all thoughtful men and 
women, namely, the effects of atomic radiation on living organisms.” The Rockefeller 
Foundation had supported nuclear research for decades, but thought the “development of 
nuclear weapons poses grave concerns which bear upon a wide range of human concerns, 
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from the lethal effects of ‘fall-out’ to the new avenues which might be opened for more 
abundant and healthful life.” Rockefeller claimed that the nation needed more knowledge 
to settle these concerns and the Trustees wanted to help explore the effects of radiation on 
living organisms, especially “the possible danger to the genetic heritage of man himself.” 
Rusk therefore approached Eisenhower seeking the President’s approval that the National 
Academy of Sciences engage such research with the Rockefeller Foundation’s financial 
support.27 
 In his response several days later, President Eisenhower said he had been glad to 
receive the letter and generally focused on how, even though the United States had 
radiation problems under control, perhaps more research could be beneficial. Eisenhower 
emphasized that radiation problems did not come only from atomic bomb testing, but also 
from peaceful developments of the atom, clearly implying that stopping bomb tests alone 
would not control every problem associated with atomic development. The President 
wrote that he had discussed Rusk’s letter with AEC Chairman Lewis Strauss, who stated 
the Commission had already budgeted $3 million a year “for its studies conducted in its 
own and university laboratories on various aspects of fall-out from weapon detonations, 
stack gases from atomic installations, the disposal of the wastes of separation processes, 
isotopes used in experimentation, etc.” Nonetheless, Eisenhower thought, “it may well be 
that much more can and should be done.” He thus promised to send the letter to Strauss 
so that the Commissioner might arrange a meeting with the Rockefeller Board of 
Trustees “to explore further [Rusk’s] very generous proposal.”28 Rusk’s response thanked 
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the President for his attention on the matter and said he would meet with Strauss on 
“whether there is a constructive and useful role for the National Academy of Sciences 
and the Rockefeller Foundation to play in this matter.”29 
 Many U.S. Senators agreed with the general tenor that produced the Rusk-
Eisenhower correspondence, trying to moderate fears of radioactive fallout with 
increased research. A month after the Rusk-Eisenhower correspondence, a group of them, 
led by Senator Frederick G. Payne (R-ME), declared that the number of nuclear tests was 
likely to increase in the future, not decrease, and that it was known that such detonations 
“can have serious deleterious effects, from an immediate and long-range standpoint, on 
human beings and other living organisms.” On 13 April 1955, these Senators therefore 
introduced Concurrent Resolution 22 of the 84th Congress that said, “Congress requests 
the President to instruct our chief delegate to the United Nations to take whatever steps 
may be necessary to propose and urge the formation of an international scientific 
commission within the United Nations to study and determine the effects on living 
organisms of radioactivity released by nuclear explosions.”30 At this point, then, it is clear 
that many in the U.S. government had begun to take radioactive fallout from nuclear 
weapons quite seriously, especially the need to better understand it through increased 
research. 
 Senator. Payne sent a letter to Sherman Adams on Senate Concurrent Resolution 
22 that underscored the growing attention paid to radiation fallout from testing with an 
eye toward international political maneuvering. Payne had introduced the resolution in 
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the Senate and twenty-seven other senators co-sponsored it. The Senator argued that 
adopting the resolution “would give the United States an opportunity to alleviate much of 
the fear of nuclear devices and the suspicion of itself which is so common in many parts 
of the world today.” Claiming that a great deal of foreign antagonism was directed at the 
United States because of radioactive fallout, Payne thought that if another nation ever 
called for an international nuclear testing moratorium the United States would be in a 
tough place without more knowledge (this proved quite prescient, as seen in Chapter 
Three). The Maine Senator wanted the United States to take the lead and exercise “moral 
leadership” to the world, as any U.S.-proposed commission would be less likely “to 
investigate or obstruct our testing program.” Finally, Payne concluded, “there is the 
possibility that an international group could reach some conclusions about the dangers of 
radioactivity which might well be of benefit to ourselves and our friends,” noting that if 
the Soviet Union did not agree “it would be another indication to the entire world of her 
utter disregard for the peace and security of all mankind.”31 The last few sentiments made 
clear that, while Payne thought radioactive fallout from tests damaged human bodies and 
world opinion of the United States, security and negotiating Cold War realities proved 
just as important in his moral calculus. 
 No matter how much policymakers in the AEC and White House focused on test 
radioactivity and its dangers, their decisions frequently reflected a desire to prevent or 
mitigate the tests’ political fallout, but not necessarily prevent altogether the radioactive 
fallout, as that would have required stopping nuclear tests. To deal with fallout that had 
already occurred, those in power needed more knowledge of environments and how 
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fallout affected those spaces. Sometimes, that knowledge merely served to allay fears, 
such as a report at the 28 June 1955 meeting of the AEC Commissioners that “no 
radioactivity attributable to Operation WIGWAM had been discovered by fish 
monitoring program on the west coast.”32 Wigwam was a test shot submerged 2,000 feet 
to test how deep underwater blasts affected submarines. At other times, such as 
ecological studies on coral reefs at the “Eniwetok Marine Biological Laboratory,” 
improved understandings both increased knowledge about the natural world and how 
fallout affected it. Those coral reef studies were “on whole plant-animal populations and 
ecological systems in the Central Pacific island areas used in atomic test operations.” 
Reckoning the effects of radioactive fallout on these systems required understanding the 
reefs’ ecology in its own right. Other research studied radioactivity, “natural or induced,” 
present in Pacific seawater and marine life. After taking measurements of the area 
(“temperatures, current characteristics, salinity, and radioactivity” at various ocean 
depths), researchers found “minute traces” of radioactivity that they said did not affect 
the safety of eating Pacific fish.33 
 Research also attempted to determine radioactive fallout’s distribution pattern 
throughout the world, which proved highly dependent on environmental factors. As 
makes sense, the atmosphere and its conditions affected fallout more than anything else. 
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Fish – Fallout 
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As one document on atmospheric fallout attested, the radiation could come in three types: 
local, tropospheric latitudinal, and stratospheric worldwide.34 The size of radioactive 
particles governed both the height these reached and the rate of fall and determined which 
air currents would buffet those particles and thus direct how far these spread. Local 
fallout (more likely if the fireball from a detonation touched the ground) mostly 
contained larger particles, with smaller particles reaching the troposphere or sometimes 
stratosphere. Rain especially affected tropospheric fallout, and in this layer of the 
atmosphere radioactive fallout had a half-life (where half dissipated) of about three 
weeks. Global wind patterns meant a radioactive cloud, barring seasonal variations, could 
circle the earth in a month or two (slower from north to south than east to west, meaning 
latitudes with testing—the tropics—received more radiation from fallout than other 
latitudes). Stratospheric particles, on the other hand, fall extremely slowly and thus fell 
over the entire earth. Only around ten percent of what was stored in the stratosphere fell 
down into the troposphere each year, and once it left the stratosphere (and entered the 
troposphere) it would affect worldwide radiation levels.35  
How the atmosphere distributed fallout radiation throughout the planet played a 
significant role in the AEC’s unplanned experiment into radiation, the natural world, and 
human health, even though this experiment went unrecognized. Thus research made its 
way to policymakers and showed a direct connection between the natural world 
(especially the atmosphere) and fallout distribution. To make good decisions about 
                                                
34 The Troposphere is the Earth’s atmosphere up to ten kilometers high, well the Stratosphere is the layer 
ten to thirty kilometers high. These are followed by the Mesosphere, Thermosphere, and Exosphere (or 
outer space). 
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radioactive fallout, those in power needed to understand something about the 
environment and how fallout functioned in natural systems.  
 To gain such understandings about the connection between the natural world, 
nuclear tests, and human health, the AEC developed affiliations with other governmental 
organizations, particularly the Weather Bureau. Emphasizing this point, significant 
meteorological research at the behest of the AEC shows an important working 
relationship between the U.S. Weather Bureau and the AEC Division of Biology and 
Medicine.36 As an example, the AEC used weather balloons to trace radioactive fallout, 
which involved meteorology and meteorologists in the research to detect and understand 
atmospheric radioactive fallout (Figures 13, 14, and 15).37 Later research emphasized 
improving knowledge about radioactive fallout in oceans. As one Weather Bureau 
representative would claim in 1959, “It appears that we do not have the oceanic fallout 
under adequate control.”38 And the relationship benefitted meteorologists, as well, since 
they could use fallout like a radioactive tracer to follow current patterns in the ozone.39 
Though testers did not intentionally do so, the fallout produced by blasts helped 
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37 NACP, 326 Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Entry 73, Division of Biology and Medicine, 
Records Relating to Fallout Studies, Box 3, 1953-6, Folder Stratospheric Monitoring, Jan. 1958, #2, 
Constant Level, Balloons as Tracers of Air Motion in Atomic Weapon Tests for the Atomic Energy 
Commission 
38 NACP, 326 Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Entry 73, Division of Biology and Medicine, 
Records Relating to Fallout Studies, 1953-6, Box 2, Folder General Files – Fallout – Collection Analysis, 
Memorandum from Lester Machta to Hal Hollister, Subj: Oceanic Sampling, 16 November 1959. Machta 
was Chief, Special Projects Section, Office of Meteorological Research, U.S. Weather Bureau, Hollister 
was Division of Biology and Medicine of the AEC. This is likely one reason why October 1960 work 
occurred by the Scripps Institute into providing “a general description of the distribution of temperature, 
salinity, density, oxygen, and other chemical properties of the Indian Ocean – in particular the study of the 
changing circulation pattern under the influence of the monsoon winds.” NACP, 326 Records of the 
Atomic Energy Commission, Entry 73, Division of Biology and Medicine, Records Relating to Fallout 
Studies, 1953-6, Box 19, Folder Indian Ocean Expedition 
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and attaches an October 1960 article in the British journal Endeavour called “Radioactive tracers in the 
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meteorologists run experiments on global environmental phenomena. The Weather 
bureau, thus, became an integral part of the research to improve understandings of how 
fallout from testing moved throughout the earth and then fell back down to the planet. 
 Of course decision makers at this time frequently proved less concerned with how 
radiation affected the environment per se, but instead cared about how it might 
concentrate in human bodies and cause health problems. That is to say, since radiation 
from the environment affected bodies, policymakers did indeed care about the how 
testing put radiation in the environment. But that does not mean they necessarily held 
concern for how radioactive fallout damaged the environment or affected environmental 
health. Once fallout reached the ground, the “physical and chemical character of soils 
plays a predominant part in the entry of minerals into the food chain.” Strontium 90, with 
its half-life of 28 years, usually stayed in the top one to two inches of the soil. Cesium-
137 (Cs137) also affected environs and humans, but drew less interest. Some research thus 
focused on how plants, soil, Sr90, and Cs137 all interacted (more in Chapter Four). 
Important to decision makers, though, studies found that as strontium progressed through 
the food chain (such as through feed into cattle and then milk into humans), the ratio of 
Sr90 to calcium (the element Sr90 most modeled in biological systems) decreased. Since 
essentially all Sr90 and Cs137 that humans ingested came as part of their diet, biological 
systems themselves provided a bit of a buffer or resistance to depositing radiation directly 
into human bodies.40 That is to say, the natural world would mediate the process as long 
as the fallout did not drop directly on human skin as happened to the downwinders after 
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the Upshot Knothole Harry shot or to the Japanese fishermen and Marshal Islanders after 
the Castle Bravo shot. 
 In 1956, the United States and the world showed an increased focus on fallout 
radiation and studying it, likely stemming from the deadly results of the Operation Castle 
Bravo shot.41 On 14 March, the United Nations convened its Scientific Committee of 
Atomic Radiation, especially concerned with fallout and the “effects of radiation on man 
and his environment.”42 The most significant program conducted by the United States 
was the Department of Defense’s Radiation Effects Program during Operation Redwing. 
That program’s primary purpose “was to obtain as complete documentation as possible of 
fallout from high-yield thermonuclear detonations” and especially study how 
radioactivity distributed itself throughout the atomic cloud; collect and characterize that 
fallout; and correlate data so that it could be extrapolated to land surfaces. This program 
found that most radioactivity stayed in the lower part of the mushroom cloud and, as 
seems logical, larger particles created the most radioactivity. With the data collected, 
researchers established what seemed to be a good cloud model, “which would allow more 
precision in predicting areas of local fallout, although it would not be possible to predict 
hot spots terribly well because of variation in wind.” And, lest anyone in the United 
States worry about the fallout created from these tests, the AEC assured that most of the 
                                                
41 For various research on fallout, see “Longterm Effects of Fall-Out from Nuclear Weapons” in Nineteenth 
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Stratospheric Monitoring, April 55 thru Dec. 57, Letter General Manager to Clinton P. Anderson. 
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Redwing test material ended up in Mexico.43 In general, the Commission tried to 
establish that its nuclear tests posed no threats to the safety of either government 
personnel or to civilians. Efforts to assuage a worried citizenry even rose to public 
prevarications, saying that the AEC knew of no member of the public “to have suffered 
an overexposure to radiation as a result of living near atomic energy production or 
laboratory centers” or from weapons tests at the Nevada Test Site (where Upshot 
Knothole Harry was detonated).44 
 Unsurprisingly, interest and focus on fallout continued to rise, and the years 1957 
and 1958 saw U.S. policymakers pay more attention to the problem of radioactive fallout 
than they likely had in the previous fifteen years combined. For example, in April 1957 
AEC Commissioner Willard F. Libby reported on the “Fireball Chemistry Project.” That 
endeavor considered “the ways and means of reducing the accessibility of radio-
strontium in fallout to the biosphere and in particular to the human body. The basic 
technique is the incorporation of the radio-strontium in insoluble particles.” In essence, 
this meant putting perhaps a hundred tons of sand around a test weapon before firing it so 
that condensation of radioactive particles might happen within that sand and trap the 
radiation there.45 And if reducing radiation in tests proved important, so did reducing 
fears about that radiation to the public. 
 U.S. decision makers on atomic matters worked hard to allay public anxieties 
about radioactive fallout as much as possible. For example, the AEC Commissioners tried 
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to explain in a Parents magazine article, “Long before nuclear weapons were even 
thought of, in fact, ever since people have lived on this planet, they have been subject to 
radiation from cosmic rays and from the radioactive material in the crust of the earth.” 
The article claimed that, while the media might make SR90 seem quiet scary, the amount 
that had already fallen from all nuclear tests was roughly equivalent to what a person 
would receive in extra cosmic rays if he or she moved to a location about 300 feet higher 
in elevation.46  
Public apprehension was significant enough, though, that at his 5 June 1957 press 
conference President Eisenhower fielded a question about how “some top geneticists and 
other scientists have testified that fall-out radiation from nuclear weapons tests will 
damage hundreds of thousands and, perhaps, millions of the yet unborn in terms of 
physical deformities and shortened life spans.” The President brushed aside such 
concerns, however, referencing a previous report about how humans receive doses of 
radiation from all sorts of things they do every day. Diminishing the veracity of such 
claims, he added, “Incidentally, I noticed that [in many instances] scientists that seem to 
be out of their own field of competence are getting into this argument, and it looks like 
almost an organized affair.”47 Eisenhower insisted that the U.S. government took its job 
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of protecting the nation very seriously and therefore the government had not stopped 
testing (even if it had tried to make those bombs cleaner).48 This President intended this 
last comment to cause the public to question its perspectives and consider which was 
truly more dangerous—fallout from U.S. tests or the threat of communist hordes with 
their own bombs.  
 With public concerns about fallout rising, the White House developed a form 
letter to send to concerned citizens who wrote the President, which reflected a desire to 
moderate public opinion on the subject. The letter stated that the President certainly cared 
about the “possible hazard of fallout,” but that he also cared about the defense of the 
United States. The letter even cited former President Truman’s thoughts on the subject. It 
quoted Truman as saying, “Let us keep our sense of proportion in the matter of 
radioactive fall-out. Of course, we want to keep fall-out in our tests to the absolute 
minimum, and we are learning to do just that. But the dangers that might occur from the 
fall-out in our tests involve a small sacrifice when compared to the infinitely greater evil 
of the use of nuclear bombs in war.” Thus, the document presented the U.S. citizenry 
with a hypothetical choice; “a very small risk [of fallout] from testing or […] catastrophe 
which might result from a surrender of our leadership in nuclear armament which has 
                                                                                                                                            
“We, the undersigned, urgently recommend that the United States immediately discontinue its explosions 
of nuclear weapons, pending thorough investigation of the long-range effects of radioactive fallout. We 
further urge that the United States take the initiative in promoting similar steps on a worldwide basis.” 
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from University of Washington students, 24 June 1957 
48 President Eisenhower later tried to clarify his comments about scientists working outside his field with a 
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D. Eisenhower Papers as President, Ann Whitman File, Press Conference Series, Box 6, Press Conference 
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been, we believe, the deterrent to aggression since 1945.”49 In short, the statement told 
those concerned about fallout in no uncertain terms that dealing with “a very small risk” 
of fallout from testing was the only thing standing between them and communist 
Armageddon. White House staff also intended to attach, with the form letter, a copy of a 
report titled “Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Testing” by Charles L. Dunham, Director, 
Division of Biology and Medicine of the AEC. 
 Dunham’s summary report had a similar feeling to it as the form letter and also 
sought to dispel fears that concerned citizens might have held about nuclear testing. The 
Director of the AEC’s Biology and Medicine division claimed, “No environmental 
hazard nor substance to which human beings are exposed has been investigated so 
thoroughly as radiation and radioactive materials.” Dunham clearly explained that three 
principal dangers existed from radioactive fallout— leukemia, genetic damage to 
reproductive organs, and “bone irradiation” from intake of radiation such as Sr90. In the 
end, though, the report claimed, “pathologists agree that while theoretically there might 
possibly be a very small addition in the amount of bone cancer over the world as a result 
of assimilated strontium-90 from fallout, the effects will be so small as to be 
undetectable, even statistically.” Genetic effects were not really such a problem either, 
according to Dunham.50 In short, while those in positions of power cared about public 
opinion when it came to the dangers posed by radioactive fallout, the information those 
decision makers put back out attempted to diminish those concerns or convince naysayers 
that worrying about fallout meant a lack of concern about national security. A month later 
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when many citizens had received their AEC response letters on “the Fallout Problem,” 
Strauss reported that he felt gratified at the surprise and pleasure many of those recipients 
felt. He said, “the attention given to each of the hundreds of letters received has helped to 
dispel some of the misconceptions held by individuals about weapons testing.”51 
 Commissioner Willard F. Libby gave similar words of assurance during a 26 
April 1957 speech that emphasized the importance of natural factors in combatting 
radioactive fallout from nuclear tests. The AEC reprinted the speech in its July 1957 
report to Congress, assuring Libby’s talk reached a wider audience. Libby explained that 
fallout and its effects depended on many factors, including “not only contact of the 
fireball with the surface, but the nature of the surface, whether it be land or water and the 
type of soil and the composition of the water, whether fresh or sea water.” He further said 
that, as a rough rule, kiloton weapons stayed in the troposphere, but megaton weapons 
would enter the stratosphere. After this, fallout might enter plant systems and get eaten by 
animals (such as cows) that would then produce milk for human consumption. Since 
humans receive most of their calcium from milk, this represented the most dangerous 
source of SR90 ingestion for humans. Libby somberly noted, “judging from experience 
with plants, insects, animals, and lower organisms, there is every reason to expect some 
genetic effects of radiation.” And yet the Commissioner downplayed such concerns in 
closing by saying, “In summary, then, we see that the present body burden of strontium 
90 from atomic weapons tests in the United States corresponds to the radiation dosage to 
the bones which would result from a few hundred feed increase in altitude, and the 
present vital statistics show no observable effect on the occurrence of bone cancer or 
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leukemia of much larger changes in altitude.”52 No matter what the gloom and doom 
crowd might say, the dangers from radioactive fallout once it entered the environments 
and biological entities with which humans most interacted resulted in less radiation 
damage than what a person moving from the East Coast to Denver might expect to 
experience. By extension, anyone who worried about SR90 did so unnecessarily and 
without proper attention to the facts. 
 Those in positions of power also attempted to increase their own knowledge about 
fallout so that they could make the best decisions possible, or at least deflect criticisms as 
well as possible. In the summer of 1957, the AEC’s Willard Frank Libby communicated 
with Eilif Dahl of the Agricultural College of Norway Botanical Institute. Libby asked 
Dahl for advice about soils and fallout. Dahl confirmed Libby’s suspicion that plowing 
might reduce the amount of strontium that crops took in, provided it occurred in humid 
areas with plants that have shallower root systems (this seemed less important in arid 
areas where plants tend to have deeper roots). Dahl also confirmed that strontium fixation 
could happen in soil, meaning that the fallout would be stuck in the soil and therefore 
more likely to be absorbed by plants.53  
 Another way to increase knowledge on fallout, like the Department of Defense 
had done with its Radiation Effects Program during Operation Redwing, was to increase 
research programs. Some endeavors sought to learn more about cleaning up past messes, 
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such as dealing with the Marshall Islanders affected by the Castle Bravo shot. By 1957, 
SR90 had decreased sufficiently among the Marshall Islands, except among land crabs, as 
to allow human repopulation. The AEC figured that as long as the Marshall Islanders 
eliminated these land crabs from their diet and imported rice they would be fine.54  
In hindsight, the Marshall Islanders would not be fine. As described by 
anthropologists Barbara Rose Johnston and Holly M. Barker, island human populations 
suffered immensely as a result of U.S. nuclear weapons tests, particularly the Operation 
Castle Bravo shot. The authors contend that, beyond immediate health effects, the 
Marshall Islanders experienced incredible doses of long-term radiation exposure, suffered 
from bioaccumulated radiation from living in irradiated environments, and even 
encountered horrifying birth defects. Even worse, Johnson and Barker argued AEC 
scientists used their bodies as test subjects without the Marshall Islanders’ consent, 
representing a significant ethical and scientific breach. Of course, some of these charges 
must be balanced with the real and necessary (even if ultimately insufficient) efforts to 
determine exactly how much the United States’ tests had harmed the Marshall Islanders 
so that these peoples could be helped—where do medical investigations to help a 
population end and “biomedical research […] conducted without meaningful consent” 
begin? 55  
 Of course in hindsight, the experiments involving the health of Marshall Islanders 
as they interacted with radioactive fallout highlight that widespread worldwide fallout 
unintentionally operated as a similar experiment on the entire world. The AEC 
investigated not only how fallout radiation had directly affected Marshall Islanders, but 
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also how they might be further exposed to radiation from the local environments and 
especially their food supply.56 Though not as direct as the Marshall Islanders, as radiation 
swirled around the world through the atmosphere, every human on the planet—especially 
those in the tropics—was affected. Thus by seeing how the fallout from nuclear tests 
affected ecosystems and human bodies, the AEC in essence ran a much less controlled 
experiment into radiation and human health. While the treatment of the Marshall 
Islanders is horrifying and shocking, what was intentionally done to them was at least 
partially done to much of the world, even if unintentionally. 
 In addition to health studies, the Commission also planned long-term ecological 
studies, such as large parts of Operation Plumbbob, emphasizing the importance of 
environmental understandings to understanding fallout. Any large test series represented 
a significant financial undertaking for the AEC, and thus Plumbbob’s approval by 
executive policymakers demonstrates that they well understood and appreciated the 
important of both fallout and the environment to understanding it. That test series began 
in 1957 and principally aimed to develop defensive nuclear weapons with reduced “off-
site fallout,” particularly using techniques such as “additional arrangements for 
forecasting of wind speed and directions.”57 Project 37 during Operation Plumbbob 
particularly studied the radio-ecological aspects of nuclear fallout, and the extended 
program shows an evolving emphasis on environmental aspects of fallout.  
While previous focus from policymakers on fallout’s relation to the natural world 
had typically manifested itself only on the subject of human health, Plumbbob’s Project 
37 research represented something new—a large research program directly into how the 
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environment responded to radioactive fallout. Overall, Plumbbob research attempted to 
construct a model to determine “the manner in which [physical, chemical, and biological] 
parameters are influenced by variations in time, detonation yields, heights, and types of 
support.” Particularly, Project 37 supplied researchers with massive data sets that 
measured the natural world and its features that could then be used to better understand 
fallout. More specifically, Project 37.1 on radio-ecological documentation of fallout areas 
“centered primarily upon the relative biological accumulation, fate, and persistence of 
fallout products within the local flora and fauna during the acute and chronic phases of 
contamination,” Project 37.2 “was responsible for obtaining and evaluating certain 
biophysical data associated with the fallout phenomenon,” and Project 37.3 on 
agricultural soils, crops, and livestock investigated “relations within human environments 
and food cycles. These studies were dictated by a need for field data on the potential 
consequences to man of nuclear fallout in agricultural areas.”58 Thus even though the 
AEC frequently told the public it should not worry about the danger of fallout, as 
Eisenhower’s presidency progressed the Commission spent much more time, effort, and 
money into studying how to prevent and mitigate the radioactive byproduct of testing. 
 In fact, constant reassurances that problems from radioactive fallout were 
overblown and that the public should not worry cast a harsh light on a simple truth—the 
same agency that built and tested bombs was also the one charged with protecting the 
public from bombs’ adverse effects. George Clark, a civilian geologist, pointed out this 
problem in an August 1957 letter to President Eisenhower. Of course, he showed his own 
                                                
58 NACP, 326 Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Entry 73, Division of Biology and Medicine, 
Records Relating to Fallout Studies, 1953-6, Box 1, Folder World-Wide Fallout (Sunshine) – General 
1958, Program 37, Civil Effects Test Group, Radio-Ecological Aspects of Nuclear Fallout: Introduction, 
Methods and Procedures, September 1957. The primary authors of the report were K. H. Larson, J. W. 
Neel, R. G. Lindberg, L. Baurmash, and G. V. Alexander.  
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biases by suggesting that the Geological Survey represented the ideal choice of civil 
servants to study the problem of radiation fallout.59 But this letter nonetheless highlighted 
and explained the herky-jerky, back-and-forth nature of AEC communications, both 
intra-agency and to the public. The AEC spent a great deal of time and effort justifying 
the need for more tests and more information about atomic bombs and atomic energy in 
general. It thus makes sense that most of the facts and figures coming out of that 
organization (and those in the White House who received their information from the 
AEC) would downplay the severity of any potential atomic dangers. It is difficult, 
therefore, to distinguish between times when downplaying concerns reflected presenting 
up-to-date environmental science to the public and when it instead represented the AEC 
allowing its mission to improve nuclear weapons to override its goal of protecting the 
public from the radioactive fallout nuclear weapons tests produced. 
 Even internal documents, though, emphasized the perceived overblown nature of 
public fears about radioactive fallout. The AEC’s Advisory Committee on Biology and 
Medicine submitted a report to the Commission on 19 October 1957 that put “The 
Problem” simply. It read, “The testing of nuclear weapons has injected into the 
atmosphere large amounts of radioactive materials in the form of dust of different particle 
sizes. These particles descend to the surface of the earth at different rates and constitute 
what is known as (radioactive) ‘fallout.’” It also reminded readers that both Sr90 and Cs137 
(especially Sr90) manifested themselves in soils and milk and had long half-lives—if all 
weapons tests stopped at that exact moment, the report estimated that equilibrium of Sr90 
                                                
59 Clark, a geologist with the Richfield Oil Corporation in Bakersfield, California, claimed the necessity of 
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would occur in the 1970s and decline after that. The fission products also could cause 
significant health issues, such as genetic damage, leukemia, bone tumors, and the 
obnoxiously descriptive problem of “life shortening.” In the end, the advisory committee 
found such problems somewhat inconsequential, saying, “Judging from discussion in the 
public press, it is not generally realized that the estimated damage is well within tolerable 
limits, applicable to radiation exposure of the whole population in its normal peacetime 
activities.” Stepping out of its purview of biology and medicine, the advisory committee 
then claimed that the real question that needed answering was whether the size and 
number of bombs being tested was consistent with scientific and military requirements.60 
 No matter their continued assertions that the U.S. populace should not worry 
about radioactive fallout, however, it is clear that U.S. policymakers did indeed care 
about what the public thought. In March 1957, the United States had declared that the 
nation intended “to conduct nuclear tests only in such manner as will keep world 
radiation from rising to more than a small fraction of the levels that might be hazardous.”  
This intention, however, meant that the United States wanted to do more testing to 
develop lower fallout weapons “so that radiation hazard may be restricted to the military 
target. This principle was first proved in the Pacific test series of 1956.” The January 
1958 AEC report to Congress emphasized these ideas and also discussed other ways the 
United States had attempted to lower fallout of nuclear weapons, improving both bombs 
and public relations. Operation Plumbbob proved especially important in improving the 
knowledge necessary for lowering the fallout in nuclear weapons while only marginally 
affecting human health, per the AEC. Its report claimed, “Measurements and calculations 
                                                
60 Underlining in original. DDEL, White House Central Files, General File, Box 1216, Folder 155-B, July – 
Sept. 1958, Statement on Radioactive Fallout Submitted to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission by the 
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of possible radiation exposures to the lungs as a result of Plumbbob fallout showed that 
the highest total accumulated dose (recorded at Eureka, Nev., with a population of about 
500) was less than that to be expected from breathing for a period of 2 weeks air which 
contained only the amount of radioactive materials that occurs naturally.”61 No matter if 
U.S. leaders continually asserted that fallout did not post a significant hazard for the 
nation’s populace, the fact that U.S. actions frequently put more radioactive fallout into 
the natural world and human bodies meant that the government would have to keep 
defending its actions. 
 Nonetheless, the AEC continued to think of its mission as first being to protect the 
United States and believed the greatest threat to the nation came not from radioactive 
contamination, but from the Soviet Union. One memo from AEC Commissioner Harold 
Vance to the Commission Chairman Lewis Strauss claimed, “In order to put the Russians 
on the defensive end to swing world opinion behind the United States, it is suggested that 
we propose an agreement to suspend the testing and manufacture of so-called ‘dirty 
weapons’ leaving the way open for testing and manufacture of so-called ‘clean 
weapons.’” Chapter Three will examine much more in depth the talks between the United 
States and the Soviet Union on nuclear test cessation during the Eisenhower presidency, 
but it is important to know is that concern about fallout played a pivotal part in those 
talks. Vance put concerns about radioactivity quite bluntly, though, in his advocacy for 
continued nuclear testing to create weapons with lessened fallout when he said, “Both 
local and worldwide contamination from fallout would considerably reduce the fruits of a 
                                                
61 Twenty-third Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, January 1958, 277-289. The report 
also included as Appendix 13 the Advisory Committee on Biology and Medicine’s “Statement on 
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military victory.”62 Others thought studies of radioactive fallout should be a much greater 
part of public policy, and the U.S. government had to deal with both public complaints 
and questions about the legitimacy of its decision-making power. 
 In May 1958, scientist-activist Barry Commoner wrote an article in Science called 
“The Fallout Problem” that called for science to take a greater role in the management of 
public affairs because he believed the U.S. government did not hold a proper balance of 
protection against communists versus fallout. Commoner saw the problem as having two 
thrusts—scientists did not know enough about fallout (so knowledge should be improved 
through further experimentation), and the public needed better access to what was known 
so that they could, with scientists’ guidance, make better decisions. As for the science 
problem, Commoner explained it quite clearly, “In part, our present troubles derive from 
the unequal pace of the development of physics and biology. We understand nuclear 
energy well enough to explode great quantities of radioactive materials into the 
atmosphere. But our present knowledge of biology and its attendant sciences is not 
adequate for contending with the difficulties that follow when the radioactive dust settles 
back to earth.” Even before the scientific process advanced biological knowledge to a 
sufficient level, though, the article challenged scientists to marshal “the full assemblage 
of facts about fallout, their meaning and uncertainties, and report them to the widest 
possible audience.” And yet reporting to the public what was known (or believed to be 
known) about fallout frequently caused the public to want different policy decisions than 
policymakers wanted to make.63 
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 Public criticisms of fallout and its effects on the environment and human bodies 
continued to exist and weighed heavily on the thoughts of decision makers, at least in 
determining how to dismiss or counter these. Alfred Phillips, a Democrat staunchly 
against nuclear testing, wrote a letter to President Eisenhower that asserted, “As a former 
member of the US Congress I believe and am reliably informed [he was not] that 
everytime an atom bomb is fired it will kill 500,000 children with cancer in the blood 
stream. Furthermore people think that the rains, the snows and the storms can be blamed 
on the atom bombs disturbing the upper air. Furthermore I have information that 
everytime an atom bomb is fired, everywhere on Earth, the upper air streams concentrate 
the dangerous fallout in New England.”64 Another citizen claimed in a letter to 
Eisenhower, “the findings of science that this radio activity gradually created by nuclear 
tests represents a grave danger for all parts of the world, poisoning air, soil and water, 
affecting people, many fatally, for generations to come.”65 Representative of a common 
viewpoint, many people in the United States believed nuclear fallout from testing (let 
alone the possibility of nuclear war) severely damaged the Earth’s environment, which 
then poisoned humans.66 Thus the U.S. citizenry worried about nuclear weapons testing, 
despite reassuring words and releases from the AEC and even Senator Clifford Case’s 
claims that the United States “must not let our enemies succeed in using the fear of 
                                                
64 DDEL, White House Central Files, General File, Box 1216, Folder 155-B, Apr. – June 1958, Telegram 
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poisoning the atmosphere—a fear felt increasingly by millions both in America and 
abroad—to halt our testing and development of weapons which may be essential to our 
very survival and to the protection of freedom everywhere on earth.”67 To give it the 
ammunition to allay such concerns the AEC continued its research programs into fallout 
and radiation. 
 By mid-1958, the AEC had begun thinking about fallout in much more ecological 
terms and actually used that term to describe investigations “into the effects of strontium 
90 on man and his environment, on the distribution, uptake, accumulation and eventual 
deposition in bone of strontium 90, and on methods of removing it from biological 
materials and from the soil.” At different sites, the AEC studied how different 
environments circulated and dealt with the fission products, especially interested in “the 
long-term effects of low-level radiation on plant and animal populations.” In one study at 
the Hanford nuclear processing plant, the AEC even created a “simulated natural pond” 
for the purpose of adding Cs137 and studying its dissipation throughout the ecosystem. 
Other research uncovered that nuclear test shots from towers produced much greater 
amounts of fallout than did balloon-supported shots (the particle size dropped from forty-
four microns in diameter to five when using balloons for the tests).68 The AEC also 
conducted deliberately ecological studies in the Pacific, such as on Rongelap Island in the 
Marshall Islands.69 Yet the Commission found some studies forced upon it.  
                                                
67 DDEL, White House Central Files, General File, Box 1216, Folder 155-B, Apr. – June 1958, Remarks by 
Senator Clifford P. Case, Prepared for Delivery at Luncheon of Advertising Club of N.J. Honoring 
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68 Twenty-fourth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, July 1958, 196-201.  
69 See research on “Radiobiological surveys of the Pacific.” Twenty-fifth Semiannual Report of the Atomic 
Energy Commission, January 1959, 195. 
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 In an incident more than vaguely reminiscent of the fallout-contaminated sheep in 
the Upshot-Knothole Harry shot, in 1959 the AEC investigated sick cattle in South 
Dakota. Floyd Fishel, a farmer living near Belle Pourche, South Dakota, claimed that 
fifteen of his yearling calves along with a few other cattle became ill from fallout 
radiation. The South Dakota Division of Radiological Health of the Public Health Service 
investigated these claims, as almost two years prior there had been a community-reported 
“radiation incident.” Investigators looked into the feedlots and hay storage and eventually 
decided that radiation had not killed the cattle; mucosal disease had. Their findings 
declared that radiation did not contaminate the hay “in sufficient quantity to be 
responsible for the death of his cattle, “ even if that hay was more radioactive than usual. 
In the end, officials hoped this analysis would be enough to prevent “what might have 
been another highly publicized radiation episode.”70 Of course, it took the AEC almost 
two years to finally make such judgments, meaning that any public relations damage that 
could have been done already would have been. And any persons predisposed to distrust 
the U.S. government and Atomic Energy Commission on the subject likely would have 
found no reason to change their minds. 
 After the United States began test cessation talks with the Soviet Union on 31 
October 1958, though nuclear tests had stopped for a time, matters of radioactive fallout 
and the threats it posed continued to stay in the public view. One March 1959 briefing on 
fallout said, “The data of the most recent [U.S. Public Health Surface] report show that 
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SR90 content of milk for the month of December has decreased from the high during the 
period following cessation of tests, but it is possible at any time for local areas to yield a 
high value over and above regional variation.” Of course, the ultimate measure of wheat 
contamination eventually would be the degree to which it affected human bones, and 
these high readings of radioactivity in wheat provoked anxiety. Concerns existed about 
other foodstuffs as well, and particularly high measurements of radiation in Minnesotan 
wheat caused the AEC to respond to public concerns. 
 At their 6 March 1959 meeting, the AEC Commissioners discussed an upcoming 
cabinet meeting with the President on that radioactive Minnesotan wheat and the need to 
respond to public concerns about it. Results from examinations in 1957 had been recently 
released that showed the levels of radioactivity in some Minnesota wheat had been 
between 105-155 sunshine units (the measurement for Sr90 contamination, after Project 
Sunshine), which exceeded the maximum permissible level in human bones of 50-100 
units. However, the amount of radiation in the wheat would in no way directly translate 
into the same amount in human bones if consumed, and Commissioner Willard Libby 
reported, “if an individual ate only ‘hot’ wheat all of his life, he might approach the 
radioactive tolerance limit.” Libby further explained that he thought, “the lack of public 
understanding of radioactive fallout was an educational problem.”71 Such an assertion 
implied that worrying about radioactive fallout in this case represented ignorance—
anyone with the proper education would have the right perspective and know that this 
wheat posed no real danger. 
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 At that cabinet meeting with President Eisenhower on the same day, Dr. Libby 
talked about the same radiation issues in Minnesotan wheat, which shows that the matter 
was of enough importance that the President himself became involved. Libby again 
explained that the maximum permissible levels of radiation ranged from 50-100 sunshine 
units, in contrast to the present general level of just one or two units. In a moment of 
candor, however, the Commissioner remarked that this top amount allowed was the 
AEC’s worker tolerance level, even though the true level at which deleterious effects 
might be expected was still unknown. Since it was impossible to run intentional 
experiments on human bodies the AEC had not done so, but Libby “concluded by 
estimating the hazard of radiation to be very small compared to other hazards of life.” 
Thus even though the wheat in Minnesota had been the most contaminated found, likely 
due to a combination of both U.S. tests and “particularly the extremely ‘dirty’ tests of the 
Russians last October,” no real danger existed.  
In the end, the meeting emphasized both executive decision makers’ commitment 
to nuclear testing and the fact that nuclear tests functioned as unplanned experiments on 
the nexus of human health and the environment. Near the end of the meeting, the 
participants again emphasized that the United States needed to keep testing to develop 
cleaner weapons for use in any hostilities. The meeting minutes finished, “The President 
concluded the discussion with a comment on the difficulty of any assumption there could 
be a nuclear war, since the radioactivity level from a massive attack would be just 
tremendous compared with what is evident in Minnesota wheat as the result merely of a 
few tests.”72 After nuclear tests temporarily ceased for test cessation treaty talks in 1958, 
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though, the worldwide levels of radioactivity in food continued to drop and officials had 
a plan that if civilians started to worry because of any news stories they should be 
reminded that “Temporary rise in strontium levels in one or some foods need cause no 
concern; it is [the] long-term average [over an] entire diet that counts.”73 No matter the 
levels, though, it is clear that when the unintentional experiment conducted by the AEC 
affected persons out of the United States it was one thing, but when domestic health was 
involved it was entirely another. A cabinet-level meeting with the President over 
contaminated domestic wheat emphasizes the importance of geopolitical factors, and also 
an affirmation that serious problems existed when the experiment touched the United 
States. Thus the meeting also represents how seriously the U.S. government frequently 
took its mandate to protect U.S. citizens in concept, even if its actions sometimes 
reflected other priorities. 
 Of course, no matter what the President declared, the public continued to have 
strong concerns about nuclear fallout. At their 17 April 1959 meeting, the AEC 
Commissioners discussed whether or not the AEC should provide testimony on the 
scientific aspects of fallout at the upcoming fallout hearings held by the Congressional 
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Beyond scientific and moral questions about 
whether the AEC should participate, the Commissioners had to decide whether the 
Commission joining the hearings would do any good at all. Commissioner Harold Vance 
thought that no education campaign could ever fully allay public concern about fallout. 
“Therefore, since all fallout to date has resulted from nuclear weapons detonations in the 
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atmosphere, the only way to eliminate this public concern is to achieve an international 
agreement banning all atmospheric weapons tests.”74 
 The AEC’s reports to Congress for 1959 and 1960 contained a smorgasbord of 
information on fallout and reflected a very different organizational state than when Harry 
Truman had been in office. The AEC reported on everything from a medical 
reexamination of the Marshall Islanders to Sr90 levels in soils around the world and gave 
a “Chronology of Fallout Studies.” An appendix after the 1959 report even focused 
specifically on the fallout from tests at the Nevada Test Site, discussing the 
approximately one megaton of fission energy released there from nuclear detonations and 
what happened to the 400-600 billion curies of radiation those produced.75 The report on 
1960 marked the last time that the AEC would focus as much on fallout as it did that year 
as an executive order in August 1959 had assigned the responsibility “for monitoring 
environmental levels of radioactivity resulting from fallout” to the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, giving “that agency primary responsibility within the executive 
branch of the Federal Government for the collation, analysis, and interpretation of such 
data.” After 28 April 1960, the AEC started giving all of its information to that 
Department for them to publish, meaning the section in the 1960 report on “Fallout 
Measurements In Foods And In Man” would not be under the AEC’s purview in the 
future.76  
 On 7 November 1960, the AEC Office of Technical Information produced an 
informational pamphlet on the “Program of the United States Government in 
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Atmospheric Radioactivity” that summed up the available knowledge and thought 
patterns at the time. Fallout sampling had improved dramatically over the years and 
involved aggregating the work of many different agencies and contractors who, in 
separate efforts, created a great deal of data on the subject, even though studying fallout 
had not been the original reason for producing the data sets. Thus the booklet described a 
network created over two presidencies, but more importantly depicted an institutional 
desire to learn more about radioactive fallout and how it entered and affected the natural 
world and human bodies. The two basic objectives of U.S. fallout programs were 
understanding both the relationship between atmospheric radioactivity input and the 
meteorological factors that led to the space-time models of fallout and also understanding 
the factors between surface deposition and surface air concentration to develop a model 
to predict distribution. As the author stated, “In summation, it is my feeling that the total 
level of effort will increase; that the scope will shift but that basic program objectives 
will not change; that complexity will increase greatly in facing the nuclear power and the 
space age atmospheric radioactivity problems.”77 A sea change in focus on fallout was 
evident by the end of Dwight Eisenhower’s term, as illustrated by the Office of Technical 
Information’s 1960 publication. 
 When the United States detonated the world’s first atomic bomb at Alamogordo 
in 1945, the nation’s scientists unleashed more than just a brilliant flash of energy—they 
also created the world’s first radioactive fallout. Even though fallout became a known 
issue at the time, U.S. policymakers did not take the radioactivity as seriously as they 
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would a decade later. Attention on the subject instead increased slowly over time, and 
two events early in the Eisenhower administration—the poisoning of downwinders after 
the Upshot-Knothole Harry test shot in 1953 and the Operation Castle Bravo test shot in 
1954—brought the nation, and indeed the world’s focus to bear on the radioactive 
particles. Because of these two formative events, paired with a focus that had been 
increasing anyway, fallout held a much greater place of importance during the 
Eisenhower presidency than it had for his predecessor. The end result was that 
Eisenhower’s administration cared much more about how nuclear tests (via fallout) 
affected the environment and human health than had his predecessor’s government, 
especially due to a consistent incorporation of environmental science into policymaking 
at the highest levels. Sometimes, however, this caution existed only to create the 
necessary knowledge and justifications to deal with public criticisms and to keep testing 
nuclear weapons in the name of national security.  
 Executive decision makers were very conscious of the many experiments they 
commissioned to improve nuclear bombs and better understand fallout, both often in the 
name of national security, but proved less conscious of the fact that their actions in 
essence turned the entire world into a laboratory and every human on it into a test subject. 
Nuclear fallout settled over much greater distances than initially believed and the most 
powerful tests even cast radioactive particles all over the entire world. Directly testing the 
effects of Sr90 and Cs137 in human bodies proved impossible, and therefore scientists were 
not exactly sure of how fallout might harm those affected. But by injecting those 
radioactive elements into the atmosphere that is exactly what they did. Radioactive 
Strontium and Cesium, once put into the atmosphere, eventually settled back to the 
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planet’s surface and entered ecosystems where, sooner or later, these frequently ended up 
in human diets. Only then could anyone know exactly how radioactive fallout might 
affect humans and our health.  
 Thus radioactive fallout and the decisions made by those in power represent a 
distinct moment in U.S. history where issues of national security, environmental 
knowledge, and human health converged into one single issue about how nuclear 
weapons testing should occur. This confluence of factors led policymakers to consider 
both the environment and human bodies as integral parts of their national security 
decisions, as they had to balance keeping the United States safe in a geopolitical context 
while still safeguarding its peoples from radiation poisoning. The AEC consistently 
decided that protecting the nation meant continuing nuclear tests, but doing so required 
caring about what those tests did to the natural world. It would be easy to say that U.S. 
policymakers consistently sacrificed environmental and human health for perceived 
safety with nuclear weapons, but that interpretation ignores all of the work to reduce 
fallout from tests and study the effects of any fallout that bombs did make. The truth is 
that decisions about nuclear fallout encompassed all of these factors and decision makers 
balanced these issues as they thought appropriate. Some of their choices had incredibly 
damaging effects that irrevocably harmed human bodies and extensively damaged 
ecosystems. But that does not mean that the environment, especially via environmental 
science, did not matter to U.S. policymakers—it just means that they thought that 
alternatively sacrificing national security was a worse option than continued testing that 
spewed radioactive fallout into the atmosphere.  
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Chapter Three 
Cold War Environmental Diplomacy:  
Nuclear Test Cessation Talks During Eisenhower’s Presidency 
 
 On 3 March 2011, Stephen Colbert, the host of Comedy Central’s “Colbert 
Report,” snarkily remarked on the social media site Twitter, “Scientists say nuclear war 
could stop global warming. I don’t know about that, but things will definitely cool off 
without all that skin.”1 This mirth-filled outburst poked fun at the idea of an atomic 
holocaust; a sentiment that likely elicited laughs in the twenty-first century, but would 
have seemed entirely inappropriate to peoples of the 1950s. During that decade, the 
possibility of Soviet bombs destroying most of the United States (or vice-versa) felt like a 
very real possibility. Even if a nuclear attack never ended humanity as so many feared, 
the inherent threat of atomic testing loomed heavily in the minds of millions.  
 It was not until 1963, several years after Dwight Eisenhower left office, that a 
treaty to ban certain nuclear testing emerged. Credited as one of President John F. 
Kennedy’s real successes, the 1963 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty banned tests in the 
atmosphere, outer space, and underwater—all environments where any nuclear 
detonation could be detected from outside the testing country. These environments also 
constituted the places where nuclear testing would do the most damage to environmental 
and human health. Thus the treaty also represented one of the first major moments where 
international concern for the environment helped lead to a political truce between hostile 
nations, as concern for nuclear fallout provided a major impetus for the test ban. In 1965, 
Barry Commoner called the 1963 treaty “the most important social action ever taken to 
conserve the quality of water, air, and the soil,” dubbing radioactive fallout from nuclear 
weapons testing the “greatest single cause of environmental contamination of this 
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planet.”2 Even owing to the inherent intersections of environment and international 
relations, the role played by the natural world in forming this treaty has gone relatively 
unacknowledged. 
 This chapter tells the story of nuclear test cessation talks during the Eisenhower 
Presidency from the United States’ perspective with particular attention paid to the 
importance of environmental science in those discussions. Focusing on personnel from 
the White House and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the chapter shows that the 
Eisenhower-era talks reveal a growing environmental consciousness, even if 
policymakers did not explicitly recognize or admit this connection. Concern for how 
nuclear testing might affect the environment and, in turn, human health underlay the 
entire series of negotiations. Knowledge about earth systems and ecology played a crucial 
role in the talks, especially in regards to detecting possible blasts. The United States 
would not budge on the issue of proper control measures to detect potential treaty 
violations. Since continually improving understandings of how the earth functioned was 
the only way to improve detection systems, environmental knowledge played a crucial 
role in the talks. In the end, this even led to an institutional position that valued improved 
environmental knowledge about the nuclear complex for how it could enhance U.S. 
national security. Simply put, the Eisenhower-era nuclear test ban talks cannot be fully 
understood without considering the role played by scientific understandings of the 
environment. 
Studies of the nuclear test ban treaty and its previous negotiations began soon 
after the inking of the official Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963.3 From early on, most 
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historians seemed to recognize that, even though the treaty did not come to fruition until 
the Kennedy administration, the international agreement had a longer history based on 
technological and scientific understandings of more than a decade.4 According to 
historian Robert Divine, for example, the Eisenhower-era nuclear fallout from testing, 
and how U.S. leaders and citizenry responded to that matter, presented the central issue in 
the nuclear treaty’s development. He particularly found importance in the conflict 
between scientists and the defense community over the effects, harmful or not, of 
radioactive fallout.5 And yet public history, at times, has mostly forgotten the role played 
by President Eisenhower’s administration leading up to the 1963 Limited Test Ban 
Treaty. As an example, the webpage for the Kennedy Presidential Library has three pages 
on the 1963 treaty, but essentially only three sentences on negotiations during the 
Eisenhower era.6 
 Many more recent accounts, on the other hand, privilege events during the 
Eisenhower presidency as an essential backdrop to the eventual 1963 treaty, with the 
                                                                                                                                            
3 Egon Schwelb produced a study of the treaty’s legal ramifications in 1964, pointing out many somewhat 
unresolved issues remained. Egon Schwelb, “The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and International Law,” The 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 58, No. 3 (July 1964), 642-670. The first historical study 
came two years later. Harold K. Jacobson and Eric Stein, Diplomats, Scientists and Politicians: The United 
States and the Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1966) And, 
unsurprisingly, not everyone found the treaty to be in the United States’ best interest. James McBride’s 
military and political study, partially historical in nature and terribly biased against the Soviet Union, found 
the Test Ban Treaty “prejudicial to the security of the United States.” James Hubert McBride, The Test Ban 
Treaty: Military, Technological, and Political Implications (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1967), vi. 
4 Nobel Laureate and former AEC Commissioner Glenn Seaborg’s account of the treaty talks approaches a 
hagiography of Kennedy. Based largely on Seaborg’s personal diary, the work claims that during 
Eisenhower’s presidency, “Little of significance was accomplished” on the treaty. Glenn T. Seaborg, 
Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 25. Kendrick 
Oliver’s work, a much fairer account, also privileges the events of the Kennedy era while downplaying the 
possibility that an agreement might have been reached by Eisenhower’s administration. This seems 
understandable in some ways, though, as the book focuses on the U.S.-U.K. interactions during the 
negotiations and not necessarily on portraying a holistic history of the treaty. Kendrick Oliver, Kennedy, 
Macmillan and the Nuclear Test-Ban Debate, 1961-63 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1998) 
5 Robert A. Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1978) 
6 “Nuclear Test Ban Treaty” on the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum website, 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty.aspx, accessed 22 February 2012 
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most vigorous debates surrounding the possibility of whether the Kansan President ever 
had a legitimate chance to forge a test cessation deal and the role he played in those talks. 
Contrary to then contemporary historical consensus, Per Fredrik Pharo argued that 
external events had little to do with the development of the test ban negotiations. Instead, 
Pharo believed constant factors in the U.S. position proved much more important in 
explaining why talks remained deadlocked during Eisenhower’s terms. Pharo argued that 
the United States would not tolerate uncertainty in its national security, especially in 
relation to nuclear weapons, and that the uncertainty surrounding underground test 
detection meant the United States would never sign a treaty banning tests without on-site 
inspections, something to which the Soviet Union would never agree.7 On the other hand, 
Martha Smith-Norris, in her history of the talks, claimed that the discussions failed for 
two different reasons—not all U.S. agencies supported a test ban and, perhaps more 
importantly, Eisenhower remained “largely uncooperative” when it came to supporting 
the talks and tended to side with the military.8 Benjamin Greene took a much kinder view 
of Ike and argued that the President truly wanted a test ban treaty as early as 1954, but 
allowed those who controlled the presentation of scientific advice to him (particularly 
AEC Commissioner Lewis Strauss) to sway his policies.9 These differing perspectives 
                                                
7 Pharo particularly argues against the interpretation set forth in Stephen Ambrose’s 1984 Eisenhower: The 
President. Per Fredrik Ilsaas Pharo, “A Precondition for Peace: Transparency and the Test-Ban 
Negotiations, 1958-1963,” The International History Review, Vol. 22, No. 3 (September 2000), 557-582. 
Of course, finding fault with Stephen Ambrose became much easier in the later years of his career after 
significant plagiarism charges, compounded by the fact that Ambrose likely fabricated many of the 
interviews that formed a significant bedrock for his study. Richard Rayner, “Channelling Ike,” The New 
Yorker, 26 April 2010. http://www.newyorker.com/talk/2010/04/26/100426ta_talk_rayner Accessed online 
27 February 2012. 
8 Martha Smith-Norris, “The Eisenhower Administration and the Nuclear Test Ban Talks, 1958-1960: 
Another Challenge to Revisionism,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 (August 2003), 503-504. 
9 Greene presents Eisenhower’s relationship with Strauss as one that did not work out in the President’s 
favor, and claims the treaty did not happen during Eisenhower’s term for a variety of reasons, chief among 
them being scientific advice, “the central variable that explained Eisenhower’s decisions during his second 
term in office and a critical factor for understanding the evolution of his approach to a test ban throughout 
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have added to a vigorous scholarly debate, but none of them showed the important role 
played by environmental science and concerns about natural systems and human health in 
the talks. 
 It is not the purpose of this chapter to weigh in on more recent scholarly debates, 
although some common sense might be useful when considering them. Like any 
historical subject, the causes and effects of the Eisenhower-era test ban talks were 
complex. What is clear, however, is that the 1963 treaty only banned tests in 
environments that could be detected from outside the territory where that testing 
occurred. In short, the eventual treaty looked very similar to some of the Eisenhower 
administration’s initial requirements and proposals, as will be seen later in the chapter. 
Whether Eisenhower and his negotiators truly were serious about or capable of 
negotiating a viable treaty at the time or not, Kennedy’s eventual Partial Test Ban Treaty 
neatly fit into a perspective firmly established by Eisenhower and his administration.  
Also clear from the published literature is that scholars have not yet recognized the role 
of both the environment and environmental science in treaty talks.10 Historians have 
begun to recognize the importance of the environment in world political affairs, 
evidenced by the September 2008 volume of Diplomatic History that was co-sponsored 
                                                                                                                                            
his presidency.” Benjamin P. Greene, Eisenhower, Science Advice, and the Nuclear Test-Ban Debate, 
1945-1963 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 6. 
10 One slight caveat to this statement might be that Toshihiro Higuchi’s “Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons 
Testing and the Debate on Risk Knowledge in Cold War America, 1945-1963” argued, “The pursuit of 
national security led, ironically, to the creation of environmental insecurity in the form of radioactive 
fallout. To contain that insecurity, Washington attempted to impose an assessment of the risk posed by 
radioactive fallout that would serve as a standard for its own citizens and the international community.” 
Toshihiro Higuchi, “Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing and the Debate on Risk Knowledge in Cold 
War America, 1945-1963,” in Environmental Histories of the Cold War, J. R. McNeill and Corinna R. 
Unger, eds., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 302. 
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by Environmental History, but more work is needed.11 This chapter continues those 
efforts in its study of the Eisenhower-era nuclear test cessation discussions. 
 In a public statement on potential nuclear disarmament, Dwight Eisenhower laid 
out his position on test cessation in the fall of 1956, and in explaining his reasoning he set 
up the U.S. position for talks that focused on safeguarding the environment and adequate 
detection systems. While disarmament and test cessation certainly are separate issues, at 
this time many policymakers conflated the two, or at least saw test suspension as the first 
step toward a disarmament plan. Therefore, although it was not expressly about test 
cessation, this statement still laid out many of the United States’ positions and concerns 
on the subject. Eisenhower told the nation’s people he considered it “in the public 
interest” to give “a full and explicit review of [U.S.] policies and actions with respect to 
the development and testing of nuclear weapons, as these affect our national defense, our 
efforts toward world disarmament, and our quest of a secure and just peace for all 
nations.” After that, the President emphasized that preventing the use of weapons in war 
was a crucial goal of the United States, and he stressed two tasks of the nation. The first 
was that the United States should “seek assiduously” to develop international agreements 
to “promote trust and understanding among all peoples.” The second point, seemingly in 
contrast with the first point, was that the U.S. should create nuclear weapons of both a 
high enough quality and quantity “to dissuade any other nation from the temptation of 
                                                
11 Historians Kurk Dorsey and Mark Lytle, in their introduction to the roundtable issue, called the 
separation between environmental and diplomatic histories “increasingly untenable.” Kurk Dorsey and 
Mark Lytle, “Introduction,” Diplomatic History. Vol. 32, No. 4 (September 2008), 517. 
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aggression.” Eisenhower elaborated, “Thus do we develop weapons, not to wage war, but 
to prevent war.”12 
 Yet even with a focus on advancing its nuclear arsenal, Eisenhower told his 
constituents that the United States had no desire to destroy the world and in fact wanted 
to reduce the danger nuclear weapons presented to the world. The President told his 
people—and the world—that the U.S. government had been “unremitting” in trying to 
“ease the burden of armaments for all the world, to establish effective international 
control of the testing and use of all nuclear weapons, and to promote international use of 
atomic energy for the needs and purposes of peace.” But the nation also insisted on 
establishing effective safeguards or controls in any disarmament program. Eisenhower 
maintained that the only reason such a program had not yet happened is that the Soviet 
Union had not accepted any “dependable system of mutual safeguards,” rejecting 
fourteen U.S. proposals over the previous two years. Without Soviet cooperation, 
Eisenhower declared that the U.S. had continued to enlarge its stockpile of nuclear 
weapons and would continue testing them.13 
 Eisenhower presented a complicated duality surrounding human health and the 
environment, however, when he tried to explain that both the reason to stop nuclear tests 
and the reason to keep testing going both centered on reducing nuclear fallout. The 
President claimed that hydrogen bomb tests were safe and did not endanger human health 
(much closer to a prevarication than being entirely truthful). He also explained that the 
United States needed to continue testing to reduce the fallout of future bombs the United 
                                                
12 DDEL, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President, Ann Whitman File, Administrative Series, Box 4, 
Folder Atomic Energy Commission 1955-56 (2), Statement by the President, 24 October 1956, 1. 
13 DDEL, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President, Ann Whitman File, Administrative Series, Box 4, 
Folder Atomic Energy Commission 1955-56 (2), Statement by the President, 24 October 1956, 2. 
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States might use in warfare, either as offensive or especially defensive weapons. Fallout 
represented a particularly important issue to many in the world after the 1954 Castle 
Bravo hydrogen bomb test in the Pacific Ocean produced much more radioactive fallout 
than anticipated and created a public relations nightmare, especially concerning a 
Japanese fishing vessel (the Lucky Dragon) it covered in the toxic substance. The 
President continued that all nuclear bombs, no matter their size, produce fallout, and 
“Thus, the idea that we can ‘stop sending this dangerous material into the air’ – by 
concentrating upon small fission weapons – is based upon apparent unawareness of the 
facts.” Testing bombs would always lead to some fallout, no matter the size of weapon 
tested, but continued tests might reduce the fallout from future detonations.14 Reducing 
the atmospheric and environmental contamination nuclear tests produced in the form of 
radioactive fallout and getting the toxins out of “the air” comprised one of the few ways 
to make nuclear testing safe, or safer, to humans. 
 Even in this first speech, though, Eisenhower put his finger directly on the 
sticking point of all negotiations to come during his term—detection systems and 
environmental knowledge. He told the U.S. people that the Soviets wanted “plans for 
disarmament […] based on simple voluntary agreements. Now, as always, this formula 
allows for no safeguards, no control, no inspection.” The President feared that simply 
trusting the Soviet Union might lead to serious problems. If the U.S. honored the test 
cessation agreement, but the USSR did not, the U.S. could lose its lead in nuclear 
weapons technology. This could cause a “serious military disadvantage” for the United 
                                                
14 DDEL, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President, Ann Whitman File, Administrative Series, Box 4, 
Folder Atomic Energy Commission 1955-56 (2), Statement by the President, 24 October 1956, 3. 
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States if research continued without testing.15 Either way, for test detection systems to 
function properly, the negotiating parties needed nuanced understandings of how nuclear 
bomb detonations influenced the earth, especially in how these put fallout into the 
atmosphere at different altitudes and caused tremors if detonated close enough to the 
ground. In essence, closely observing and measuring the earth and its systems constituted 
the only way to monitor for possible treaty violations. 
 Eisenhower’s statement, following this reasoning, ended with two conclusions 
premised on protecting both national security and the natural world. The President first 
argued the United States needed to keep developing nuclear weapons “until properly 
safeguarded international agreements can be reached” and do so “for the sake of our own 
national safety, for the sake of all free nations, for the sake of peace itself.” Eisenhower’s 
second point was that the country also must try to reach some level of world disarmament 
for the safety of both the nation and the world.16 These conclusions, and the logic that 
preceded them, set up the general U.S. position for the next several years. Clearly nuclear 
weapons, used in aggression, defense, or in tests, represented a threat to humans and the 
environment from fallout. However continued testing would help the United States 
maintain its military supremacy and could reduce the threat of radioactive fallout from 
future bombs, even though such tests still polluted the planet and endangered the world 
populace. Eisenhower also took a position that the only thing standing in the way of some 
sort of international agreement was Soviet intransigence and the USSR’s inability to 
agree to perfectly reasonable inspection plans. Fundamentally, disagreements over 
                                                
15 DDEL, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President, Ann Whitman File, Administrative Series, Box 4, 
Folder Atomic Energy Commission 1955-56 (2), Statement by the President, 24 October 1956, 3-4. 
16 DDEL, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President, Ann Whitman File, Administrative Series, Box 4, 
Folder Atomic Energy Commission 1955-56 (2), Statement by the President, 24 October 1956, 4. 
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inspection plans were crucial from the outset to the Eisenhower administration. As 
President Eisenhower’s pre-press conference notes from 22 May 1957 told him to 
respond if questioned about whether aerial inspection planes, necessary for “adequate 
inspection,” might be armed, he was told to respond, “they will be, with cameras, not 
with bombs.”17 
 Disarmament continued to be the issue in 1957, although concerns over fallout 
and nuclear testing formed a crucial part of that debate. At a 5 June 1957 press 
conference, a reporter questioned President Eisenhower about how he planned to deal 
with the country’s “anxiety” over fallout and whether he intended to modify plans about 
testing. The President responded, “the plans that we have for testing are all bound up in 
the plans we have for disarmament, which we think is necessary.” Eisenhower continued 
that tests were necessary, as when scientists “believe they have found something that 
makes [bombs] cleaner, better, more efficient” they need to test the new weapons. Later 
in the press conference, someone again questioned the President about disarmament and 
he responded that the United States could only support disarmament if it was agreed that 
there would be no more atomic bombs in war. He explained, “we couldn’t enter into any 
program which forever banned tests unless we also had a system which we knew would 
and could be convinced would, forever ban the use of weapons, of these weapons in 
war.”18 Thus even in the summer of 1957 it was clear that disarmament, nuclear tests, and 
fallout were intertwined issues to Eisenhower.  
                                                
17 DDEL, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President, Ann Whitman File, Press Conference Series, Box 6, 
Press Conference 22 May 1957, Pre-press conference notes 
18 DDEL, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President, Ann Whitman File, Press Conference Series, Box 6, 
Press Conference 5 June 1957, Official White House, Transcript of President Eisenhower’s Press and 
Radio Conference #112, 7, 11. 
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 Later in the month, Eisenhower again received queries on testing and showed a 
focus on testing’s necessity for reducing nuclear fallout. One reporter declared that there 
seemed to be “a hesitancy on the part of the government to an unequivocal yes or no on 
this business of immediate suspension of nuclear testing.” After first responding that 
testing was “one of the most complicated subjects that the government has to deal with,” 
the President said that the U.S. stood by its offer to cease tests as a first step toward 
disarmament, as long plans included a proper inspection system “to make certain that the 
whole scheme was being carried out faithfully on both sides.” Moreover, Eisenhower 
stood by the necessity of testing to develop cleaner weapons—a “clean” nuclear weapon 
would produce little to no radioactive fallout. He told the press that top scientists had 
informed him that then current bombs were 96% less dirty than the original bombs—that 
is to say, they produced 96% less radioactive fallout than had the original bombs—and 
that with enough time could be made completely clean (produce no radioactive fallout). 
This was important for two reasons. If a bomb were going to be used for peaceful 
matters, it would need to be completely clean. If used in war, a clean bomb would allow 
the U.S. military to confine the effects only to the desired target. Atomic bombs were 
destructive enough, and adding toxic radioactive fallout on top of the blast destruction 
seemed like a bad idea to U.S. decision makers. 19 Eisenhower emphasized the 
importance of “clean” nuclear bombs for peaceful uses in a 3 July 1957 press conference 
when we said, “We are trying to make small bombs—clean bombs, and to develop 
                                                
19 The President further elaborated on Soviet use of clean weapons, “I would hope that they would learn 
how to use clean bombs and if they ever used any atomic bombs would use clean ones, -- for the simple 
reason that then at least the bombs used would be specific weapons instead of weapons of general and 
uncontrolled destruction.” DDEL, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President, Ann Whitman File, Press 
Conference Series, Box 6, Press Conference 26 June 1957, Official White House Transcript of President 
Eisenhower’s Press and Radio, Conference, #114, 2-5, 8. 
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usefulness in a peaceful world as well as just weapons of war.”20 Of course, no 
guarantees existed that the Soviets would use clean bombs if they ever attacked the 
United States.  
 Behind the scenes, policymakers expressed similar concerns about nuclear fallout 
from atomic testing. At a meeting of the AEC Commissioners that same summer, 
Commissioner Willard F. Libby declared that, especially because of the disarmament 
talks occurring in London, it would be important to speed up the development of clean 
nuclear weapons.21 To that point, during the fall of 1957 the AEC and Department of 
Defense (DOD) planned a series of nuclear tests in April 1958 at the Eniwetok Pacific 
Proving Grounds. The draft public announcement of those tests stated, “The United 
States repeatedly has stated its willingness to suspend nuclear tests as part of a 
safeguarded disarmament agreement. Until such an agreement is attained, however, 
continued development of nuclear weapons is essential to the defense of the United States 
and of the Free World.” The AEC intended these tests to advance clean weapons “with 
greatly reduced fallout” and wanted to conduct the tests in a way that would “keep world 
radiation from rising to more than a small fraction of the levels that might be 
hazardous.”22 But no matter the push for disarmament and nuclear test cessation, some 
decision makers in the AEC thought the United States should continue testing. 
                                                
20 DDEL, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President, Ann Whitman File, Press Conference Series, Box 6, 
Press Conference 3 July 1957, Official White House Transcript of President Eisenhower’s Press and Radio 
Conference #115, 6. 
21 NACP, RG 326 Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Entry A1 19, Minutes of the Meetings of 
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22 Underlining is present in the original document. DDEL, White House Office, Office of the Special 
Assistant, OCB Series, Administrative Subseries, Box 2, Folder Operations Coordinating Board General 
(3) [September-October 1957], Memo from R. Hirsche to Cutler, Subj: AEC Reaction re Hardtack (1958 
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 Captain John H. Morse of the AEC, for example, repeatedly stressed the 
importance of testing for the United States, especially to help develop cleaner weapons. 
In a memo to F. M. Dearborn, Special Assistant to the President, Morse explained that 
the U.S. needed cleaner and smaller weapons than the country already possessed, 
declaring, “The true justifications for further testing may be divided into considerations 
of self interest, and moral, political, and military reasons.” The “self interest” reasoning 
related to the dangers of nuclear fallout. If nuclear war erupted without clean weapons, 
the damage from that fallout would be much more significant than from any tests the U.S. 
performed. Thus, even if the Soviets did not have clean weapons, the effects on 
worldwide radiation still were significant enough in a nuclear war that the U.S. should 
only use clean weapons. Morse also believed that smaller, cleaner weapons might reduce 
the chance of unlimited nuclear war. He continued, “Energy serves man to the extent he 
tames it. Nuclear explosives are no exception,” and further explained that test cessation 
“slams this door” shut at the moment when small nuclear bombs might be used just like 
dynamite.23 
 Morse continued his reasoning by melding environmental and national security 
concerns, deeming nuclear weapons that produced little to no fallout vital to protecting 
the United States. For his “moral” reason, he claimed, “To overkill by radioactivity and 
excessive yield is immoral.” He also noted that a clean bomb could be made dirty if so 
desired, but vice-versa was not true—thus, a country with a clean stockpile would not 
lose the deterrence of dirty bombs, but would be able to fight clean if it so chose. To 
support his “political” reason, Morse argued that inadvertently but indiscriminately 
                                                
23 DDEL, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant, OCB Series, Subject Subseries, Box 4, 
Folder Nuclear Energy Matters (2) [Jan 1958], Memo J. H. Morse to F. M. Dearborn, Subject: Reasons for 
Further Nuclear Testing, 20 January 1958, 1-2. 
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killing with dirty bombs—very likely in the case of nuclear war—might cause friendly or 
neutral nations to change their position on the United States. Morse’s “military” reason 
was that some targets, such as concrete runways or buried command centers, require 
larger blasts than can be achieved by conventional weapons. But unless such attacks used 
clean nuclear weapons, “Vast and deadly areas of nuclear contamination result,” which 
would be bad for both any invading military force or later occupying force. Morse 
finished by saying that agreeing to stop tests implied that testing was bad, and he thought 
this was not true at all. The United States should continue testing, as stopping would be to 
the “detriment of all mankind.”24 Of course, not everyone agreed with Captain Morse’s 
reasoning. 
 Robert E. Matteson, Director of the White House Disarmament Staff, wrote a 
dissenting opinion back to Morse that questioned whether the United States needed 
cleaner weapons. Matteson reminded Morse that the latter previously had favored a two-
and-a-half year test suspension. Morse had changed his mind, however, and now believed 
ground notification posts in the Soviet Union aimed at preventing surprise attacks would 
be more advantageous for the United States than the inspection posts involved in a test 
suspension treaty. Countering this logic, Matteson said that he did not believe the Soviets 
would accept installation of ground posts as a separate matter. Instead, Matteson declared 
that the original position from the National Security Council (NSC) Planning Board, 
installation of scientific instrument posts, seemed most likely to gain Soviet support. 
Moreover, Morse’s assertion that the U.S. needed cleaner weapons ignored that the 
weapons already were 95% clean, clean enough to confine much of the fallout of any 
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nuclear attack over the Soviet Union. Moreover, Matteson was not convinced by Morse’s 
“morality” reasoning, as the White House staff member questioned, “will morality have 
any real effect on what the Russians do or say?” As for the “military” reasoning, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff had yet to offer any, and thus this point seemed less worthy.25 In short, 
Matteson did not find Morse’s arguments for why the United States needed to keep 
testing to be very convincing, especially if that reasoning might prevent a treaty with the 
Soviets. 
 A few weeks later, Dearborn condensed information in a memo to Eisenhower 
that argued for a policy based on balancing national security and environmental health. 
The President’s special assistant asserted that the world needed to understand the value of 
continued U.S. nuclear testing, claiming that there were “real risks for mankind involved 
in test cessation.” The memo continued that the nation should not accept the risks of 
ceasing tests lightly, and that if the country did decide in the end to “acquiesce,” it should 
try to “force maximum concessions” from the Soviets or even try to “pass the onus to 
Russia as the nation willing to perpetuate existing deadly risks to mankind by opposing 
our attempts to control radioactivity. Thus Russia might appear the threat to humanity, 
not the U.S.” In short, Dearborn believed, “test cessation [was] counter to the long-term 
welfare of mankind as well as national and free world security” because it posed a threat 
to efforts at developing cleaner bombs that reduced the amount of radioactive fallout any 
atomic detonation would spew into the atmosphere. He proposed that Eisenhower 
announce before the United Nations that, pending a nuclear weapons ban with inspection 
and disarmament, the United States would only produce clean weapons and only use 
                                                
25 DDEL, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant, OCB Series, Subject Subseries, Box 4, 
Folder Nuclear Energy Matters (2) [Jan 1958], Memo Robert E. Matteson to John Morse, Subject: Test 
Suspension Issue, 24 January 1958, 1-6. 
 
 130 
them for self defense, eliminate the danger of nuclear tests by testing them underground 
(or only testing clean versions), and also share clean nuclear weapon technology with the 
Soviets to “protect” humankind. Dearborn also included an attachment on “The Case of 
Clean Nuclear Weapons,” which was very similar to Morse’s original statement.26 Of 
course, though this recommendation may have influenced Eisenhower, it did not end up 
becoming policy. Divided or not, Eisenhower administration officials continued down a 
path of negotiation and worked toward a test cessation treaty with the Soviet Union. 
 As historian Charles Maier pointed out, Eisenhower seemed much more willing to 
consider arms control in the latter years of his presidency (1958 and on) than he had 
earlier. Particularly, advances in Soviet missile technology influenced this opinion, as 
they made the idea of a costless massive retaliation infeasible.27 Moreover, the Soviets 
also appeared quite willing to consider talks about a test ban, even if only on terms of 
their choosing. After conducting its own extensive test series in early March, on 31 
March 1958 the Soviet Union announced that it would unilaterally cease all nuclear bomb 
tests, provided the United States and its allies also did the same. At this point, attempts to 
create some sort of nuclear test ban cessation agreement could begin in earnest. That is, 
test cessation talks could begin unless the United States kept testing and did not commit 
to the process. The choice was not easy, however, as Soviet actions had put the United 
States in a difficult position. While the Soviets had just finished a large test series, the 
United States had one planned for the near future. This put pressure on U.S. policymakers 
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Office of the Special Assistant, OCB Series, Subject Subseries, Box 4, Folder Nuclear Energy Matters (4) 
[Feb-Mar 1958], Memo to President, 14 February 1958 
27 Charles S. Maier, “Introduction: Science, Politics, and Defense in the Eisenhower Era,” in A Scientist at 
the White House: The Private Diary of President Eisenhower’s Special Assistant for Science and 
Technology, by George B. Kistiakowsky (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), xxvi. 
 
 131 
to decide what they thought was most important for the nation and its nuclear program. 
Questions abounded about what constituted the true threat to the world—real nuclear 
tests (with the goal to make cleaner weapons with less nuclear fallout) or potential 
nuclear wear (that would surely contaminate the whole world).28 
AEC Chairman Lewis Strauss, for example, championed the idea that the U.S. 
should eschew the Soviet test ban offer and continue with its planned tests, generally 
arguing that making cleaner, less environmentally damaging bombs could function as an 
effective political tool for the United States. At the time, the United States still planned to 
conduct its Hardtack I series of tests starting in April 1958, but some worried that the 
“international atmosphere, with the Soviet initiative for a summit meeting and a cooling 
off of tensions, which has aroused wide favor does not make a favorable backdrop for 
initiating tests.” Strauss countered, “The testing of small clean weapons bordering on and 
blending into the conventional would serve to offset hitherto relatively successful 
Communist propaganda efforts to effect a distinct separation between conventional 
(good) and atomic (bad) weapons.”29 Strauss thought reducing the fallout of U.S. 
weapons would take the venom out of some of the Soviets’ public relations attacks, and 
the United States could only do so through more nuclear tests. But the subject of 
continued testing was still open to some debate. 
 Following the unilateral Soviet declaration, the United States had several possible 
courses of action, but the overarching debate centered on whether or not nuclear testing 
should continue. Some in the AEC, especially Captain Morse, wanted to continue testing, 
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but only underground (“thereby eliminating any spread throughout the world of 
radioactive material”). Others wanted to focus on further disarmament negotiations 
through United Nations channels. No matter the course of action, questions abounded. 
For example, if the U.S. suspended tests how long should that suspension last? There also 
existed a focus on using nuclear production for “non-weapons purposes” such as 
developing “‘nuclear dynamite’ for a variety of peaceful purposes.”30 Policymakers did 
seem clear, however, that they needed to take action to ensure that the U.S. did not fall 
behind the Soviet Union in the global public relations arena, as if the Soviets stopped 
testing but the United States did not, the USSR could claim that the U.S. was not serious 
about making peace and instead continued to poison the atmosphere. 
 Others questioned whether the Soviets truly were serious in their desire for peace, 
pointing out that the USSR’s ban came at a very self-serving time immediately after it 
had heavily polluted the environment with its own nuclear testing. Senator Clifford Case 
(R-N), in an opinion mirrored by many in the executive branch, observed that the Soviet 
Union only suspended tests, unilaterally at that, after it had completed a long nuclear 
weapons test series, “described as putting into the atmosphere more radioactive material 
than ever before.” Case argued that the United States “must not let our enemies succeed 
in using the fear of poisoning the atmosphere—a fear felt increasingly by millions both in 
America and abroad—to halt our testing and development of weapons which may be 
essential to our very survival and to the protection of freedom everywhere on earth.” 
Since the United States had made great strides in the production of clean weapons, Case 
thought U.S. tests could continue and would not cause “a dangerous contamination of the 
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earth’s atmosphere.”31 Concern for the environment and world political opinion, then, 
played a role in developing the U.S. position even at an early stage. 
 President Eisenhower was very clear on the issue of test cessation, however, and 
argued that the United States would not suspend tests, no matter how much they might 
harm the environment, if such a suspension would put the United States at risk. The 
President’s pre-conference notes for his 9 April 1958 press conference declared, “The 
United States [sic] position is that we could not consider suspension of testing as a purely 
propaganda measure at the risk of the security of the nation.” Furthermore, the notes 
advised the President to stress that the United States would only stop testing when 
production stopped and inspections started. The U.S. also would continue Pacific tests.32 
Once that press conference started, President Eisenhower fielded a question about the 
general ability to detect testing, as detection formed a crucial part of the country’s 
position. That reporter asked whether “this problem has become more difficult in terms of 
negotiation” due to the notion that an increased number of detection and inspection 
stations were needed. Basically, for the sort of comprehensive ban the United States 
desired, when either side detected a potential nuclear test from a seismograph or 
atmospheric reading, that side would need to send in on-site inspection teams to verify 
whether the readings had detected a nuclear blast or merely some other natural 
phenomenon (frequently the two were difficult to distinguish). The President responded 
that the number of inspection stations then suggested by scientists was larger than it had 
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been previously, and that everyone needed patience to get a final answer.33 The U.S. 
position held paramount the necessity of more technical and environmental knowledge to 
design any effective international treaty; hence the President proposed to organize a 
conference in Geneva that summer on the subject. 
 No matter how Eisenhower arrived at the position, however, his move to convene 
a Conference of Experts over the summer of 1958 returned positive public feedback, 
especially as the conference represented the first step to protecting the earth and its 
peoples. One Merritt S. Webster sent the President a letter congratulating him that the 
U.S. had moved toward test cessation, and declared, “May this really lead to less 
emphasis on weapons and stop the contamination of the atmosphere by manmade 
radioactivity.”34 Another citizen exclaimed that stopping tests represented a “first great 
step toward maintaining a healthy environment for humanity and protecting the genetic 
heritage of untold generations to come.”35 More than just normal citizens expressed their 
desire for an end to nuclear tests. One letter was signed by quite a few well-known 
figures, including Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, and 
Christian ethicists Albert Schweitzer and Martin Niemöller. That letter told the President, 
“We want you to feel that your job is to help make this planet safe and fit for human 
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habitation.”36 While the focus of this chapter certainly is not about public feedback on 
government policies, these reactions show that, like the President, at least a section of the 
public also cared about the environment and its relation to human health when 
considering nuclear testing. Encouragement from the public certainly would not have 
swayed Eisenhower’s opinion and might have helped cement it. 
 When the Conference of Experts finished, it released a report on 21 August 1958 
that claimed covenanting nations would indeed be able monitor whether other signing 
nations faithfully followed the established guidelines through a series of on-site 
environmental monitoring stations. The Conference explained that tests on the Earth’s 
surface up to fifty kilometers high (thus not deep space tests) also could be monitored 
effectively. In response to this report, President Eisenhower announced the next day that 
the United States was willing to enter into nuclear test cessation negotiations with other 
world nuclear powers on 31 October 1958, provided those talks hinged on the 
establishment of an effective monitoring system. Eisenhower proclaimed the United 
States’ willingness to keep its test ban on a year-to-year basis, as long as an effective 
monitoring system stayed in place and the negotiation progress continued. The President 
also reminded his audience that such talks were only “significant” if they constituted the 
first step to world disarmament and the halt of fissionable material production.37 On 25 
October, Eisenhower issued another statement reaffirming his 22 August desire to 
suspend nuclear tests for a year and begin negotiations on 31 October. The United States’ 
sole condition for these talks required that the Soviet Union also suspend tests. The 
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President noted, “The United States regrets that the Soviet Union has not accepted the 
offer of the United States and the United Kingdom, although we still hope that it will do 
so.”38 The Soviets shortly thereafter accepted the presented terms. Talks did indeed begin 
in Geneva on 31 October, with the convening nations beginning one-year test 
moratoriums around the same time. 
 The AEC Commissioners met on 1 December and discussed the “U.S. Position on 
Nuclear Test Suspension Negotiations,” grounding that position on a concern for the 
environments in which tests could be effectively monitored. The Commissioners’ general 
sentiment held that the Soviets scored a propaganda win with recent statements and that 
the U.S. “should develop a new position which would attempt to attain agreement to 
permit controlled underground testing but ban all nuclear weapons tests above ground.” 
Inspection systems remained important to the AEC, and the Commissioners believed 
there should be a temporary ban until such a system could be developed with an 
indefinite ban afterward. The Commissioners noted that Eisenhower’s 22 August 
statement “had specifically not included a reference to underground tests.”39 This non-
reference was important for two reasons. The first was that underground tests were nearly 
impossible to monitor, and the second is that the United States intended to continue 
nuclear tests underground, especially non-weapon nuclear tests. 
 Eisenhower released a statement on 7 November 1958 on the Soviet Union’s 
continuance of nuclear weapons testing, “despite the fact that negotiations for the 
suspension of testing of nuclear weapons have since October 31 been under way at 
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Geneva.” The charge stated that the United States, on 22 August, had agreed to halt 
testing for a year provided the Soviet Union did as well. And though the USSR had 
stopped testing at its Arctic proving ground, the country had continued to test at another 
location, violating both this agreement and a United Nations General Assembly 
resolution that requested the negotiating parties not test during ongoing Geneva talks. 
The President continued, “This action by the Soviet Union relieves the United States 
from any obligation under its offer to suspend nuclear weapons tests. However, we shall 
continue suspension of such tests for the time being, and we understand that the United 
Kingdom will do likewise. We hope that the Soviet Union will also do so.” The President 
further elucidated the U.S. position by saying that if the Soviets did not shortly denounce 
testing, the U.S. would be “obliged to reconsider its position.”40 Clearly the Geneva talks 
rested on the edge of a knife blade and could easily fall off at any time, no matter the 
willingness of one side or the other to formulate a treaty. 
 On 24 November 1958, the AEC Commissioners met specifically to discuss the 
nuclear test suspension talks and fleshed out the position already established, especially 
clarifying the necessity of a control system to any U.S. agreement. At this time, it became 
clear that the U.S. delegation had decided it did not want to link the test suspension talks 
to disarmament and held three basic positions: disarmament and test suspension should 
not be linked, periodic evaluations should be held to determine satisfactory progress of 
disarmament and control system implementation, and effective control systems were 
necessary to make sure testing actually stopped. The delegates considered yielding on the 
first two positions, but some in the meeting believed the U.S. should not yield on any 
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fronts. The biggest point of contention rested on the notion of a control system for 
monitoring—the United States wanted one and the Soviet Union did not (odd in some 
ways, because during the Geneva Technical Discussions from June to August, the Soviets 
delegates had agreed on the need for a control system).41 Environmental science and 
geography proved central, as only by monitoring the natural world from specific 
locations could the United States feel comfortable about the authenticity of any test 
cessation treaty. 
Importantly, out of distrust of the USSR, the Commissioners thought such a 
control system should not preclude U.S. entry into Soviet territory to inspect possible 
tests, as they deemed atmospheric monitoring alone insufficient to deter Soviet 
subterfuge—more environmental knowledge was needed to give U.S. decision makers 
the confidence to enter into a treaty. In the end, the Commissioners judged the U.S. 
position to be difficult because, since no test shots had been fired since 3 November 
1958, a de facto test cessation agreement was currently in place with no control system. 
Moreover, the U.S. had to balance world opinion with legality, as public relations were 
crucial. The public held great fear of “off-site fallout,” though Captain Morse thought the 
public could be educated on fallout within a 2-3 year period. Eventually the 
Commissioners decided that the AEC should propose that the U.S. reject the 
recommendations of U.S. delegates and should not give into the Soviets at all.42 The AEC 
Commissioners met later that day to review the results of their earlier meeting and to 
propose using Christmas as an unofficial recess to negotiations. The meeting also 
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reviewed Captain Morse’s previous position paper on the necessity of testing, but did not 
make any decisions based on it.43 The AEC Commissioners held their next meeting on 2 
December 1958, especially to discuss the test cessation talks and come to terms about 
how the AEC should proceed. Fundamentally, the Commissioners decided that the AEC 
was not fit to decide whether the Geneva talks should be about disarmament or not, but in 
the absence of disarmament the AEC should proceed with “armament development 
through testing, and testing would mean the need for controls.” 44 
 That 2 December meeting also included a discussion of a test cessation proposal 
by Senator Albert Gore, Sr. (D-TN) that focused on protecting the earth from radioactive 
pollution produced by nuclear bomb tests. Gore proposed that Eisenhower “announce the 
unconditional and unilateral cessation of all nuclear tests in the earth’s atmosphere for a 
specific period, possible three years, and ask similar action by other nuclear powers.” 
This would keep treaty talks going and eventually might lead to discussions on the 
discontinuance of other types of tests. Gore’s proposal stemmed specifically from him 
being “deeply concerned with the apparent impasse in the Geneva talks and with what he 
believed to be an increasingly high contamination of the atmosphere with radioactivity.” 
Commissioner Willard F. Libby countered that the Soviet tests in October had raised 
strontium contamination in the Earths’ atmosphere by twice what U.S. tests had during 
the previous four years. Since “the world cannot tolerate unlimited dissemination of 
airborne radioactivity,” Libby believed “the President [ought to] make a public 
announcement concerning the amount of atmospheric radioactivity created during 
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October by the Russians.”45 This sentiment shows that radioactive fallout in the 
atmosphere held great importance not only for how it damaged human health and the 
environment, but also for how it could be used by both sides to score political victories 
with the public. 
 The Commissioners saw several different positions the United States could take 
concerning Senator Gore’s proposition to stop testing for both political and 
environmental gains. The AEC could have supported Gore’s proposal or merely kept 
talks going at their present rate while ramping up U.S. aggressiveness at the negotiating 
table. Another possibility involved sharing (or not sharing) a technical paper with the 
Soviets that highlighted the costs of detecting underground tests (in contrast to effective 
and already existing means of detecting atmospheric tests) to prod the Soviets into 
agreeing to an atmospheric ban. The last choice called for Eisenhower to announce the 
airborne radiation previous Soviet tests produced and try to publicly shame the USSR 
into a bilateral agreement to stop further atmospheric contamination. Libby responded 
that the first two options were too negative and should not be undertaken, but that he 
liked the last two. Chairman McCone said that each of the latter choices could be 
interpreted as an attempt by the United States to break up the conference. Instead, he 
thought the U.S. should maintain its position that monitoring and controls were crucial 
for any agreement. Perhaps most importantly, Commissioner Harold S. Vance pointed 
out that the AEC had, the year previously, proposed to the President a plan similar to 
Gore’s. Eisenhower rejected that plan. Moreover, Foster believed that any announcement 
similar to what Senator Gore desired should be withheld until it was clear that the Soviet 
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delegates would not accept any control agreement.46 Thus while the AEC took seriously 
the idea that nuclear tests poisoned the atmosphere, and by extension the whole planet 
and the human race, that idea held the most sway in how it could be used for political 
gains. While this may not be the sort of environmental consciousness most commonly 
thought of by modern environmentalists, it does demonstrate a developing sensitivity to 
the environment and a prioritization of environmental science by nuclear complex 
officials trying to balance their responsibilities to the nation as they understood these. 
 The meeting, as a whole, showed a melding of concerns about the nuclear 
complex, environment, national security, and politics, as decisions about one affected the 
others. As the discussion and meeting wound down, Brigadier General Starbird, Director 
of Military Application of the AEC, claimed “that the matters under discussion were 
highly sensitive in that if the Russians learned of the debating going on within U.S. 
Government agencies regarding the U.S. position at Geneva, they would be aware of a 
weakening in the U.S.-U.K. position and could exploit the situation.”47 Distrust and 
paranoia aside, this meeting well laid out the AEC’s place in the negotiations. The 
Commission had no formal power in the talks, other than its advisory role on nuclear 
policy to the President. That said, nuclear test cessation was not necessarily in the best 
interests of the AEC as an organization. Contrary to what many historians have written, 
however, the AEC was not entirely against a nuclear test ban, even though a ban would 
have limited the agency’s power. Instead, the Commission balanced concerns about how 
tests affected the environment and human health, but did so within an institutional 
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framework obligated to develop the nuclear weapons deemed necessary for the security 
of the United States.48 
 On 9 December, the Commissioners again met to discuss Senator Gore’s test 
suspension proposal, particularly focusing on how detection capabilities differed vastly 
depending on environment. Following Gore’s call for the Geneva conference to proceed 
immediately to negotiate for a permanent stoppage of atmospheric tests, Commissioner 
Libby pointed out that the number of stations required to detect atmospheric tests would 
be much fewer than those to detect underground tests. Atmospheric-only test detection 
stations could also be confined only to the Soviet Union, negating any possible issues of 
location in China, and would thus be both more geopolitically feasible and more 
economical. However, Chairman McCone chastised the AEC report made on Gore’s 
proposal, as he felt the report only sought to discredit Gore’s ideas and provided 
insufficient analysis. Moreover, Commissioner Vance reminded everyone at the meeting 
that with both President Eisenhower’s 22 August announcement on halting U.S. weapons 
tests and the Geneva conference the United States hoped to achieve complete cessation of 
all nuclear tests. If the U.S. kept the negotiations from achieving that goal, the USSR 
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might gain a propaganda advantage by stating that the U.S. had never been sincere about 
achieving a total ban. Chairman McCone countered that the United States should pursue 
the original goal of a complete ban, and if a more elaborate detection system was later 
found necessary that it could be considered at such a time.49 Even if a partial ban might 
have been much more feasible in the moment and eventually have led to a complete ban, 
there clearly existed a significant section in the AEC’s leadership that thought the United 
States should pursue a total ban or no ban at all. 
 The issue of a control system continued to vex negotiators, especially because 
detection capabilities differed in each testing environment. Even from the beginning of 
the atomic age, issues of test detection existed, and the very first Soviet test heightened 
their importance. Almost a decade previously, on 3 September 1949, the United States 
began detecting “the emission of large quantities of radioactive material” and later 
determined through various systems that this came from the first Soviet atomic test.50 A 
year later, the U.S. public learned exactly how this occurred. On New Years Eve of 1950, 
brothers Joseph and Stewart Alsop (two men very unpopular with the Truman 
administration for not toeing the official line at all times) wrote an article for the 
Washington Post titled “How Red A-Blast Was Detected.” The article rankled many, 
especially Gordon Dean, AEC Chairman, who declared that detection methods 
represented “a tightly held secret” that he did not appreciate the Alsop brothers divulging. 
President Truman himself called the article “a matter of deep concern [because] of its 
disclosure of highly classified information of major significance to our national 
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security.”51 National security or not, the Post article clearly explained the U.S. method 
for detecting blasts. 
 The detection system had four parts, and all of them depended taking 
measurements of the natural world and interpreting those readings: seismic readings, 
using Geiger counters to detect the presence of radioactive particles in the stratosphere, 
sampling air particles from the radioactive cloud, and finally having scientists interpret 
all the data. The Alsops explained, “When the Soviet bomb exploded in central Siberia in 
September, 1949, all this elaborate organization, already trial-tested by our own Eniwetok 
bomb, went smoothly to work.” Seismologists located the explosion location and Geiger 
counters detected the radioactive cloud, with air samples providing the “decisive 
evidence” of the bomb detonation occurring and its type, as different nuclear processes 
(ex. uranium bomb vs. plutonium bomb vs. an atomic pile explosion) produced very 
different sorts of radioactive particles.52 And yet for all the desired secrecy on test 
detection systems during the Truman presidency, by the summer of 1958 things had 
changed a great deal. The July 1958 semiannual AEC report to Congress contained an 
appendix titled, “Information on Detonations Released For Use In Seismological 
Studies.” Though it left out some important information, such as power of the tests, the 
appendix released exactly when and where U.S. tests happened and what type of test 
occurred so that seismologists could cross-reference their records with the AEC data.53 
Released at the same time as the Conference of Experts occurring that same summer, the 
AEC surely intended the data to further test cessation talks and make discussions of a 
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monitoring network much more feasible. Such an appendix especially demonstrated 
several things—not only was the United States very serious about establishing a control 
system to aid test cessation talks, but decision makers understood that environmental 
knowledge was key to that process.  
  The AEC Commissioners met on 22 December 1958 and discussed the proposed 
AEC position on test cessation, and unsurprisingly the issue of a control system loomed 
large over the proceedings. With the Geneva talks on a break surrounding Christmas, the 
AEC revised its official position for when talks resumed in January 1959 so that the AEC 
would suggest no arrangements be made on a control system until its scope could be 
determined. The Commission would also stand by the idea that fixed detection posts 
would be inadequate because the Soviets might just find a way to work around any 
immoveable posts. The issue of whether stations were needed in China remained tricky, 
and General Starbird stated that he felt not including posts there would create a possible 
loophole. The issue elicited a lengthy discussion, but no clear answers.54 What remained 
clear, however, was that while knowledge of the environment allowed for test detection 
under certain circumstances, similar knowledge also aided any country that desired to test 
nuclear weapons without the knowledge of rival nations. Whether a country desired to 
construct a control system or evade it, understanding the natural world proved vital in 
such efforts. 
 The next day, Harold Vance, as acting AEC Chairman, sent a memo to summarize 
the AEC position on detection systems to Under Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, 
and that AEC position drew heavily from environmental science. Vance told Herter that 
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seismological results from the underground nuclear tests conducted in Nevada in October 
1958 showed that the Conference of Experts’ conclusions on detection “require re-
examination.” In short, the detection capabilities assumed during the conference were not 
as accurate as initially believed. Therefore, the AEC proposed the U.S. adopt a new 
position because of three reasons. First, the control system proposed by the Conference of 
Experts to detect underground and space explosions had a much more limited capability 
than initially believed. Also, tests in those environments did not cause fallout like 
atmospheric tests, meaning preventing tests underground and in outer space proved less 
pressing to world concerns than atmospheric tests. Moreover, extremely adequate control 
systems already existed for atmospheric testing and thus the United States would not 
have to sacrifice its core stance on detection to ban atmospheric tests. The new proposed 
AEC position was that the U.S. should adhere to the idea that only detectable and 
identifiable tests should be stopped and negotiate, as a first step, a treaty for the cessation 
of atmospheric tests. The United States also should postpone treaties about underground 
and space tests, while proposing international cooperation in investigating identification 
problems and preserving the right to develop “non-military applications of nuclear 
explosives.”55 The implication was that tests might eventually be banned in all environs, 
but only when environmental knowledge advanced enough to allow for detection 
measures deemed adequate by the United States. 
 This official AEC position, suggested as a model for the U.S. negotiators, 
reinforced the importance of environmental factors and test detection capabilities to any 
test cessation agreement. Moreover, the Commission emphasized that stopping 
                                                
55 DDEL, John A. McCone Papers, Box 6, Folder Testing File #1 Eyes Only (3), Letter from H. S. Vance to 
Christian A. Herter, 23 December 1958 
 
 147 
atmospheric tests should be the primary goal anyway, as these tests are the ones that 
cause radioactive fallout and damage the environment and in turn human health. Thus the 
environment, long before negotiators had even decided what the official goal of their 
talks was, played a crucial role. Not only did concern for environmental health form a 
significant part of the reason for the talks, but also examining the environment (both the 
atmosphere and with seismological readings) was the only way to tell if a nuclear test had 
occurred. It is unclear whether participants at any level, including in the AEC, recognized 
that the Earth and its systems were a significant actor in test cessation negotiations, but 
the planet certainly was. Moreover, knowledge (or lack of knowledge) about how the 
Earth functioned played a paramount role in determining the U.S. position.  
 Yet the AEC had not settled on an official position, as differing goals between 
U.S. officials made it difficult to achieve consensus about how to put existing 
environmental knowledge into practical use. On 26 January 1959, Chairman McCone met 
with the other Commissioners to firm up the AEC’s position on test cessation so that 
McCone might be prepared for later meetings with the Secretary of State and Department 
of Defense. Fundamentally, the issue of a detection system loomed large. The 
Commissioners—those with military and civilian backgrounds alike—all agreed that the 
AEC needed more underground testing to gain the necessary environmental knowledge to 
develop an adequate detection system. Commissioner Graham suggested the U.S. 
“develop an orderly program for obtaining the additional information needed for 
establishment of an adequate detection program” and should do so immediately, not 
reserved as a fallback position. He did believe all atmospheric tests should stop. 
Commissioner Vance pointed out that top U.S. scientists agreed that the inspection 
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system approved during the summer 1958 Geneva Conference of Experts was not 
adequate, and agreed with Graham’s position that the U.S. needed to conduct more 
underground tests “to know with certainty that a detection system would be dependable,” 
though the earliest time more underground tests could be conducted was summer 1959.56 
Practically, though, the Geneva talks could not wait on these tests so the AEC 
needed to take existing environmental knowledge about the nuclear complex and form a 
new base position immediately. After further discussion, the Commissioners decided on 
several recommendations. First, the U.S. proposal should seek agreement among nuclear 
powers to suspend atmospheric tests and create “an adequate detection system to insure 
compliance. This step would eliminate the fallout issue.” Second, the U.S. proposal 
should permit testing in outer space and underground “pending the conclusion of a series 
of tests in diverse geographical and geological environments and in outer space from 
which could be designed an effective system to detect and identify such explosions” Such 
tests could be joint efforts or unilateral, and the data would be shared either way.57 More 
discussions continued on how measuring the Earth could help detect nuclear weapons 
tests. 
 By the end of March 1959, the U.S. Department of State-sponsored Panel on 
Seismic Improvement reported its findings, but the fact that the Panel even came into 
existence is a testament to the need and desire for improved environmental knowledge to 
aid in the improvement of detection systems. The report’s message can be summed up by 
its title, “The Need for Fundamental Research in Seismology.” The Panel explained that 
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both earthquakes and nuclear explosions produce seismic waves, and therefore 
determining the difference between the two from a seismograph represented the key 
issue. To have such a capability, however, would require greater knowledge about 
seismic waves. The Panel concluded, “The strategic requirements of detection, together 
with the need to maintain a competitive position in one of the most significant fields in 
the earth sciences make it a matter of urgency to institute a high level of support of 
seismological research.” The report also laid out exactly the sort of research the panel 
thought should be conducted.58 
 Decision makers created the Panel to consider “the feasibility of improving the 
capability of the system recommended by the Geneva Conference of Experts last summer 
to detect and identify underground events.”  To do so, the panel looked at ways to 
improve the Geneva system with existing technology, improve the system through 
research in seismology, and the possibility that any detection system might be 
circumvented via concealment of underground tests. The Panel also confirmed that earlier 
detection methods did not work as effectively as previously thought and validated 
concerns about the difficulty in distinguishing from seismic readings alone whether a 
tremor had been from an earthquake or a nuclear detonation. Improved equipment and 
techniques would greatly improve detection capabilities for underground shots, but 
detection still would be limited to blasts no smaller than five-kiloton weapons. And yet, 
these conclusions came from still very limited data, and “The Panel concluded that a 
vigorous research program in seismology would result in important improvements in the 
ability to detect and identify earthquakes of small magnitude.” It also suggested that 
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augmenting the Geneva net with unmanned stations also might improve capabilities.59 
The Panel’s report and even its very creation help emphasize the importance of the 
natural world in any test detection system. Without both environmental measurements 
and improved knowledge to help interpret such readings, creating an effective control 
system would be all but an impossibility. Without that control system, the United States 
never would agree to any test cessation treaty. In effect, the United States fundamentally 
required high-level understandings of the natural world to proceed with any treaty talks 
aimed at ending nuclear weapon tests. 
 Two weeks after the Panel on Seismic Improvement released its report, President 
Eisenhower wrote a public letter to Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev on the subject of 
the test cessation talks, and, unsurprisingly, the issue of a detection system and how it 
might influence the eventual treaty took up much of the ink. Eisenhower declared that the 
United States “strongly seeks a lasting agreement” about test cessation, but that the 
agreement should be “subject to fully effective safeguards” and the “present proposals 
[by] the Soviet Union fall short of providing assurance of the type of effective control in 
which all parties can have confidence: therefore, no basis for agreement is now in sight.” 
And yet, the President asserted that the cessation talks “must not be permitted completely 
to fail.” Thus he thought perhaps talks should start only with an atmospheric ban, because 
such tests could be monitored and would not require on-site inspections. Continuing the 
use of fears about radioactive fallout for political gain, Eisenhower asserted that some 
sort of test ban was vital to calm the public about atmospheric radiation. Doing so would 
cause “fears of unrestricted resumption of nuclear weapons testing with attendant 
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additions to levels of radioactivity [to] be allayed, and we would be gaining practical 
experience and confidence in the operation of an international control system.”60  
 Ten days later on 23 April 1959, Khrushchev responded to Eisenhower, also in a 
public letter, and questioned some of Eisenhower’s basic assumptions about testing and 
the natural world. Khrushchev said he was glad that Eisenhower also was “of the opinion 
that these negotiations must not be allowed to fail.” Yet, Khrushchev argued that 
stopping atmospheric explosions up to fifty kilometers did not “solve the problem,” nor 
did it prevent the production and improvement of other types of nuclear weapons. He 
continued, “explosions of nuclear weapons at altitudes of more than 50 kilometers would 
also poison the atmosphere and the earth, contaminating with radioactive fallout the 
vegetation which finds its way into the food of animals and into the human organism, just 
as is occurring at the present time.” Even though detection might stop at fifty kilometers, 
detonations at both forty and sixty kilometers similarly affect the atmosphere and human 
health meaning that a ban on tests only fifty kilometers and below represented a 
“dishonest deal.” The Soviet Premier thought that such issues should not deter either side 
and the talks must find a way to cease test of all types of nuclear weapons. Khrushchev 
acknowledged that the “most serious difference” between the U.S. and Soviet positions 
was the issue of inspection teams, but that no matter what the talks decided, the Soviets 
would “make every effort to achieve agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons 
tests,” telling Eisenhower that he could “be certain that if we sign a document we shall, 
even if there is no control whatsoever, faithfully carry out the obligations assumed by us, 
because for the Soviet Union public opinion and the opinion of nations is dearer than 
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anything else.”61 No matter that both sides were attuned to environmental understandings 
and espoused platitudes about how tests “poison the atmosphere and the earth,” 
differences continued unresolved. 
 In May 1959, the AEC Commissioners met and received a presentation on 
potential treaty control systems by Sterling Colgate, advisor to the U.S. delegation to the 
Geneva test cessation talks. Colgate discussed the Soviet position on the talks and 
summed up his ideas in six points. He claimed that the USSR would not insist on veto 
rights over each proposed inspection of a suspected nuclear detonation as long as there 
was a maximum number of yearly inspections, had accepted that technological criteria 
will be used to dispatch inspection teams, would not object to establishment of permanent 
inspection teams, would insist all inspection teams contain Soviet nationals, would agree 
to inspection teams having on-site inspection access, and that the number of inspections 
each year must be limited, though that number was a political question and subject to 
negotiation. The Soviets also suggested they might forego veto power for other questions 
as well, but that the U.S. delegates had not explored such positions as they awaited 
further instruction from Washington.62  
 Still, the issue of test detection remained the stickiest wicket in the treaty talks. 
The Commissioners met again on both 8 May and 12 May 1959 and discussed the 
Geneva Conference. In the latter meeting, the Commissioners learned that talks would 
adjourn until the week of 8 June and that the Soviets had agreed to a proposed control 
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system that would use satellites to observe nuclear tests in outer space.63 After talks had 
resumed, a reporter questioned President Eisenhower about the idea of “decoupling,” or 
using specific techniques in underground atomic tests so that tests appeared much smaller 
than they actually were. For example, the seismic readings from a ten-kiloton blast might 
measure as the equivalent readings from a one-kiloton test. The President responded that 
while concealment techniques had improved, so had detection techniques, and therefore 
detection capabilities were roughly the same as earlier, despite technological 
improvements.64 The improvement of environmental knowledge may have enabled 
improved detection capabilities, but it also provided any countries determined to avoid 
detection the means to do so, emphasizing how scientific knowledge and technological 
advancements play no favorites and can be used by different parties for different aims. 
 Over that same summer, AEC Chairman John McCone went to Geneva to attend 
the Conference on Nuclear Test Cessation, and his time there showed him that the issue 
of a detection system mired the talks to an even greater degree than he had thought. After 
his return on 2 July, he gave the AEC Commissioners a report on his trip. McCone 
described a dinner he attended “as a pleasant and convivial affair at which there was a 
frank exchange of views among those present,” and yet in spite of the amiable 
conversations problems still existed. For starters, the Soviets insisted that they would not 
agree on a specific quota about on-site inspections until both sides reached an agreement 
“on the idea of a quota.” McCone feared that there was pressure to reach an agreement on 
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a quota with no reference to the technical capability of the supposed inspection system, 
and he was afraid that if that happened public opinion might cause the United States to 
accept an inadequate number, such as twenty-five inspections per year or less. Moreover, 
while the United States did not desire a ban on anything that could not be monitored, the 
Soviets still pushed for a complete ban.65 The fact that the two sides could not even agree 
“on the idea of a quota” is a bit shocking considering how long the talks had been going, 
but the melding of international politics and environment has rarely, if ever, produced 
easy answers. 
 Prompted by these fundamental differences between U.S. and USSR positions, 
McCone said the congressional consensus recently expressed to him had been that the 
Conference should be recessed so that “senior Government people capable of making an 
objective appraisal” could reexamine the U.S. position. Only then could the United States 
develop a firm stance, and upon the Conference’s reconvention the U.S. delegates should 
state this position (esp. on basic issues of inspection, staff access, and veto) and force an 
agreement before returning to fringe issues. And yet, U.S. scientific advisors could not 
decide on the technical components of some of these issues. In June, Chairman McCone 
had noted a planed scientific panel to evaluate test detection systems. This 
“Interdepartmental Panel on Test Detection” contained representatives not only from the 
AEC and White House, but also the Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, 
and the State Department. But as of early July, there existed no set agreement by the 
Interdepartmental Panel on the number of required inspections for an adequate control 
system, and General Starbird contended that even more important than technical 
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requirements was the unknown role that U.S. intelligence reports might play in verifying 
any test ban violation.66 
 In August, President Eisenhower extended the one-year nuclear test suspension 
until 31 December 1959 in an attempt to salvage the talks, which became less and less 
likely as time passed. This prompted the Soviet Union to state that it would not resume its 
own nuclear tests so long as the U.S. and its allies maintained their moratorium, but by 
December, it became clear that an agreement likely would not be reached before 1 
January 1960. In October, General Starbird wrote a memo that the U.S. should plan to 
begin testing underground as soon as possible after the 1 January deadline.67 In one 
December meeting, AEC Chairman McCone announced that the Congressional Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) supported the AEC’s position on the necessity of 
effective monitoring in any test ban agreement. Since it seemed unlikely any agreement 
would come to fruition before the year’s end, Senator Clinton P. Anderson (D-NM), 
chairman of the JCAE, “urged” that the AEC be in a position to test nuclear devices as 
soon as the test moratorium ended.68 The U.S. position continuously evolved, though, at 
least in its details.  
Less than a week later, the Commissioners met again and discussed the idea of a 
“phased suspension treaty” where the test ban might initially extend up into the 
atmosphere to 300,000 kilometers (around 186,000 miles). A ban to this height should 
have eliminated any fallout problems and could be monitored with a combination of both 
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ground controls and satellite systems.69 Thus reducing atmospheric pollution remained 
important, but geopolitical strategic concerns trumped environmental and health concerns 
in the long run. An underground test ban remained off the table for the United States, 
though on 18 December in Louisiana the AEC performed two high explosive detonations 
as part of an experiment on decoupling atomic tests (making underground blasts appear 
much smaller than they are).70 
 The AEC report to Congress on the year 1959 well summarized the previous 
year’s activity, and its simple timeline of events helped show that environmental health 
and knowledge lay at the center of the talks. After the Conference of Experts met in 
Geneva from 1 July to 22 August 1958, negotiations began on Halloween of 1958 and 
were ongoing. A second technical conference had met for a few weeks during summer 
1959 and produced a report that described a system of monitoring nuclear detonations at 
very high altitudes and in outer space. And yet, as the year closed, no real agreement 
existed, other than a “Memorandum of Cooperation,” signed 24 November 1959, that 
provided for reciprocal information and scientific exchanges.71 The negotiating countries 
still could not agree on some of the basic goals of talks, such as exactly what sorts of tests 
would be banned, indicative of differing goals based on the way disparate environments 
affected test detection capabilities. 
 On 11 February 1960, President Eisenhower released a statement on the state of 
the test cessation negotiations, but even though he declared that the U.S. would start 
pushing a proposal to end the negotiation deadlock, his statement accentuated U.S. 
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intransigence on the issue of a detection system. The President reminded the public that 
the United States “had stood, throughout, for complete abolition of weapons testing 
subject only to the attainment of agreed and adequate methods of inspection and control.” 
Following this position and foreshadowing the treaty eventually penned in 1963, the U.S. 
proposal would seek to end tests “in all the environments that can now be effectively 
controlled”—tests in the atmosphere, oceans, space, and underground where it could be 
monitored. While not a complete test ban, the proposal contained “initial, far-reaching, 
but readily attainable steps” that would “allay world-wide concern over possible 
increases in levels of […] radioactivity into the atmosphere.”72 Such a treaty proposal 
looked remarkably similar to the eventual 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty and highlighted 
that the fundamental environmental issues at hand (reducing radioactive fallout from the 
atmosphere and navigating the differing environmental responses produced by nuclear 
testing). 
 Several days later, expecting questions on the new U.S. position, a briefing paper 
for Eisenhower’s 17 February press conference gave the President some prepared 
answers that unsurprisingly cast the United States in the best possible light while 
concomitantly seeking to put all blame for treaty talks on USSR diplomats. The Soviets 
had turned down the U.S. proposal and countered with their own plan that would ban all 
explosions, but only allow a limited number of inspections on suspected programs or 
explosions. The briefing sheet told Eisenhower that the correct “answer” was that such a 
policy “casts considerable doubt on the Soviet Union’s professed desire to halt nuclear 
weapons tests,” and that the Soviets are doing a “disservice” to “the hopes of all peace 
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loving people.”73 When asked about this in the actual press conference, the President 
reviewed the situation and then stated that he thought the U.S. proposal had been a good 
one, and that the Soviets’ counter-proposal seemed to change the criteria they were 
willing to observe. Hence deciding on an appropriate number of inspections would be 
difficult.74 Even when the two sides seemed closer to reaching an agreement, significant, 
fundamental differences in positions remained. 
 The issue of detection systems continued to vex negotiations as increasing 
environmental knowledge both allowed for greater test detection and highlighted the 
ever-increasing difficulty of detecting the covert tests of any potential treaty violators. 
The briefing paper for President Eisenhower’s 27 April press conference informed him 
that scientists claimed a need for 180 more testing stations in order to ensure effective 
monitoring. This would help the U.S. achieve a system to monitor a ban on “all nuclear 
weapons tests in the atmosphere, the oceans, at high altitudes and above seismic 
magnitude 4.75 in the underground area.”75 At the actual press conference, a reporter 
questioned the President about testimony the previous week before the JCAE on how 
“the art of concealing underground tests was outstripping the art of detecting them.” The 
President replied that the U.S. position only concerned itself with tests that produced 
seismic readings of 4.75 or more, which Eisenhower said would come from bombs 
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somewhere around the twenty-kiloton range. Anything below that would require a 
separate plan.76 
 No matter the progress made (or not made), after 1 May 1960 the possibility that 
any agreement might be reached on a test cessation treaty diminished greatly, at least in 
the minds of the participating parties.77 On that day, Soviet forces shot down a top secret 
U.S. U-2 spy plane, piloted by Francis Gary Powers. Since 1956, U-2 missions had 
gathered information, snapped photographs, and provided the United States important 
intelligence on the Soviet Union that it otherwise never would have had. At first, the U.S. 
position on the shot down plane followed a predetermined cover story that the aircraft 
was a low performance, high-altitude weather research plane. Soviet Premier 
Khrushchev, over the course of two weeks, slowly released information to the world 
public that showed this story to be false and proved the U.S. statements to be 
prevarications. Once the USSR revealed that it had the pilot, Francis Gary Powers, in 
custody, the U.S. could no longer deny the U-2’s true purpose. Higher-ups had instructed 
Powers to kill himself if captured to avoid any such incidents, but in the moment, as 
scientific advisor to the president George Kistiakowsky put it, “he just chickened out.” 
Kistiakowsky explained the incident simply: “the affair affected the whole tone of the 
administration.”78 
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 In the days after the Soviets shot down the U-2 plane, at first U.S. administrators 
acted as if everything would be fine. On 3 May, the AEC Commissioners met to discuss 
the U.S. position on how many inspections should be permitted in the USSR under a test 
cessation agreement. In short, the minutes noted that a “re-evaluation of the proper 
threshold for detection together with further study of the relationship between on-site 
inspections and the pattern and number of inspection stations within the USSR [had] 
presented new problems.” Other issues included how and what type of monitoring system 
would be used (a new system installed or already existing stations used) and what would 
happen to the information as the stations collected it. The President had previously 
approved a U.S. position for twenty on-site inspections each year and a system that 
monitored for seismic activity above 4.75 on the Richter scale. On-site inspections could 
be fly-overs, follow-up ground inspections, or drilling operations. Of course, new data 
from the RAND Corporation indicated that increased control stations might mean that on-
site inspections could be decreased, but some maintained a position that the U.S. should 
propose a high number of on-site inspections so as to have something to give up in 
negotiations. On-site inspections could have cost up to $6.5 million a year.79 
 By 11 May, the United States seemed to be abandoning the possibility that a test 
cessation treaty could be accomplished during the Eisenhower administration, as the U-2 
affair overrode any environmental or security concerns that might push toward an 
agreement. In preparation for a press conference on that day, the President received a 
briefing paper that counseled him how to answer questions about a recent U.S. 
announcement to resume tests. Eisenhower was supposed to respond that this 
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announcement had been misunderstood, and that these tests were purely so that the U.S. 
could “further an improved capability to detect and identify underground nuclear 
explosions.” Moreover, the tests did not represent anything new, just the ramping up of 
an already existing program.80 No matter the justification, nuclear tests of any sort would 
have made negotiating a nuclear test cessation treaty extremely difficult. 
 Furthermore, advocates for more nuclear tests remained in positions of power, 
particularly in the military, and where diplomats might have worried about public 
reaction to increasing atmospheric radiation, military men proved more concerned with 
more direct national security issues. In June, Nathan F. Twining, chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, sent a memo to Secretary of Defense Thomas F. Gates on the subject, 
“Draft Treaty on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests.” In that letter, Twining 
explained that the Joint Chiefs’ position held “that an adequate military posture for the 
United States will not be attained until there is available a complete spectrum of weapons 
compatible with modern delivery systems which will make it possible to apply selectively 
adequate force against any threat.” A test ban would not allow the U.S. to develop that 
spectrum of nuclear bombs. And even though the Joint Chiefs recognized that stopping 
tests could indefinitely maintain the nuclear arsenal advantage the United States held over 
the Sino-Soviet stockpile, only a treaty complete with adequate safeguards would do so. 
Fundamentally, though, the Joint Chiefs believed that detonating nuclear weapons as tests 
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played an “essential” part in maintaining nuclear deterrence and national security should 
be the most important factor.81  
 Even without a feasible treaty in the near future, the United States continued to 
work toward a time when an agreement might be possible with environmental research 
programs. The AEC Commissioners met early July to discuss a proposal for a “Seismic 
Research Program.” Devoting their entire 1 July meeting to the subject, AEC Chairman 
McCone reported that after a 30 June 1960 “meeting of the Principals, a new proposal for 
the seismic research program” existed. Policymakers grounded the program in a control 
method of pooling devices between the U.S., UK, and USSR, with each nation sharing 
designs with the other two nations. In yet another instance of amalgamating geopolitical 
security and environmental concerns, significant issues existed with such a program, 
especially over whether Soviet nuclear devices might be used on U.S. soil within the 
testing program and whether certain tests constituted weapons tests or not. Finally the 
Commissioners decided “that too much detail should be avoided in presenting the 
statement initially [to the Soviets], and that further details could be more advantageously 
determined after initial Soviet reactions.”82 Several days later the Commissioners again 
focused an entire meeting on the seismic research program. Particularly important to 
those at the meeting seemed to be disassociating the Plowshare program for peaceful uses 
of atomic weapons from the seismic research program.83 Issues of a control system 
continued to dominate the U.S. position. 
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 A late July 1960 position paper on the issue of nuclear test detection at high 
altitudes provides another example of how test detection and environmental knowledge 
and measurements governed U.S. thinking on the issue. Previous evaluations noted that a 
high altitude detection system could be installed in about two years, but would depend on 
unproven techniques and instrumentation. Moreover, any “determined violator” could 
evade any potential control system with existing technology. This caused the U.S. 
Defense Department to recommend that the nation limit its treaty obligation only up to 
tests in the top of the stratosphere (30-50 km, or the detectable portion of the atmosphere) 
with research done on any higher altitudes. The State Department, however, did not agree 
with this position. Either way, detection techniques would have to be improved 
constantly to stay ahead of evaders, as U.S. ideas of a ban still fundamentally depended 
on effective controls. The position paper explained that any treaty based on “unproven 
technique would be inconsistent with our basic principle.” Eventually, the paper 
recommended that the Defense Department take the following positions: limit test bans to 
environments where they could be detected, propose a moratorium of no more than two 
years, separate from the treaty at hand, on banning outer space nuclear tests, and the 
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Department of Defense should defer tabling the outer space ban until more negotiating 
could be done “concerning the coordinated seismic research program.”84 
 An August 1960 article in the Atlantic by Dr. Hans Bethe, Nobel laureate in 
physics, titled “The Case for Ending Nuclear Tests,” summed up the events to date, 
focusing especially on the issues of test detection and how nuclear tests affected the 
natural world. Bethe told his readers that the issue of nuclear test cessation frequently 
turned into an issue of detection, and while blasts could be detected fairly easily in the air 
and very easily underwater, it was quite difficult to detect blasts in outer space. 
Underground testing was also difficult to detect and had thus received the most publicity. 
Bethe explained, “It has the obvious advantage that it does not contaminate the 
atmosphere, and therefore the great disadvantage, from a detection point of view, that 
radioactive air samples cannot be gathered.” U.S. tests in Nevada had shown that, if 
buried deep enough (about 400 feet for a 1 kiloton blast, or about 1,100 feet for a 20 
kiloton blast), nuclear tests would not release any radioactive material into the air, but 
distinguishing these tests from normal earthquakes on a seismograph was actually 
somewhat difficult. The only sure way to tell if a tremor had been produced by a blast or 
an earthquake would be to send in an inspection team, but it was still unclear how many 
U.S. inspection teams a year Russia would tolerate.85 
 Other issues of detection still existed, but Bethe also questioned whether the 
Soviet Union would try to violate any test ban by carefully using natural formations to 
evade detection. Techniques like decoupling could be used to deliberately conceal 
                                                
84 DDEL, John A. McCone Papers, Box 4, Folder RES&D 1-2 -- TESTING -- March 1960 - July 1960 
[Folder 1] (1), Position Paper: Nuclear Test Suspensions High Altitude Detection Problem, 21 July 1960 
85 DDEL, John A. McCone Papers, Box 4, Folder RES&D 1-2 -- TESTING -- March 1960 - July 1960 
[Folder 1] (1), Memo From S. G. English To Chairman McCone, Commissioner Graham, Commissioner 
Wilson, Commissioner Olson, 28 July 1960 
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nuclear tests, such as setting off the bomb in a large cavern so that “the apparent size of 
the explosion is thereby reduced by a factor of about 300.” Making a hole large enough is 
problematic, but using a salt cavern and washing away the salt was not as difficult 
(though it would take about 2 years and around $10 million). Such an endeavor, of 
course, would still be quite an effort. No matter the trouble, Bethe’s fundamental position 
was such: “I believe that the Soviet Union, which is posing as a peace-loving nation, 
whether rightly or wrongly, simply cannot afford to be caught in a violation, and 
therefore I think that it will not try to cheat.” Beyond that, cheating and conducting one 
test would not be terribly useful—any country would have to be a serial violator for its 
efforts to pay off. Moreover, researching possible concealment just to make better 
detection systems would only do the research for a possible violator, which seemed like a 
poor plan.86 
 In short, Bethe expressed the common opinion that a test ban should be 
implemented and it would be to the United States’ advantage. There still existed some 
technical issues on detection, which he outlined in his article, but these either needed to 
be solved or ignored. Bethe wrote in conclusion, “Opponents of the test cessation 
agreement want to have a perfect agreement; they want to have an agreement in which 
we can be sure to detect each and every violation, no matter how small. I think that by 
insisting on perfection we shall end up with nothing.”87 Many U.S. policymakers, 
however, did not agree, and the Eisenhower administration never did deviate from its 
                                                
86 DDEL, John A. McCone Papers, Box 4, Folder RES&D 1-2 -- TESTING -- March 1960 - July 1960 
[Folder 1] (1), Memo From S. G. English To Chairman McCone, Commissioner Graham, Commissioner 
Wilson, Commissioner Olson, 28 July 1960 
87 DDEL, John A. McCone Papers, Box 4, Folder RES&D 1-2 -- TESTING -- March 1960 - July 1960 
[Folder 1] (1), Memo From S. G. English To Chairman McCone, Commissioner Graham, Commissioner 
Wilson, Commissioner Olson, 28 July 1960 
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original position. Eisenhower’s briefing papers before his 17 August press conference 
stated that the U.S. still intended to negotiate for a control system, “which would assure 
that no nuclear weapons tests are carried out clandestinely. However, until such a system 
is brought into being we have no way of being absolutely certain that the Soviet Union is 
not testing clandestinely.”88  
 As Eisenhower’s term ended, it became even clearer that an agreement would not 
be reached during his term. The United States had suspended weapons tests for more than 
two years, since October 1958, both to aid in negotiations and also because “radioactivity 
from nuclear tests is a source of concern in the minds of many people.” 89 The U.S. 
position still rested on issues of detection and the U.S. worry that its own security, and by 
extension that of the rest of the world, might be harmed by stopping nuclear weapons 
tests. 
 In the end, President Eisenhower felt that the U-2 affair—and not disagreements 
about control systems—had ruined any chance the U.S. had to help make any test 
cessation agreement and perhaps even more. After the incident, George Kistiakowsky, 
presidential scientific advisor, met with Eisenhower and the subject of the U-2 plane 
came up in their conversation. Eisenhower claimed that the scientists had let him down, 
but Kistiakowsky responded that scientific advisors had warned the President that the 
Soviets would eventually gain the capability shoot down the planes. Instead, 
                                                
88 DDEL, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President, Ann Whitman File, Press Conference Series, Box 10, 
Press Conference 17 August 1960, Briefing Papers 
89 Of course, the quotation continued to say: “regardless of whether or not the fears of fallout radiation are 
scientifically valid. Accordingly, the Commission would propose that future tests, if any, be conducted 
underground, or in space beyond the earth’s atmosphere, in such a way as not to cause fallout.”  Annual 
Report to the Congress of the Atomic Energy Commission for 1960, January 1961, XIII-XIV. A good brief 
summary of the negotiations is contained on pages 125-127. 
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Kistiakowsky declared that it was the bureaucrats running the program who had let down 
the President. At that point:  
[The] President began to talk with much feeling about how he had concentrated 
his efforts the last few years on ending the cold war, how he felt that he was 
making big progress, and how the stupid U-2 mess had ruined all his efforts. He 
ended very sadly that he saw nothing worthwhile left for him to do now until the 
end of his presidency.90 
 
But perhaps President Eisenhower misjudged the situation, and a fundamental difference 
in positions—especially related to detection systems—meant that blaming the U-2 
incident does not make sense. Instead, it is very possible that the United States and Soviet 
Union simply were not in the correct respective places for the agreements to be feasible. 
 What is clear, though, is the crucial role that the natural world and scientific 
understandings about it played in the negotiations. Both negotiating sides were concerned 
about fallout and especially how the radiation would be transferred from testing 
environments to human bodies. It was this fear that undergirded the entire negotiation 
process, especially as poisoning the environment might damage the United States’ 
reputation or be used by the Soviets as propaganda. Thus, whether induced by heartfelt 
concern or political maneuvering, policymakers and negotiators should be taken at their 
word in this instance—protecting the environment mattered. Moreover, policymakers’ 
decisions helped enact an institutional position that improving environmental knowledge 
about the nuclear complex was crucial to bettering national security in a Cold War 
geopolitical context. 
 Beyond a desire to protect the natural world, environmental science played a 
crucial part in the largest point of discussion in all treaty talks—detection systems. Put 
simply, both sides thought testing should be curbed, at least to some significant degree, 
                                                
90 Kistiakowsky, A Scientist at the White House, 375. 
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but could not agree on how such a ban might be monitored, or even if it should. 
Representing a fundamental lack of trust in the Soviets’ willingness to maintain any 
agreement reached, the United States insisted on only banning tests that could be 
effectively monitored. For tests to be monitored and detected, scientific understandings of 
the environment proved central. Not only did tests conducted aboveground leave telltale 
radiation in the atmosphere, which could be detected, but the ground itself and tremors 
throughout it took center stage when discussing underground tests. The whole detection 
argument centered on environmental knowledge and how it had to be continually 
improved so that detection systems also could improve. 
 In sum, environmental science and knowledge must be recognized as crucial 
components of early nuclear test cessation treaty talks. Without sensitivity to the natural 
world and understandings of it, nuclear test ban discussions would have happened very 
differently or likely not at all. In addition, the Eisenhower-era treaty talks represent the 
antecedent action to the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, which followed closely many of 
the U.S. requirements established before Kennedy even took office. Though the talks 
during the Eisenhower presidency failed while those during the Kennedy administration 
succeeded, these earlier treaty discussions still deserve recognition and understanding, 
both for their place in Cold War history and for how they help illuminate this under-
recognized relationship between the environment and the Eisenhower administration. 
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Figure 1: Hand Drawn Map of Hanford Atomic Works Area1 
Notice how natural and agricultural factors are interspersed with industrial centers of both 
traditional and nuclear varieties.  
  
                                                
1 DDEL, White House Central Files, General File, Box 1214, Folder 155, 1958, Letter from Donald A. 
Pugnetti to James Hagerty, 16 August 1958. 
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Figure 2: Step-by-step chart from the AEC on the production of nuclear products2 
Notice that the chart implies that peaceful and war uses of fissionable materials receive 
and equal amount of time, attention, and research, and also that the two are merely halves 
of the same coin. Moreover, neither mining nor nuclear waste are mentioned at all.   
                                                
2 Fifth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, January 1949, 4. 
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Figure 3: “Trinity,” the world’s first detonation of a nuclear weapon3 
After this test, which occurred on 16 July 1945, Robert Oppenheimer proclaimed, 
quoting from the Bhagavad-Gita, “I am become Death, the shatterer of worlds.”  
  
                                                
3 Photo accessed on 2 April 2012 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Trinity_shot_color.jpg Quotation 
from Donald Worster, Nature’s Economy (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1977), 339. 
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Figure 4: The Trinity shot 16 milliseconds after detonation4 
At this point, the fireball is about 600 feet wide. 
  
                                                
4 Accessed on 2 April 2012 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Trinity_Test_Fireball_16 ms.jpg  
 
 173 
 
Figure 5: Operation Crossroads “Able” shot, detonated 1 July 19465 
Able was the first post-World War II nuclear test. 
  
                                                
5 Accessed on 2 April 2012 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Operation_Crossroads_-_Able_001.jpg  
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Figure 6: Another view of the Operation Crossroads “Able” shot6 
The juxtaposition between beautiful, natural features in the foreground and the iconic 
mushroom cloud in the background reminds us that nuclear tests were always situated 
within an environmental context. 
  
                                                
6 Accessed on 2 April 2012 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Able_crossroads.jpg  
 
 175 
 
Figure 7: Operation Crossroads, “Baker” shot, detonated 25 July 19467 
This underwater detonation spewed copious radioactive water into the air and carried it 
out in hundred-foot tall waves. 
  
                                                
7 Accessed on 2 April 2012 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Operation_Crossroads_Baker.jpg  
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Figure 8: Operation Crossroads, Baker shot8 
From this angle it is easy to see the ships moored at varying distances around the blast 
epicenter and the considerable spray of water. 
  
                                                
8 Accessed on 2 April 2012 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Crossroads_baker_explosion.jpg  
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Figure 9: Another view of Operation Crossroads “Baker” shot9 
In this photograph, both the moored ships and nuclear test (at the time the height of 
technology) combine with the palm trees (reminiscent of a tropical paradise) create an 
almost paradoxical scene. 
  
                                                
9 Accessed on 2 April 2012 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Operation_Crossroads_Baker_Edit.jpg 
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Figure 10: A comic about Bert the Turtle in the same vein as the popular short film 
Duck and Cover, first page 
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Figure 11: A comic about Bert the Turtle in the same vein as the popular short film 
Duck and Cover, second page   
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Figure 12: The Operation Castle “Bravo” test, detonated 1 March 195410 
This bomb, one of the first thermonuclear weapons detonated, caused the Lucky Dragon 
controversy and showered the Marshall Islanders with radioactive fallout. 
  
                                                
10 Accessed on 2 April 2012 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Castle_Bravo_Blast.jpg 
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Figure 13: Weather balloons used for stratospheric fallout monitoring11 
Balloons like these marked the confluence of U.S. nuclear weapons advancement and the 
interests of U.S. scientific advancement. 
  
                                                
11 NACP, 326 Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Entry 73, Division of Biology and Medicine, 
Records Relating to Fallout Studies, 1953-6, Box 3, Folder Stratospheric Monitoring, Jan. 1958, #2, 
Balloons Photo 
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Figure 14: Drawing on the use of weather balloons to monitor stratospheric fallout 
in the Pacific, left half12  
                                                
12 NACP, 326 Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Entry 73, Division of Biology and Medicine, 
Records Relating to Fallout Studies, Box 3, 1953-6, Folder Stratospheric Monitoring, Jan. 1958, #2, 
Constant Level, Balloons as Tracers of Air Motion in Atomic Weapon Tests for the Atomic Energy 
Commission 
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Figure 15: Drawing on the use of weather balloons to monitor stratospheric fallout 
in the Pacific, right half13 
This drawing, in conjunction with the previous figure, conveniently hides most of 
Micronesia under cloud cover, including heavily populated downwind locales like most 
of the Marshall Islands. Perhaps most notably, strategic U.S. interests—like Midway and 
Hawai’i—feature most prominently on the map.     
                                                
13 IBID. 
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Figure 16: “Safe, Harmless Giant Atomic Bomb” Toy14 
Toys like this, even with scenes of destruction on the box, belied the fact that nuclear 
weapons were not safe, even with the best intentions of policymakers and scientists to 
make such bombs “clean.” 
  
                                                
14 Accessed on 2 April 2012 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Giant_Atomic_Bomb_toy.jpg 
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Figure 17: Cover of Dagwood Splits the Atom15 
This booklet attempted to explain, in very plain English, exactly how many nuclear 
processes happened and certainly is representative of nuclear boosterism. Though 
produced by King Features Syndicate, Inc., a comic and newspaper print syndication, 
author Joe Musial wrote the work with the scientific advice of Lt. General Leslie R. 
Groves, Dr. John R. Dunning, and Dr. Louis M. Heil. In the introduction, Groves, 
described as having “headed the great organization which developed the atomic bomb” 
(the Manhattan Project), wrote to readers, “To those who will read it carefully, this 
pamphlet will bring a clearer understanding of atomic energy. Many will understand what 
has formerly confused them. Mere words need not frighten them in the future—words 
such as fission, isotope, proton, chain reaction and atom bomb. This book will reassure 
the fearful that the future can be made bright.”   
                                                
15 Joe Musial, Learn How Dagwood Splits the Atom! (King Features Syndicate, Inc., 1949), introduction. 
© BLONDIE ©1949 by King Features Syndicate, Inc. World rights reserved 
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Figure 18: Page 31 of Dagwood Splits the Atom16 
This one-page section of Dagwood Splits the Atom helped explain how agriculture could 
expect to see big gains from atomic research.  
                                                
16 Joe Musial, Learn How Dagwood Splits the Atom! (King Features Syndicate, Inc., 1949), 31. 
© BLONDIE ©1949 by King Features Syndicate, Inc. World rights reserved 
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Chapter Four 
Atomic Agriculture:  
The Atom, Agriculture, and Hopes for Technology 
 
“A growing plant is a chemical factory, of course. Scientists have known this for years—
but haven’t known exactly what went on in that factory. They didn’t know and couldn’t 
find out how chemicals entered the plant, what the chemicals did, how they accomplished 
their work. So, agriculture has had to depend on trial-and-error in producing vital food. 
 
“Now agricultural science has perfected a way for studying and following plant 
chemicals from the time they leave the soil until they are finally deposited in the various 
parts of the plant. By mixing small quantities of radioactive isotopes with the soil, the 
scientist, with his Geiger counter, can now follow the movement of important chemicals 
through the whole cycle of plant life. […] 
 
“Food production, therefore, is passing from trial-and-error to certainty.”17 
 
—Learn How Dagwood Splits the Atom! (1949) 
 
 
 
The loveable cartoon character Dagwood Bumstead is best known for eating 
impossibly large sandwiches, napping, and of course his beautiful wife Blondie. During 
the Cold War, however, the United States enlisted the good patriot Dagwood to help 
teach the nation about nuclear science. In Learn How Dagwood Splits the Atom!, the 
magician Mandrake shrank our animated protagonist and his family to the size of  
molecules, and in their diminutive states the Bumsteads learned about the composition of 
atoms and how nuclear chain reactions work. The booklet not only sent Dagwood on his 
miniaturized journey, but also, unsurprisingly, acted as a booster for the nuclear industry. 
In this mission as a booster, Learn How Dagwood Splits the Atom! (Figure 16) 
also promoted the benefits of the harnessing the atom to improve agriculture. Completely 
outside the tiny Dagwood story arc, several pages at the end of the comic were single-
page snapshots of how atomic energy had benefitted, and would continue to benefit in the 
                                                
17 Joe Musial, Learn How Dagwood Splits the Atom! (King Features Syndicate, Inc., 1949), 31 
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future, medical science, industry, and agriculture (Figure 18). As the quotation at the start 
of the chapter shows, atomic tracers could track “plant chemicals from the time they 
leave the soil until they are finally deposited in the various parts of the plant” and seemed 
to be a miracle technology that would soon transform growing food from “trial-and-error 
to certainty.” Such statements held a clear implication: if researchers could only 
understand the exact biological processes that govern how plants grow and produce food, 
those scientists would be able to help farmers feed the nation in a failsafe fashion. As an 
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) report to Congress in the same year of the Dagwood 
cartoon’s publication claimed, “The story of the Garden of Eden and the myth of 
Promethean fire find uncanny parallels in the huge responsibilities of the Atomic Energy 
Commission to control the unprecedented forces of atomic energy for the welfare of 
man.”18 With atomic energy and its lessons, U.S. policymakers hoped to turn the 
country’s agricultural lands into a modern-day Garden of Eden, albeit with less 
devastating apples. 
The Dagwood cartoon is important for the attitudes and mindsets it represents. 
The cartoon is emblematic of how, during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, 
policymakers paid careful consideration to the ways growing nuclear scientific 
understandings might be applied outside of improving war-making capabilities. General 
Leslie Groves, former head of the Manhattan Project, wrote of Learn How Dagwood 
Splits the Atom, “This book will reassure the fearful that the future can be made bright.”19 
Similarly, agriculture frequently assumed a place of prominence for explaining how 
splitting the atom was a gift to the world and not the red horse rider of the apocalypse. 
                                                
18 Sixth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, July 1949, 16. 
19 Musial, Learn How Dagwood Splits the Atom!, introduction. 
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Historian Joel B. Hagen has described how many people, specialists and not, quickly 
realized that atomic energy could pose incredible dangers to both human health and the 
environment. Hagen explained that, “In response, professional ecologists effectively used 
concerns over atomic energy as a convincing justification for ecosystem studies.” He 
further elucidated that for postwar professional ecologists (or in our case, agronomists), 
nuclear energy became “a kind of double-edged sword” that could wreak havoc on the 
natural world, but also unlock “many of nature’s secrets for human benefit.”20 In the 
same way, research into atomic agriculture allowed U.S. policymakers to simultaneously 
increase research into atomic energy and how it affected the natural world without 
necessarily creating bombs that could cause incredible harm to both human and natural 
systems, as previous chapters have showed. 
This chapter traces how top decision makers during the Truman and Eisenhower 
administrations understood the relationship between agriculture and the atom and how 
they explained their understandings to other policymakers and the public. While nuclear 
science proved incredibly important to agriculture during the 1940s and 1950s, 
particularly with radioactive tracer isotopes, this chapter argues that agriculture was also 
important for nuclear development as it provided a clearly peaceful output for atomic 
research. To show this, the chapter particularly looks at the research reported by the AEC 
to Congress and what this research explains about the mindsets and goals of AEC 
policymakers—where the AEC put its time and money and what it thought worth telling 
Congress tells us a great deal about what policymakers thought about atomic agriculture. 
Worth noting in this discussion is that atomic agricultural research could and did take 
                                                
20 Joel B. Hagen, An Entangled Bank: The Origins of Ecosystem Ecology (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 1992), 100-101. 
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many forms, especially including the byproducts of nuclear energy like radioactive 
isotopes and even radioactivity itself. What tied together these disparate research methods 
and atomic energy products is that all of these fell under the umbrella of the AEC, further 
emphasizing the sweeping nature of the nuclear complex. After 1945 high-level decision 
makers recognized they would need to justify research into atomic energy and downplay 
the possible harms inherent in it.  
Executive policymakers, especially in the AEC not only wanted to help improve 
the nation’s agriculture, but more importantly they saw that doing so would represent 
their commitment to more than creating weapons of greater and greater mass destruction. 
In short, atomic agriculture represented an attempt by policymakers at repurposing 
atomic energy research as a peaceful endeavor. Those decision makers intended atomic 
agriculture to create hope for the future and a belief that technology and greater control of 
nuclear energy could create a better nation. Moreover, they realized that if the AEC 
helped improve agriculture that agriculture could help the AEC better develop atomic 
energy and cast its research into a much more publicly palatable form. 
In order to understand this interplay between the atom and agriculture, however, 
atomic agriculture must be placed in several different contexts—the developing nuclear 
complex, the modernization of agriculture, and the Green Revolution.21 Agricultural 
modernization and the Green Revolution require some additional background at this 
juncture. Farmers in the United States began their journey to modernized farm production 
                                                
21 These contexts continued to intertwine after 1960 as well as shown by historian Jacob Darwin Hamblin, 
who traced the “origins of the [Food and Agriculture Organization and International Atomic Energy 
Agency] conflict and collaboration in the 1960s, and [explored] the failed effort of plant geneticist Ronald 
Silow to stop what he saw as the IAEA’s hijacking of agriculture at the [United Nations].” Jacob Darwin 
Hamblin, “Let there be light … and bread: the United Nations, the developing world, and atomic energy’s 
Green Revolution,” History and Technology, Vol. 25, No. 1 (March 2009), 25. 
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in the nineteenth century, but after the First World War that action accelerated.22 Farmers 
adopted more machines, particularly machines powered by hydrocarbon fuels like 
gasoline, and these mechanical aids let farmers do their jobs easier, quicker, and with less 
human labor. With those machines came a rising industrial logic as well, as the 
transformation also had an ideological component.23 After World War II, agriculture took 
off in an even more spectacular way, as “During the generation after [World War II], 
agriculture underwent a revolution in productivity spurred by machines, chemicals, and 
improved plant and animal breeds.”24 Continued use of machines combined with a 
budding U.S. chemical industry as tractors went hand in hand with fertilizers, herbicides, 
and pesticides.25 The process did not happen seamlessly, however, and farmers made 
many individual decisions along the way as the process advanced in starts and fits.26 In 
                                                
22 One excellent example of both the technologies and mindsets involved in modernized agricultural 
production can be found in Melody Petersen, “As Beef Cattle Become Behemoths, Who Are Animal 
Scientists Serving?” The Chronicle of Higher Education, 15 April 2012. Can be found online: 
http://chronicle.com/article/As-Beef-Cattle-Become/131480/ accessed 9 September 2012. 
23 Deborah Fitzgerald argued, “although individual technologies, particular pieces of legislation, new sorts 
of expertise, and the availability or disappearance of credit opportunities are all key to understanding what 
happened in twentieth-century agriculture, it is essential to grasp the overarching logic of change that was 
taking place in bits and pieces and the industrial system that was being constructed around the country.” 
Deborah Fitzgerald, Every Farm a Factory: The Industrial Ideal in American Agriculture (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2003), 4. 
24 David Danbom’s history of the rural United States focuses on farming peoples as exemplary of rural life 
in the country. His larger argument for this time period is that “Socially, culturally, materially, and in terms 
of life experiences, rural life was converging with urban life in the decades following World War II.” David 
B. Danbom, Born in the Country: A History of Rural America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1995), 233-234, 252. And neither modern rural life nor farm production would not be the same 
without the development of prefabricated housing. John Fraser Hart, Michelle J. Rhodes, and John T. 
Morgan, The Unknown World of the Mobile Home (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002) 
25 One of the very best examinations of the development of the U.S. chemical industry surely is Edmund 
Russell’s study of pesticides and war gases that argues the two coevolved, especially in the rhetoric of their 
producers. Edmund Russell, War and Nature:  Fighting Humans and Insects with Chemicals from World 
War I to Silent Spring.  (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2001) 
26 This is as is argued by J. L. Anderson in Industrializing the Corn Belt. Anderson tried “to explain 
farmers’ roles in changing agricultural production, to describe the technology they adopted, and to show 
how they transformed the rural landscape,” particularly through the perspective of farmers. Fundamentally, 
he contends, “Farmers who worked the land during the postwar period not only accepted the industrial ideal 
but made it their own,” and in doing so “the ecosystems and physical landscape of Iowa farms changed as a 
result of many thousands of small decisions concerning the use of technology.” J. L. Anderson, 
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the end, farming became more of a business, leading to the current state of trucking 
cheaply-produced agricultural products across the country to feed a nation that eats more 
and at less expense than any before it in history.27  
Once the United States reached that situation, however, a series of decisions to 
share the methods to such agricultural productivity coalesced into what is commonly 
called the Green Revolution. Previous world hunger, such as the El Niño-exacerbated fin-
de-siècle drought famines that killed tens of millions, had elicited little attention from the 
United States and especially the U.S. government.28 After World War II the world 
political climate changed enough that feeding the world and eradicating hunger became 
an important political goal. In addition to previously described mechanical and chemical 
advances, improved plant breeding also played a crucial role in getting food to mouths. In 
particular, improved cereal grain crops like highly productive dwarf wheat and rice 
                                                                                                                                            
Industrializing the Corn Belt: Agriculture, Technology, and Environment, 1945-1972 (DeKalb: Northern 
Illinois University Press, 2009), 5-12, 192. 
27 On family farming becoming a business, see John Fraser Hart’s The Land That Feeds Us. He argues that 
post World War II U.S. agriculture became an increasingly international enterprise because farmers in the 
country were just too good at what they did, leading to surpluses. “The United States has more good 
farmland than it needs to feed and clothe its people, so American farmers must export because they can 
produce more than the American people can consume. The surplus may be either a vexatious problem that 
must be controlled or a blessing that should help to feed a hungry world, but American farmers suffer when 
other countries, for whatever reason, do not or cannot buy the surplus they have produced.” John Fraser 
Hart, The Land That Feeds Us (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1991), 356. On the development of 
cross-country trucking networks, see Shane Hamilton’s Trucking Country. Hamilton contends that New 
Deal agricultural policies led to a consumer attitude that valued inexpensive food no matter the human cost 
on the supplier side. “By relying on long-haul trucking to craft a low-price food economy on America’s 
rural highways, agribusinesses cultivated the antistatist, antiunion ideologies that made post-New Deal 
capitalism palatable not only to Mike Parkhurst’s anarcho-populist followers, but to the broad swatch of the 
American populace who came to demand ‘always low prices’ at the supermarket. […] agribusinesses 
crafted a business model that promoted low consumer prices, low wages, and minimal government 
regulation as inherent social benefits.” Shane Hamilton, Trucking Country: The Road to America’s Wal-
Mart Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 5.  
28 The ever-iconoclastic Mike Davis called these famines “The Secret History of the Nineteenth Century,” 
and argued that a “fatal meshing of extreme events between the world climate system and the late Victorian 
world economy” caused these famines. In Davis’ mind, El Niño droughts were not sufficient to cause 
famines, but when the peoples affected by those droughts also became integrated into modern economies 
the result was the deaths of perhaps fifty million people and the creation of the “Third World.” Mike Davis, 
Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third World (New York: Verso, 2002), 
6, 12. 
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strains, combined with chemical fertilizers and petro-fuels, meant that producing 
incredible amounts of food could be done easier than ever before.29  
Perhaps more crucial than improved technology, however, was the 
reconceptualization that foreign nations needed the United States’ help to feed their 
peoples. Nick Cullather described how the Green Revolution typically is conceived as 
“the greatest success in the history of foreign aid since the Marshall Plan,” but instead 
should be thought of as “the birth of a new type of international politics.” Many U.S. 
leaders believed that a multitude of hungry peasants in Third World countries, 
particularly Asia, presented a threat to either foment communist uprisings or politically 
destabilize the region. Feeding these hungry mouths would not only head off those 
problems, but also help integrate Asia’s population into the world economy.30 The Green 
Revolution did not deliver on everything it promised, however. Though it might have 
been intended as a foreign aid solution that would put the entire Third World into the 
United States’ camp by feeding a hungry world, the Green Revolution did nothing to 
change existing social imbalances. And a host of unexpected outcomes, like pesticides 
damaging both the environment and human health, meant that even its successes came 
with distinct failures.31 In short, the Green Revolution was no perfect solution and 
                                                
29 John Perkins considers this an historical moment exemplary of “the immense importance of agriculture 
in general and the cereal crops in particular to the shape of human culture and the security of nations.” In 
considering “agriculture as a complex set of technologies that access natural resources to produce food,” he 
further argued, “considerations of national security and foreign exchange were really important examples 
of an even broader concept: that wheat and people are two species that have evolved a complex 
codependency since their first major encounter in the Neolithic agricultural revolution.” John H. Perkins, 
Geopolitics and the Green Revolution: Wheat, Genes, and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), vi, 4. 
30 Cullather argued the United States had three conflicting goals with Green Revolution: 1) “restore a 
putatively lost ‘balance’ between food supply and population”; 2) “modify the psychology of the peasant”; 
3) use “rural reconstruction [as] a technique of nation-building.” Nick Cullather, The Hungry World: 
America’s Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), ix, 7. 
31 Angus Wright wrote about the death of Ramón González, a fictitious Mextico farm worker clearly meant 
to represent many unnamed peoples, caused by pesticides. Wright criticized what he called “the modern 
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perhaps what U.S. planners considered to be the problem (lack of food) was more a 
symptom of uneven development than the problem itself. No matter the problem, though, 
atomic agriculture did play a key role in increasing agricultural production. 
Fundamentally, though not exclusively, agricultural research with atomic energy 
began with the use of radioisotope tracer atoms. A 14 June 1946 press release by 
President Truman boldly declared, “The first peacetime applications of the results of 
wartime atomic research becomes immediately possible with announcement today of 
availability of radioisotopes for biological and medical research.”32 Even though less than 
a year had passed since the August 1945 bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the 
United States represented the only nuclear power in the world, Truman’s administration 
already had begun to promote atomic energy as a peaceful entity. Produced from the 
“atom pile,” radioisotopes offered scientists the ability to use “tagged” atoms—
radioactive versions of common elements—to track how these atoms moved through 
biological processes, ecosystems, or anything else through which elements moved. 
Applying the tracers to agriculture seemed quite logical and, as President Truman 
expressed, would revolutionize biological research. The results from radioisotope 
research caused policymakers to champion the atom as a true boon to agriculture.  
                                                                                                                                            
agricultural dilemma” and wrote argued “the social and ecological conditions of the countries of the South 
tended to magnify rapidly the ill effects of dangerous pesticides.” In short, “When the growth of a 
technology seems immune to the consequences of disastrous experience and the invention of inexpensive 
and effective alternatives, we have to begin to ask why.” And with a Marxist analysis, he pondered, 
“Persistence of dangerous technologies may also be based on severe social imbalances that allow hazardous 
technologies to prevail because the pattern of rewards and penalties associated with the technology is 
rooted in the distribution of power in the society.” Angus Wright, The Death of Ramón González: The 
Modern Agricultural Dilemma (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), xi, xiv-xv. 
32 HSTL, Papers of Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files, Box 174, Folder Atomic Bomb, Press Releases 
[2 of 3], Press Release “First Peacetime Application of Atomic Research Becomes Immediately Possible 
under Army Program,” 14 June 1946 
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David Lilienthal, Chairman of the AEC, continued the President’s tone of 
progress when he gave a speech titled “Atomic Energy is Your Business,” sponsored by 
the Civic Organizations of Crawfordsville, Indiana on 22 September 1947. Lilienthal 
previously served as the head of the Tennessee Valley Authority, and therefore it is no 
surprise that he publicly held a collectivist stance when it came to the benefits of atomic 
energy. As the speech’s title indicated, Lilienthal’s first goal on that Monday evening was 
to contradict the notion that atomic energy was none of the U.S. public’s business, as 
Lilienthal considered such a stance, “plain nonsense, and dangerous nonsense, dangerous 
to cherished American institutions and for that reason dangerous to national security.” He 
also stressed that atomic energy and science did not change the “fundamental principles 
of democracy” and made the point that “atomic energy and atomic bombs are not 
synonymous.”33 To Lilienthal, the newly acquired powers from atomic energy, be these 
violent or peaceful, did not change the nation at all, and in fact the United State’s new 
nuclear capabilities should be made to conform with the nation’s already-present ideals 
with little change to the crucial ideas that made up the country’s identity. New atomic 
understandings may have meant progress and the promise of a better future, but the good 
times ahead still aligned with bedrock U.S. principles and did not represent a rupture in 
U.S. history. In this way, atomic energy’s relationship to agriculture should be conceived 
as a supporting force and not as anything that changed farming’s character. 
Most of Lilienthal’s speech, though, stressed to his audience the benign 
possibilities for nuclear energy. He reminded his listeners that the sun is an “atomic 
energy factory,” and continued, “Atomic energy is not just another new gadget, nor just a 
                                                
33 Underlining present in the original speech. HSTL, Papers of Clark Clifford, Subject File, 1945-54, Box 
1, Folder Atomic Energy--Lilienthal, Atomic Energy is Your Business, 22 September 1947, 1-3. 
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new weapon, however powerful and devastating. We are dealing with forces as 
fundamental to your life as the force of the sun, the forces of gravity, the forces of 
magnetism.” By comparing splitting the atom to the processes of the sun, Lilienthal 
turned harnessing atomic forces from something dangerous and arcane into something 
natural and common that his audience dealt with every day.34 Nuclear energy was not 
new, dangerous and full of peril, but instead similar to a warm sunbeam on your face or 
any other natural force that humans could bend to their will for benefit.35 
Even if Lilienthal did not want his audience to consider splitting the atom new or 
dangerous, he still emphasized that atomic energy could produce incredible advances and 
throw “a clear light upon some of the oldest mysteries of life.” For example, humans 
could now answer the question of “how does a stalk of growing corn use the rays of the 
sun to manufacture its products into energy-giving food substances?” Agriculture, and its 
relationship to the sun, explained why atomic energy affected national destiny and 
buttressed the principles on which patriots built the United States.36 In this way, 
Lilienthal’s rhetoric showed that improving agriculture through atomic energy clearly 
served the dual purposes of both agricultural and national improvement. Ideas about 
agriculture helped to express to his audience that nuclear research was important, natural, 
                                                
34 Lilienthal made this comparison even though a sun is powered by nuclear fusion and the chain reactions 
humans could create were nuclear fission. A similar comparison was made here: HSTL, Papers of Truman, 
President’s Secretary’s Files, Box 194, Folder ABomb War Department, Atomic Energy Source of 
Inexhaustible Power 
35 HSTL, Papers of Clark Clifford, Subject File, 1945-54, Box 1, Folder Atomic Energy--Lilienthal, 
Atomic Energy is Your Business, 22 September 1947, 4-5. 
36 Particularly, Lilienthal claimed that engineering knowledge was not needed to make decisions about the 
atom, but instead “What is needed is sense about human relations, about standards of fairness, about 
principles of self-government and of self-education” so that “petty politics” would not get in the way of 
progress. HSTL, Papers of Clark Clifford, Subject File, 1945-54, Box 1, Folder Atomic Energy--Lilienthal, 
Atomic Energy is Your Business, 22 September 1947, 5-9. 
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and should continue. Perhaps most importantly, that research did not have to be 
associated with nuclear weapons in any way.  
In addition, popular notions about technology’s rightful place in agriculture 
served as an undercurrent to Lilienthal’s speech and undergirded his contention that 
nuclear energy could play an important role in agriculture. Historian Donald Worster 
wrote that for agriculture around the turn of the twentieth century, the “most important 
new wrinkle was the machine.”37 From John Deere’s metal plow in the middle of the 
nineteenth century to Henry Ford’s automobiles, trucks, and tractors, agriculture received 
a significant technological boost in the century before Lilienthal’s speech causing 
productivity to soar and prices to drop. Thus when Lilienthal’s audience received the 
good word about the atom, they likely readily accepted the idea that technology fit into 
agriculture like sunshine and good weather. If the atom could provide the newest piece of 
equipment for farmers, it should be welcomed with open arms. David Lilienthal gave 
another speech that year worth noting, this one before the Annual Meeting of the 
American Farm Bureau Federation.  
In his Farm Bureau speech, Lilienthal much more explicitly connected the atom to 
agriculture and showed the AEC’s commitment to improving agriculture, implicitly 
showing how important agriculture was to the AEC’s research agenda. On the afternoon 
of 16 December 1947, the AEC Commissioner offered the Chicago-gathered Farm 
Bureau Federation crowd advice as to why they should care about atomic energy. He 
explained, as his number one point, “No one in this country has a greater stake in the 
vigorous development of atomic energy, and the consequent increase in knowledge of the 
                                                
37 Donald Worster, Dust Bowl: The Southern Plains in the 1930s (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1979), 87. 
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fundamental laws of Nature, than you who day after day work most closely with nature – 
the farmers of America.” Since he thought farmers had such a high stake in atomic 
development, Lilienthal’s second point followed closely when he contended that farmers 
needed to stay informed of atomic energy discoveries and peaceful uses of the atom.38  
With the speech, Lilienthal, and by extension the AEC, had several goals and all 
of these related to atomic boosterism through agriculture. Other than his stated goals 
above, Lilienthal also echoed his earlier desire to distance atomic energy from atomic 
bombs in the minds of his audience members. He declared a “myth” existed that atomic 
energy could only be used as a bomb or as a weapon, but instead argued, “Nothing could 
be farther from the truth,” and that now a “new world of knowledge” had opened. 
Lilienthal further explained that treating atomic energy and atomic weapons as linked 
would cause the United States “to fall into an even deeper pit of error. We will grow 
forgetful of the true sources of America’s strength.” For Lilienthal, in implicit contrast to 
the Soviets, the U.S. got its strength not just from its military prowess, “but rather in the 
spirit of this nation, in the faiths we cherish.” He particularly cited faith in God and “a 
deep sense of stewardship to our Creator, the Father of us all; and when that is no longer 
strong within us we are weak and we are lost, however heavily armed with weapons – 
even with atomic weapons – we may be.”39 Instead of war mongering, with this speech 
Lilienthal wanted to stress that atomic forces were “fundamental,” comparable to gravity 
and magnetism and could be harnessed as such. Anything that perpetuated the myth 
                                                
38 HSTL, Papers of Clark Clifford, Subject File, 1945-54, Box 1, Folder Atomic Energy--Lilienthal, 
Atomic Energy and the American Farmer, 16 December 1947, 1. 
39 All underlining is original. HSTL, Papers of Clark Clifford, Subject File, 1945-54, Box 1, Folder Atomic 
Energy--Lilienthal, Atomic Energy and the American Farmer, 16 December 1947, 1-4. 
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conflating the atom with military might would, in his opinion, only work to deprive “you 
and yours of the peaceful fruits of this discovery” and even go against the will of God.40 
Not until page six of his speech did Lilienthal get back to his main point “that the 
farmer and the farm family have a very special stake in the wise and vigorous 
development of the science of the nucleus of the atom, for peaceful purposes.” He even 
compared the incredible stores of atomic energy to farm energy, saying, “the energies 
that produce great poems, that build churches and homes, the energies from which spring 
such noble ideas as our Constitution and Bill of Rights. That energy has been stored up in 
the plants of the field, and in the tissues of the animals that feed on your pastures; thence 
it comes to men.” Farms had produced food from the atomic energy of the sun for 
millennia, and farmers represented “the trustee and steward of that never-ending miracle 
by which the atomic energy of the sun becomes chemical energy and then human 
energy.”41 With this reasoning, farmers held an important stake in the development of 
atomic energy and its application. Farmers made possible all the United States’ great 
history and ideas by nourishing the bodies that produced these marvels, and the country 
needed them to help continue this great legacy. Moreover, the AEC needed farmers, the 
trustees and stewards of the sun’s atomic forces, to help support its atomic energy 
research agenda. 
                                                
40 The religious undertones were not uncommon at the time, either. In January 1951, one concerned citizen 
wrote to “Mrs. ‘First Lady’” to protest nuclear tests in the desert as being against divine plan. “This area 
which is chosen for the sake of proving the effectiveness of atomic destruction, was created by God to 
demonstrate to man the miraculous power of construction. Proof of this fact is God’s Law, which says: 
‘The desert shall bud and blossom as the rose’.” The civilian also wrote, “May I add: that you secure about 
2 bushels of desert top sand from Nevada and I will gladly show you how to have most beautiful flowers,” 
and claimed that, with more nuclear tests, “Our farm problems are most serious now.” HSTL, Papers of 
Harry S. Truman, Official File, Box 1524, Folder 692-Misc. (1950-53), Letter Hamilton L. Roe to Mrs. H. 
S. Truman, 12 January 1951 
41 HSTL, Papers of Clark Clifford, Subject File, 1945-54, Box 1, Folder Atomic Energy--Lilienthal, 
Atomic Energy and the American Farmer, 16 December 1947, 2, 5-6. 
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To Lilienthal, the difference between “a modern American farm and a backward 
poverty-stricken farm” was knowledge, and “In this country the farmer has seen that the 
scientist is his partner, his companion and friend.” Lilienthal’s message held a clear 
implication—if providence (or the AEC) gave farmers, the “custodian of the sun’s energy 
and the forces of growth,” the opportunity to do something like develop nuclear power 
they surely would. The AEC Chairman gave the example of phosphorous to help explain 
why the wise farmer would want atomic science developed. He elaborated that, even 
though it cost a great amount, U.S. scientists could produce radioactive phosphorous. 
Phosphorous, like many other elements, gets taken up by plants during the growth 
process, but at the time agricultural knowledge had not advanced enough to know exactly 
what the plant did with that phosphorous after the chemical’s uptake. By using tagged 
radio-phosphorous, scientists could help “in a way never before possible chart the 
changes that occur in matter in the process of plant life and growth. In your behalf, the 
researcher can gain new and important knowledge of how plants convert the sun’s energy 
into life energy on this planet.” Clearly this represented the farmer’s “big stake” in 
nuclear development.42 Since scientists worked on the behalf of farmers, per Lilienthal’s 
own words, it seemed only logical that farmers would support their efforts, as supporting 
scientists truly was, in effect, supporting themselves. 
Near the end of his speech, Lilienthal brushed aside any concerns his audience 
might have had over exactly what the uses of the atom in agriculture might be, 
encouraging that the breakthroughs would be significant. He reminded them that many 
prominent scientists, like Gregor Mendel, had been unsure of what their research might 
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mean when they began, though that research eventually proved fundamental to farmers. 
Lilienthal noted that harnessing the atom might also improve agriculture through pest 
control, pointing to an upcoming conference on the subject at Alabama Polytech at 
Auburn (today Auburn University). And while radiation might not be useful directly as 
fertilizer or in foods (though research would continue on this subject), agricultural 
improvement remained “one of the glorious promises of atomic science. It well may help 
to solve one of the most vexing problems of humanity – how to keep food production in 
pace with the growth of the world’s population.” With this flourish, and with a reminder 
that farmers needed to endorse atomic research, Lilienthal ended his speech. He claimed, 
“Trained as are no other group of men in the discipline of understanding and working 
with and through natural forces, endowed by the very nature of your calling with both 
persistence and patience, you American farmers are uniquely qualified to play a leading 
part in realizing the beneficial possibilities of this new force.”43 Thus farmers, using 
atomic agriculture, would play a pivotal part in U.S. foreign aid plans in the future as the 
United States reconceived of its world role as helping poor, underdeveloped, and hungry 
countries become modern, fed, and prosperous nations.44 
Lilienthal did not stand alone in his ideas about the importance of farmers and 
indeed federal focus mirrored such notions. Historian Jenny Barker-Devine noted that 
that campaigns by many federal agencies used rhetoric that “placed farmers and rural 
residents on the front lines of the Cold War,” in contrast to these peoples’ typical moral 
and geographical distance from urban centers that were most likely to experience nuclear 
attack. Though focused on inculcating rural people into civil defense networks, especially 
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for urbanites fleeing potential nuclear attacks, Barker-Divine showed that much rhetoric 
coming from U.S. administrators described farmers as being essential to the Cold War 
effort, both for the agricultural products they produced and the moral bedrock they 
provided. And as the danger of radioactive fallout caused fear that rural areas too might 
be subject to danger (from that fallout), distributing scientific information to rural 
communities became even more important. Barker-Divine further explained that rural 
civil defense promoters used scientific boosterism “to foster positive attitudes toward 
family and farm preparedness, though much of the published literature and information in 
the media ultimately proved somewhat superficial.”45 Farmers played a crucial role in the 
development of the atom rhetorically, and this chapter shows the importance of 
agriculture in nuclear development more directly. 
With its lofty claims, Lilienthal’s speech served as a harbinger of future AEC 
emphasis on agriculture. Lilienthal’s speeches are like the loveable Dagwood anecdote 
from the beginning of this chapter—important because they are emblematic of how AEC 
officials thought about atomic agriculture and its place in the United States. The 
Commission put significant resources into researching how atomic energy and its 
products might improve agriculture and had great hope for the results their new 
technology might bring. The AEC also counted on agricultural development via atomic 
energy to help distance some atomic research from atomic weapons—as Lilienthal 
worked so hard to say in his two speeches, the two were not inseparable. The 
Commission also showed a focus on agriculture in its reports to Congress, and the 
January 1949 report showed the Commission had an emphasis on studying both how 
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living creatures absorb radiation and also using radioactive tracer atoms to follow life 
processes. 
That report asked, “Does Radiation Stimulate Plant Growth?” and showed an 
AEC commitment to harnessing the atom on a very blunt force level to improve 
agriculture. Even though David Lilienthal warned farmers in 1947 that radiation would 
not be useful as fertilizer, during the 1948 growing season the AEC supported 
experiments in fourteen states on nineteen different crops to see if radiation could be used 
successfully to boost plant growth. Unsurprisingly, the experimenters did not prove 
effective in using radiation to induce plant growth, but nevertheless the AEC planned 
more experiments for 1949. The report clearly stated, however, that such experiments 
were “quite separate and distinct” from other experiments into using radioactive isotopes 
to better understand plant growth—experiments on “the rate and volume of movement of 
various fertilizer materials in the soil, their absorption into the plants, and their 
accumulation in plant parts.” The Commission expected such studies would “solve 
practical problems of fertilizer application which are of direct dollars-and-cents interest 
to farmers, fertilizer producers, and farm machinery manufacturers.”46 Even if radiation 
did not work as a fertilizer itself, research using radioactive isotopes could make existing 
fertilizers work better and unequivocally save farmers, and through them the rest of the 
nation, money. 
The July 1949 report further espoused the AEC’s research plan regarding 
agriculture and portrayed improving agriculture as one of the Commission’s goals. In a 
section on “Radiation and Life,” the Commission described all of the ways that humans 
had learned about radiation, peaceful and violent, helpful and harmful. The report 
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explained, “Radiation attacks, disrupts, and destroys the delicate electro-chemical balance 
in the atoms, molecules, and protein combinations within the bodies of living things. As a 
result, it damages and kills the cells of which atoms and molecules are a part. If enough 
cells are destroyed, the whole organism—plant, animal, man—is severely injured or 
dies.” Curiously, though, the AEC continued its program on radioactive fertilizers. It is 
unclear where the logical disconnect occurred. Clearly knowledge existed that radiation 
harmed living things, but somehow this fact did not manifest itself in the cognizance that 
radiation might not be successful as a fertilizer. Researchers tested the same crops as in 
1948 and still found no beneficial effects. The AEC also ran agricultural experiments on 
studying cattle exposed to radioactive fallout dust, understanding how fertilizers feed into 
plants, and many other smaller programs such as studying photosynthesis, mineral 
nutrition, and improving fungicides and herbicides.47 
To help meet its goal of improving agriculture, in the latter half of 1949 the AEC 
expanded its programs that studied the effects of “atomic energy and its products” on 
plants and animals, both in AEC installations and at the various colleges and universities 
through which it contracted. Not all of this research centered on agriculture. For example, 
at the Hanford plant, sited on the Columbia River in Washington, researchers determined 
that some organisms, such as plankton, could tolerate radiation much better than could 
other animals, such as humans. In the field of agriculture, specifically, research continued 
on how plants take in and utilize fertilizers, a program that the planners hoped could 
“mean a saving of thousands of dollars to the farmers of the country.” Specifically, 
researchers determined that crops use certain forms of phosphate better than others and 
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that soil acidity plays an important role in how certain crops process that nutrient.48 In 
addition to research aims and successes, the AEC and others frequently espoused how 
research into atomic agriculture actually saved money. Put bluntly, research was and is an 
expensive endeavor, and therefore the AEC found it beneficial to justify its sizeable 
expenditures. Any program that could claim to pay for itself in savings passed directly 
onto the taxpayers would be much easier to justify.  
 Somewhat surprisingly, research continued into the possibility of using radiation 
as a growth stimulant or fertilizer, which showed a deep commitment to atomic 
agriculture. In 1950 the Commission reported that too much radiation could slow tomato 
plant growth. Its studies found that if tomatoes received 20,000 roentgens total at a rate of 
150 an hour, the plants would suffer ill effects.49 The next AEC report clarified the 
seemingly commonsense (even then) position that radiation would hurt plants: 
“Experiments gave no indication that radiation could improve growth rate or yield, but in 
large doses caused marked damage to both.”50 The desire to demonstrate that radiation 
itself could be beneficial to life forms had proved so strong that the Commission 
continued research into programs that, as AEC Chairman David Lilienthal had stated 
publicly in 1947, seemed pointless.51 Fortunately for taxpayers, not all AEC-supported 
research proved so fruitless. 
                                                
48 Seventh Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, January 1950, 21-23. 
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is not always fatal.” In general, there existed an emphasis on downplaying the threat of atomic energy, 
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 Use of radioisotope tracers continued to form a crucial component of the 
Commission’s research and helped the AEC show how atomic products were not 
inherently hazardous. For example, research delved into how cattle interacted with their 
environment, particularly how the ruminants broke down feed and converted that to milk. 
Other investigations used radioiodine to study plant growth regulators and also looked 
into mealybugs and how the critters affect pineapple plants, using radioisotopes to study 
the salivary secretions of the pests. Research even tested radioactive weed killers to 
determine how plants interacted with the chemicals. Further studies used radioisotopes to 
look at how plants absorb nutrients into their roots, transport them throughout the plants 
themselves, and then deposit those nutrients in the various plant structures.52 
Radioisotope research proved diverse and robust, and the AEC continued its research 
programs in 1951. That year agriculture and animal husbandry research advanced 
especially on the subjects of the metabolism of cows, fertilizers, and plant nutrition.53  
 These programs show the thinking behind AEC decisions and how research 
frequently proved important for its own sake. Sometimes projects had specific foci, such 
as when the scientists attacked the mealybug problem. Many other times, though, 
researchers worked to know more about biology and plant physiology. While uncovering 
exactly how plants absorbed and transported nutrients had some direct applications to 
fertilizer use, the AEC supported such research to improve agricultural knowledge in 
general. The January 1952 AEC report to Congress contained the largest section yet on 
the atom and agriculture, with dozens of pages under the heading, “Atomic Energy and 
                                                
52 Ninth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, January 1951, 24-25, 28. 
53 Tenth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, July 1951, 42-44. 
 
 207 
Its Applications in Plant Science,” which helped explain the AEC’s research program and 
its goals.  
Important for understanding the Commission’s motivations, the report claimed 
that there were two broad objectives in supporting research in plant science, one related 
to radiation safety and the other to directly improve agriculture as an industry. The first 
encompassed determining “the effects of radiation and radioactive products upon plants 
in order to broaden scientific understanding and to aid manufacturers and users of atomic 
energy in adopting measures to safeguard life and property.” In short, the AEC wanted to 
help humans be able to protect “crops and other property” from the damages radiation 
might present, as research “is necessary to cope with circumstances that may follow 
atomic explosions.” Focused on protecting the United States during an atomic bomb 
attack, knowing how plants and animals reacted to radiation exposure would be vital to 
the nation’s long-term survival. The second reason for studying the atom and agriculture 
was to “help in the application of atomic energy products and techniques to fundamental 
and applied research with plants” for the benefit of the United States’ people and 
industries. During the fiscal year that ended 30 June 1951, the AEC budgeted $20.6 
million on the entire field of biology and medicine, with $1.3 million (over $11.2 million 
in 2011 dollars54) researching plant life.55 While not the Commission’s primary focus, 
clearly the expenditure represented a significant emphasis on the matter. 
The first research listed in that January 1952 AEC report focused on “Intense 
Radiation and Plant Development” and provided an endpoint to previous research. 
Different from past investigations, though, the AEC did not present this inquiry as any 
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55 Eleventh Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, January 1952, 69, 71, 75. 
 
 208 
sort of fertilizer program. Instead, pertaining to objective one of the plant science 
research program, the research focused only on how radiation affected plant growth so 
that the Commission would know how plants might be affected after a nuclear blast. In 
general, the experiment produced mixed results. For example, on tested potatoes, some 
grew malformed, but others failed to sprout at all. Interestingly, these latter potatoes did 
not rot in the ground—irradiating the potatoes seemed to preserve them. This information 
would be important in the future. Fungi tended to better handle radiation than plants, so 
using radiation as a fungus control seemed impractical—dosing the undesired fungus 
with enough radiation to kill it would do more harm to the plants to be protected than to 
the attacking fungus.56 
Finally clearing up previous investigations into radiation being used as a fertilizer, 
the January 1952 AEC report stated, “Claims that radioactive fertilizers would increase 
crop yields have been discredited by repeated tests. Even small amounts of radioactive 
material used for ‘tracer’ research in plant studies may—unless care is taken—damage 
the plants and cause error in observed results.” The most obvious question is thus, “why 
did research into radioactive fertilizers continue for so long?” This question is made even 
more necessary considering the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) had 
claimed in 1914 that radioactive fertilizers did not work. Nonetheless, further tests 
continued with USDA backing until 1944. And even though the USDA had discredited 
radioactive fertilizers decades before, agricultural scientists considered the question anew 
after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings because observers claimed in the aftermath 
there had been “greatly increased crop yields” near the cities. In hindsight, though, it 
became clear that something else caused those bountiful harvests. In short, findings 
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showed that if radiation had any effects on plant growth, those effects would be negative, 
either killing the plant or stopping it from growing (or never growing in the first place).57  
At this point, the notion of radiation as a fertilizer seemed officially dead, but the 
fact that it held sway for as long as it did in research programs is important for what it 
says about the AEC as an organization and its goals. For political reasons, or perhaps 
merely to satisfy their own consciences, the idea that splitting the atom could and should 
be used for more than making war wove a common thread in both the Truman and 
Eisenhower presidencies (especially Eisenhower’s with the “Atoms for Peace” program). 
Agriculture represented an easy way to show the benign effects of nuclear programs, and 
demonstrating that radiation was not a wholly bad entity seemed important in promoting 
the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Radiation, especially at high levels, breaks down 
living tissues. Thus while it may be put toward useful ends (such as in x-rays or for use as 
a radioactive tracer), in and of itself radiation does not present any beneficial qualities. 
The U.S. public knew that radiation represented a real threat to human health as well, 
especially after John Hersey’s New Yorker articles turned into the book Hiroshima 
described in vivid detail the devastation wrought by the first atomic blast in Japan.58 
Clearly, then, research into ways that radiation, with no qualifications, might be a good 
and useful thing would have been important for policymakers. If decision makers could 
show that radiation had benefits or even could be healthy for some organisms in certain 
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contexts, the moral position of creating radiation (such as in a nuclear bomb) would 
change dramatically. This helps explain why AEC research plans held onto the idea that 
radiation might function as a fertilizer so long after the USDA knew that it proved 
harmful to plants.  
On the other hand, emphasizing the Commission’s need to find peaceful and 
helpful aspects of atomic energy, the AEC chronicled radiation’s harmful effects quite 
clearly. Beyond its obvious effects on living tissues, radiation also seemed to either kill 
soil microorganisms or make these much less effective. This could be especially 
damaging to plants if radiation killed the microorganisms around plant roots that help fix 
nitrogen—an element vital to plant growth. Also, the January 1952 report to Congress 
recognized strontium 90 (Sr90), an isotope produced as fallout from nuclear explosions, as 
“potentially the most biologically hazardous of the fission products.”59 In contrast to Sr90, 
reactor cooling water seemed safe, as even though it has some radioactivity, most of that 
is either short lived or diluted, even if some might get absorbed by plants or algae. Effects 
on plants also depended on exposure, with those effects especially noticed in the growing 
sections of plants.60  
Research into how fallout radiation might harm U.S. agriculture also reflected a 
deep understanding of new geopolitical realities. In August 1949, the Soviet Union 
detonated its first nuclear weapon. This meant that the United States suddenly had to 
contend with another country unleashing an atomic blast upon it. With this new reality 
came a desire to know exactly how the nation might be affected. Agriculture formed a 
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crucial part of that desire, and thus experimentation into what might happen to U.S. 
agriculture after nuclear attack—discerning how fallout and other radiation affected 
plants—became an even more important part of the U.S. atomic energy program. 
 Forays into the potential benefits of radiation did not end with the 
acknowledgement of its dangers, though, as the AEC worked to show how radiation 
could indeed be a positive force. The January 1952 report to Congress also stated, 
“Although fertilizers that depended on radioactivity for their action proved useless, 
radioactive tracers are showing how conventional fertilizers can be used more efficiently 
and economically.”61 Radioactive tracers helped scientists track nutrients through both 
whole ecosystems and individual plants, uncovering life processes as the radioactive 
elements made their way through biological cycles.  
Also, studies on genetics and radiation spoke to this point and the AEC’s mission 
to better understand living beings through radiation. For example, inquiries found that 
corn exposed to less than five roentgen of radiation exhibited no appreciable effects, but 
exposure between 5-55 roentgen caused mutations proportional to the radiation dose. 
Mutations can occur naturally, and though some are beneficial an overwhelming majority 
end up being negative (at least from the perspective of the individual organism). If 
radiation could speed up the rate at which mutations occurred, in a controlled laboratory 
setting, beneficial mutations could be created, discovered, and isolated much more 
quickly than if humans left natural processes to their own devices. Radioisotopes also 
helped make possible research into tree and crop diseases, insecticides, herbicides, and 
photosynthesis.62 
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 As the Eisenhower presidency began, no great changes in agricultural research 
occurred from the AEC perspective, though a focus on peaceful uses of the atom 
increased. As the files from Eisenhower’s 1952 presidential campaign show, developing 
atomic energy into a true industry formed an important part of Eisenhower’s platform. 
Citing the need to both “improve the atomic arsenal” and continue “to probe the frontier 
of knowledge,” soon-to-be President Eisenhower claimed during his 1952 campaign that 
nuclear energy should be viewed as past leaders had considered the steam and internal 
combustion engines. “Both of these opened vast new field in the development and 
application of energy and were considered by some to be so dangerous that their need 
should be carefully and rigidly controlled by government.” Eisenhower cautioned against 
being afraid of advancing nuclear technology and instead explained that present decision 
makers needed to be as prescient as their predecessors support the development of this 
new technology, atomic energy, and all its beneficial advances. In this mindset, properly 
developing atomic energy certainly would create great developments in many fields, 
including agriculture.63 
 These campaign speeches made sense in the context of an Eisenhower 
administration that tried to base agriculture much more on free market ideals than had his 
Democrat predecessors. Eisenhower selected Ezra Taft Benson for Secretary of 
Agriculture, and this represented a very conservative shift in policy. Benson believed that 
agricultural problems of the 1950s stemmed from overproduction by farmers in previous 
decades. The end result of Benson’s policies, especially cutting holdover price floors 
from the 1930s, meant an incredible number of failed farms, as the number in the country 
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dropped from 5.8 to 2.8 million. Edward and Frederick Schapsmeier claimed this 
happened due to “business failure, particularly among the small, inefficient operators.”64 
In hindsight, it is clear this occurred as part of a trend toward larger industrial farms and 
away from family farming (something Eisenhower surely would have supported in 
rhetoric as part of a Jeffersonian ideal, but obviously not in practice). Decisions during 
the Eisenhower era represented notions that agriculture should be considered a business, 
and atomic energy improving agricultural technology well fit a mantra later popularized 
by Richard Nixon’s Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz, who famously quipped, “Get big 
or get out.” 
With the nuclear industry and the threat of nuclear war in mind, the AEC 
sponsored investigations continued into how plants dealt with radiation. Those 
experiments studied how plants grew in soil containing concentrations of “fission 
products” (such as fallout like Sr90) equal to the maximum fallout observed at nuclear 
blast sites. Growing radishes, barley, oats, cowpeas, and ryegrass, researchers found that 
strontium was indeed the radioactive element most likely to be absorbed by plants, but 
this occurred at a lower rate in soils rich with calcium (remember strontium and calcium 
function very similarly in biological processes). When cattle ate plants that contained 
radioactive fallout, cattle absorbed 25-30% of ingested strontium, with about 25% of that 
reaching the bone. This bone contamination would only be a hazard to humans if they 
ingested the bone splinters that might get into meat, though.65 Other experiments 
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measured how radiation sickness affected animals and used radioisotopes as tracers to 
study how tropical crops absorbed potassium.66 
 A 1954 speech by Richard Bradfield, head of the Cornell University Department 
of Agronomy, emphasized the already present and growing importance of agriculture to 
atomic policymaking. Speaking at a New York meeting sponsored by the Atomic 
Industrial Forum, Inc., Bradfield started off his speech by remarking that the “value of 
radioactive forms of the various elements in agricultural research had been clearly 
demonstrated” long before the atomic bomb. While such research had been expensive in 
the past, the atomic pile made the generation of tracer isotopes less costly and therefore 
made research more feasible. The true purpose of the speech, though, was to “discuss 
some of the contributions which the atomic energy program has made to agriculture, 
particularly agricultural research.” Bradfield stated clearly, “In spite of our unprecedented 
increase in population, our agriculture has been able to keep up with our continuously 
expanding needs. It is now easily possible for ten percent of our population to produce all 
the food and fibre which our entire population needs. Probably never before in the history 
of the world have so few people fed so many so well.”67 U.S. policymakers intended 
atomic advances of agriculture to ensure this trend remained realistic and also allow the 
United States to feed impoverished peoples around the world. Thus where just a few 
decades earlier during the Great Depression policymakers considered overproduction the 
problem, by the mid-1950s that overproduction meant prosperity at home through 
cheaper food prices and the ability to save lives and bolster world opinion of the United 
States abroad.  
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 In fact, Bradfield asserted that dealing with surpluses represented the most 
pressing problem in current agriculture, a complete turnaround from most of human 
history. Agricultural surpluses, though, are obviously not the worst problem to have, as 
Bradfield claimed that plenty of food is important to both national security and peace. By 
referencing national security, Bradfield implicitly argued that agriculture was a part of 
keeping the United States safe and perhaps supplying food to the rest of the world could 
help bring peace. Agriculture thus transitioned from merely being the way we feed 
ourselves into being the way that the United States could help support geopolitical 
stability and set up itself as the leader of that new world order. Atomic agriculture could 
do this because radioactive tracers allowed a scientist “to follow the meanderings of his 
atoms” and ensure productive agriculture, defined by Bradfield as the combined product 
of good soil, varieties of crops being suited to environment (better seeds), and the 
reduction of the threat of plant diseases and insects (all of which could be improved by 
radioactive tracers).68 
 Continuing this emphasis on productive agriculture, Bradfield reported that at 
least 30% of the recent increase in U.S. agricultural productivity had been from 
fertilizers, but continued, “we know that some of these fertilizers are not being utilized 
effectively.” In particular, phosphorous use in fertilizers was the culprit, and the country 
needed “wise use” of its phosphate reserves. USDA and Oak Ridge laboratories thus 
tested fertilizer intake by plants with radioactive phosphorous tracers. This enabled 
scientists to tell how much phosphorous came to a plant from fertilizer and how much 
came from the soil’s natural phosphorous. The experiments also enabled plant 
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physiologists to better understand the role of phosphorous in a plant’s internal 
functions.69 
 Bradfield also talked about the importance of some of the previous work on 
radiation and mutations so that his audience could further appreciate the gifts atomic 
energy provided agriculture. He explained that mutations are frequently useful to plant 
breeders, and “seem to be produced under natural conditions by radiations which reach 
the earth from outer space, the so-called cosmic rays.” But, as has been explained earlier, 
these do not occur very often and breeders frequently wish they could speed up these 
mutations—radioactive isotopes help speed up this process. The Gamma Field, located 
on Long Island near Brookhaven, represented the best example of this. There, radioactive 
cobalt got lowered into the ground by remote control when needed, and then researchers 
planted crops in concentric circles around the cobalt. Researchers studied the resulting 
crops, and “occasionally” one of the resulting mutations from exposure to the radioactive 
cobalt proved beneficial. Bradfield stated that already one promising crop, “a mutant of 
oats,” had been produced that “seems to have resistance to one of the most destructive 
diseases which attack this important crop.”70 Thus Bradfield offered the mutant oats to 
the audience as proof that the experiments were worthwhile and successful. 
 Bradfield ended his speech by trying to dial back the enthusiasm for atomic 
agriculture a bit while emphasizing that any caveats did not diminish the benefits 
provided to the nation. He expressed that radioactive isotopes did not represent “a 
complete panacea for all the agricultural ills of the world.” And yet, they did have the 
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power to help scientists “unravel many of the mysteries which have so far eluded them. It 
will enable them to trace these elements from fertilizer to the soil, to the plant, and 
through the plant to the animal and then to man.”71 These closing remarks had a bit of a 
different tone than the rest of the speech. For several pages, the potential of atomic 
products to agriculture seemed incredible, at least in hypothetical terms. Moreover, 
Bradfield tied the future achievements of nuclear agriculture to the current state of 
agricultural surpluses, implicitly telling his audience that the true legacy of the described 
research would be to help make sure the nation remained well fed in the future. No matter 
how beneficial atomic agriculture had been to this point, only if their gains continued 
would programs be considered true successes. Even though Bradfield finished differently 
than he began, his speech still represented the idea that improving agriculture with the 
atom meant more than enhancing food production—it meant a policy decision about the 
security of the nation.  
 The AEC continued to support projects and research that reflected a position that 
atomic energy benefitted agriculture and by extension the nation. For example, the AEC 
reported in July 1954 on studies of how radiation affected plant growth and reproduction. 
It claimed an objective of testing “the feasibility of producing useful mutations by means 
of ionizing radiations in plants, shrubs, and trees normally propagated asexually.” These 
experiments produced several varieties of disease resistant plants. The AEC continued 
earlier experiments on irradiating potatoes as well, with the intention of determining what 
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it takes to prevent these from spoiling.72 Another project studied calcium and magnesium 
content on twelve Wisconsin and Illinois farms in relation to how atoms got exchanged.73 
 Public promotion of these atomic agricultural programs also continued, though 
not always in prominent places. In 1954 President Eisenhower received a personalized 
copy of “The Contribution of Atomic Energy to Agriculture and Medicine” from Carl 
Hinshaw (R-CA), a member of Congress’ Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 
Commission (JCAE). When thanking the Hinshaw for the book, the President said that he 
was “fascinated, as is everyone, by the potentialities of this great new era into which we 
are so rapidly moving.”74 In that same year, James Hagerty, White House Secretary, 
communicated with organizers from the Toledo Council on World Affairs. Those 
organizers wanted to bring to Toledo, Ohio the atomic energy exhibit from Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee and arrange for 60,000 schoolchildren to attend it free of charge. One of the 
nine key points of that exhibit was “Atomic energy in the processing of feed and as it 
affects plants and domestic animals.”75 It seems probable that the White House and AEC 
engaged in many other publicity activities, but the documentary record is not so full as to 
elucidate further. Most likely is that by the mid-1950s atomic agriculture still held 
importance in justifying the peaceful uses of the atom, but those who the AEC and White 
House wanted to know about atomic agriculture already knew enough to justify 
continued research. Atomic agriculture still served as a defense of atomic research for the 
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benefit of humanity and by this point the larger public’s blessing (other than from the 
JCAE via the AEC’s reports to Congress) seemed less important. 
 AEC support of agricultural studies using radioisotopes continued to occupy a 
prominent role in justifying how those programs produced interrelated benefits for both 
atomic energy and agriculture. Experimenters paid particular attention to studying “the 
intake of radioactive materials” by livestock, including tissue distribution, absorption, 
retention, and excretion.76 Intake by plants also received study. The AEC reported to 
Congress that “Knowledge of the effects of fission products on plant growth and 
reproduction is important in evaluating health and safety aspects of atomic tests and 
production operations of nuclear reactors.” In short, agriculture could help better 
understand the effects of atomic bombs, emphasizing that agricultural research helped 
more than agriculture. Research also confirmed that fallout products tended to act like 
other elements—strontium like calcium, cesium like sodium or potassium, etc. Other 
research, at North Carolina State College, used radioactive tracers to show that corn 
obtained about 70% of its nutrition from the top ten inches of soil and peanuts about 87% 
from the top ten inches. How nutrients get absorbed depended on the specific plant and 
its root distribution pattern.77 
 Radioisotopes also could be used for much more than uncovering how plants 
absorbed nutrients and helped push atomic agriculture into new realms. The tracers also 
made possible inquiries into how a rubber plant produces its valuable product, and then 
enabled tracking that produced rubber to see how it broke down and degraded. In 
addition to tracers, experimentation continued into how plants absorbed fallout products. 
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The AEC also reported that the ratio of calcium (and thus strontium) plants absorbed 
seemed identical to the concentration of other chemicals (ammonium acetate in 
particular) in the soil in which the plants grew. Researchers continued to use radiation to 
produce mutations in plants, hopefully improving the crops, such as their physical 
characteristics and disease susceptibility. And if immunity could not be created to 
diseases or pests, then radiation might be used to control those pests. Research showed 
that nematode worms might be controlled by radiation, but of course too much radiation 
would prove injurious to the plants on which the worms feasted.78 
 The boosterism of atomic energy in relation to agriculture continued in 1956 with 
the Report of the Panel on the Impact of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy to the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy. While technically a report in the legislative branch, 
Robert McKinney, former Assistant Secretary of the Interior under Truman, chaired the 
panel. The panel devoted chapter five of its report entirely to agriculture, and argued, 
“Peaceful uses of atomic energy in the field of agriculture are a significant addition to the 
many other modern methods of improving farm technology.” Not only did atomic 
agriculture mean “increased productivity and lower costs for individual farmers,” but the 
report also argued that improved agriculture also gave the U.S. a “dramatic opportunity to 
lead underdeveloped, undernourished nations to higher living standards.”79 Only by 
sharing food production techniques with impoverished nations, by cultivating the Green 
Revolution, could U.S. planners safeguard the Third World from communist influence 
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and keep those nations secure from destabilizing influences. Hence, atomic agriculture 
could play a significant role in defining the United States’ place in the world.80 
 The ways the panel expected these incredible achievements to happen show 
another public expression of the national benefits provided by atomic agriculture. The 
panel hoped the power of the atom could help scientists learn more about life processes 
of the plants and animals in agriculture and how best to use fertilizers, insecticides, and 
medicines. Radioactive tracers did not necessarily make such research possible, but 
certainly made it much easier. The panel also reported that atomic agriculture could help 
breed new plant varieties that were better adapted to particular climates, soils, and rain 
patterns, while also being more resistant to diseases and “tailored to mechanized 
cultivation and harvesting.” Very much playing into notions of the Green Revolution, 
using the power of the atom would “add great impetus to the technological revolution in 
agriculture.” In short, readers should “expect higher farm output, more flexibility as to 
the crops and animals produced, and ultimately more varied diets at lower costs.”81 
Language like that made harnessing the atom in agriculture not only a foolproof way to 
improve the nation’s resources—a way one would have to be foolish not to support—but 
also became a moral imperative for helping to improve the world. 
 Plant breeding offered one specific way to accomplish these lofty goals and a 
provided dramatic expression of how radiation could be a good thing for living beings 
just as the AEC had hoped earlier experiments into radiation fertilizers would. Scientists 
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could do this by using atomic energy “to speed the evolution process.” This implied that 
radiation mutations were not unnatural, but instead merely helping natural forces work a 
little faster than these might on their own. Exposing plants, animals, or insects to 
radiation made it possible to create new plant varieties or varietals more quickly and 
replace natural selection with human choices. The report further explained that only a 
small percentage of the new “variations” would be good, and scientists still had to 
winnow these from the unhelpful ones so they could be “put to work on the farm.” The 
report closed the section by boldly claiming, “At least on a laboratory scale, the day of 
the tailormade plant seems close at hand.”82 Already on hand, though, was the day of 
using hopes for the atom in agriculture to push research agendas. 
 Atomic boosterism caused the AEC to cast even seemingly negative experimental 
results, such as the development of new blights with increased virulence, in a positive 
light. The report claimed that the development of these new blights under controlled 
conditions allowed geneticists to breed plants resistant to the new pestilence, preparing 
the plants and farmers for these new blights before they appeared in the field.83 Of 
course, such a statement assumes one of two things—either the blight created under 
laboratory conditions would at some point get out into the larger world and plague crops 
that way, or that natural selection and evolution are sure to produce the same or a similar 
disease on their own. Assuming the first (laboratory release) would not happen, any 
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assumption that the second would occur represents an understanding of evolution that is 
far too linear and progressive to be accurate (just because laboratory conditions produced 
one blight it does not mean that natural conditions ever would have). 
 Other parts of the report seem like science fiction, even in today’s world. The 
report claimed that researchers could duplicate many of the steps involved in 
photosynthesis, meaning that a time was “within the realm of possibility” that humans 
would not depend on plants “to produce edible energy in the form of starches, sugars, fats 
and proteins,” but this could instead by done chemically on a commercial scale. And if 
other boosterish claims were not so far fetched, they still presumed a great deal. For 
several pages the report made claims about how atomic energy would help produce more 
food on fewer acres at a lower cost. Since a “principal fact of the American way of life is 
that it is based on abundance,” creating even more abundance with food would only 
enhance the lives of the nation’s citizenry, as surely low food prices would stay low (how 
such production might hurt farmers went unmentioned). Again, the greatest problem the 
U.S. ran into with this line of reasoning was how to deal with all the agricultural 
surpluses that such research would surely help produce.84 Historian Shane Hamilton has 
interpreted these surpluses (and the trucks used to transport the foodstuffs around the 
country) as aggressively undermining New Deal liberalism with free market solutions.85 
Whether this is true or not, policymakers did believe that if then current excessive 
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production meant consumer prosperity that even more food would lead to ever-lower 
prices on the shelves and improved lives of the nation’s citizenry. 
 This report differed most significantly from other treatises on atomic agriculture 
in that it explicitly insisted this new knowledge and technology could help the United 
States feed the world, emphasizing a perception that the United States’ role in the 
geopolitical realm had changed. It stated bluntly that the U.S. “can help the 
undernourished peoples of the world have more to eat” so long as more research, 
education, and work occurred, as there would be “no miracles” without these. The report 
finished with three recommendations: the United States needed to keep researching; those 
dealing with the farm surplus problem take into account that atomic developments will 
exacerbate the problem; and an exploration of the humanitarian benefits that could result 
should begin immediately. The third point held particular importance, as “Only in this 
way can the United States bring to bear atomic contributions to agriculture, so as to 
demonstrate our historic sense of international humanitarian leadership.”86 This particular 
sentiment likely proved particularly important as the U.S. sought to establish its place as 
a world leader in contrast to the Soviet Union. If the United States could help feed the 
world it would have a significant bargaining chip in the Cold War court of world public 
opinion. Thus agriculture, and by extension atomic agriculture, became fundamentally 
tied to a U.S. global imperative. 
 The AEC continued to use agriculture as a public demonstration of the benefits 
provided by atomic energy. In its 21 January 1956 issue, Science News Letter ran an 
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article titled, “Atoms Vital to Agriculture.” That article cited Dr. Williard F. Libby, AEC 
Commissioner, as claiming that the U.S. economy may get “as a big a boost from the use 
of atomic energy in agriculture as it will from atom-generated electricity.” Though he did 
not provide any sort of timetable for when gains could be expected, Libby’s “low” 
estimate was a $210 million per year benefit. In general, Libby propounded atomic 
benefits to agriculture in fertilizer studies, pest control, and preservation.87 The article, 
thus, effectively served as an atomic booster and gave a broader audience to Libby’s 
voice, and by extension the AEC. 
 In July 1956, the Commission claimed that the radioisotopes used for research 
and production in industry and agriculture already repaid the U.S. “a dividend of several 
hundred millions a year” on monies invested. Of course, it added, that such focus on 
money ignored “the value to mankind of these substances as scientific tools, diagnosis, 
treatment and scientific study of human diseases and their consequent alleviation of 
human misery.”88 Strangely, at the same time the AEC made such incredible claims as to 
the value of the atom in agriculture, its reports on agricultural research waned a bit. The 
January 1957 AEC report to Congress only reported on the use of radiation to inhibit 
photosynthesis as 100,000 roentgens of gamma radiation temporarily reduced that 
process in wheat to 25% of normal.89 It is unclear how such research might have proved 
compatible with previously stated goals. 
 It did seem clear to AEC officials, however, that radioisotopes were of incredible 
use to the U.S. atomic energy program and the public needed to know that. A February 
1957 AEC report prepared in advance of hearings by the Congressional Joint Committee 
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on Atomic Energy claimed that the estimated savings in agriculture by radioisotopes 
might reach $210 million per year. The report did not, however, explain in very much 
detail how such an estimate had been measured or figured. It continued, “There is no 
reason to doubt the order or magnitude of these figures.” As an example of this, the 
material estimated that radioisotopes saved the nation around $500,000 to $1 million per 
year in fertilizer studies, “based on spot checks.” Moreover, the report emphasized that 
the knowledge gained in studies with radioisotopes needed to be passed onto state, 
federal, and country agricultural organizations, as ultimately farmers would need the 
findings for these to be of any real use. In short, “There is every reason to anticipate that 
when this translation can be accomplished and made available to the nation’s farmers, the 
estimated potential savings of $210 million per year can in a large measure be realized 
within the foreseeable future. Such savings could be reflected in an improved farm 
productivity at lower unit costs not only in this country but also in other nations.”90 The 
report clearly implicated that if only the knowledge gained by scientists with the help of 
radioisotopes could be put in the hands of farmers, the nation would become even more 
prosperous. 
 At this point, much of the research intended to eventually help farmers, at least as 
conveyed to the public by the AEC, was lists of the previously known ways that atomic 
energy could improve agriculture. Reiterating the importance of radioisotopes and their 
use, the July 1957 report to Congress listed as the major benefits to agriculture:  
(a) better placement and application of fertilizer, (b) new and improved growth 
regulators, herbicides, etc., (c) improved measures against plant diseases and 
fungi, (d) better knowledge of animal nutritional needs, (e) improved measures 
                                                
90 DDEL, White House Central Files, Official File, Box 453, Folder OF 108-F Atoms For Peace (5), 
Material prepared for hearings by the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, February 1957, 1-
2, 13-14, 20. 
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against animal diseases, (f) better insect control through sterilization, insecticides, 
and information on migration and hibernation, and (g) new or improved varieties 
of plants and breeds of animals. 
 
In fact, these benefits had proved so valuable that agricultural use, in conjunction with 
use by medicine and industry, had created such demand for radioisotopes that demand 
had begun to exceed supply.91 
 One new avenue of research pursued by the AEC centered on irradiating seeds 
and crops to produce beneficial effects and continued the theme of searching for positive 
benefits of radiation. Just as earlier research had accidentally discovered with potatoes, 
irradiating, if done at proper levels, could significantly improve the storage of agricultural 
products. Too much irradiation, though, could be harmful to seeds. Some research even 
found that after seeds had been irradiated, stored, and then planted, radiation damage 
could increase by as much as a factor of three than if scientists only irradiated and planted 
them. Water, oxygen, and heat exposure before and after irradiation also affected how 
seeds performed.92 
 This is not to say that previous avenues of research did not continue as part of the 
AEC’s plan to improve the nation through atomic agriculture. Emphasis on radioisotopes 
and the amount they saved the nation continued, with special attention paid to the gains 
made in “broadened knowledge and improved management” of both crops and livestock, 
including a greater control over the diseases and pests that afflicted both. Better fertilizer 
use and improved insecticides and herbicides also derived from research, with “benefits 
                                                
91 Twenty-second Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, July 1957, 29, 32-33. 
92 Twenty-second Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, July 1957, 116-117. 
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in sight from widening experiment with plants and animals.”93 The January 1958 report 
later elaborated that researchers made these gains with “essentially a byproduct of atomic 
energy activities—the radioactive isotopes of the natural elements created in nuclear 
reactors.” Radioisotopes also helped scientists create soil moisture and density gauges, 
useful in both agricultural and industrial processes. 94 
 Even when not explicitly focused on improving agriculture, AEC research 
frequently found grounding in it. Other projects focused on “the impact of various atomic 
energy activities on man’s environment.” The AEC intended these studies to better 
understand “the balance” between all life forms, whether they live in land or water 
habitats. The report claimed that the answers gained would assist decisions about the 
extent to which agriculture, and other atomic energy activities, “may occupy an area and 
lead to general benefit rather than detriment.”95 More direct inquiry into agriculture 
continued as well. 
Significant research in livestock and insecticides persisted, especially in using 
radioisotopes to track biological processes in the studied creatures. Such research 
continued to provide a public display of the atom’s gifts to agriculture. For example, 
using radioisotopes, scientists uncovered that some fatty acids absorbed by cattle in their 
digestion are used to form milk sugar lactose, while others are used principally to make 
butter fat. Researchers uncovered other technical information about digestion as well. In 
general, studies tagged parts of a cow’s feed and then traced those bits to see how cows 
                                                
93 The AEC claimed that in saving about $500 million per year, radioisotopes produced a better than 7% 
yearly return on the $7 billion spend on them in taxpayer money. Twenty-third Semiannual Report of the 
Atomic Energy Commission, January 1958, 4. 
94 The soil moisture gauges worked, in layman’s terms, by zipping radiation into the soil and then 
measuring what got reflected back into the gauge. Twenty-third Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy 
Commission, January 1958, 26-30. 
95 Italics are in the original. Twenty-third Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, January 
1958, 36. 
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transformed feed into milk. For insecticides, by using radioactive tracers, scientists 
determined not only exactly how pesticides affect pests, but also how much toxic residue 
made it into and onto raw agricultural commodities. Experiments also successfully led to 
the eradication of the screwworm fly in controlled tests on the island of Curacao in the 
West Indies. Since screwworm flies caused damage to Southeast livestock of around $10 
million a year, finding a way to combat them seemed important. Radioisotopes also 
helped provide insight into how herbicides affected plant growth regulators, helping 
scientists study the agricultural chemicals 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T.96 However, the most 
heavily pushed research occurring at the time related not to using radioisotopes, but 
instead to using radiation to change the composition of foodstuffs. 
In contrast to early efforts with using radiation as a fertilizer, irradiating foods and 
seeds at precise levels did seem to have real benefits and at the end of the decade 
occupied much of the ink received by atomic agriculture. This is not to say older sorts of 
experiments (such as using radioisotope tracers to trace how nutrients travel through 
plants’ leaves, stems, and fruits) disappeared entirely, but irradiating plants became much 
more important. Previous experiments had used radiation to create beneficial mutations, 
and the AEC reported, “beneficial mutations are being found in sufficiently high numbers 
to justify continuing efforts.”97 The most exciting and prominent gains of the time 
through irradiating plants and foodstuffs, though, came in the form of food and seed 
preservation. 
                                                
96 These two chemicals, in conjunction, formed the active ingredients in the infamous Agent Orange used 
so profusely during the Vietnam War. Twenty-third Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, 
January 1958, 57-63. 
97 The January 1958 AEC report to Congress listed some of the particularly beneficial mutations derived 
from mutations to be disease resistant strains in wheat, oats, and flax, and high-yield dwarf varieties that 
suffer from less wind damage. Twenty-third Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, January 
1958, 64-67. 
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It is no surprise that the AEC moved toward development of irradiated agriculture 
because such a program well fit the Commission’s goals of benefitting agriculture and the 
nation and using atomic energy to do it. On 25 February 1960, the Commissioners of the 
AEC met and discussed the establishment of a radiation processed food program. The 
Interdepartmental Committee on Radiation Preservation had proposed a conservative 
investigation into the potential of irradiated foods building upon a similar Army study 
from 1953. At that time, the Army performed experiments on twenty-six types of food, 
particularly focused on unrefrigerated preservation for up to a year. It found that only 
certain meats—beef, pork, poultry, and ham—fit the desired specifications.98 Thus while 
atomic agriculture could serve the national security mission by feeding a hungry world, it 
also could enable the U.S. military to conduct even longer troop deployments than 
previously. If “an army marches on its stomach,” then having food that would last for a 
year without refrigeration might keep soldiers marching for a long time if they were cut 
off from supply routes. 
 Though the Army program certainly found some success, there had been no 
testing on civilian foods as such would have been out of the military’s purview. The 
Commissioners, however, decided that the AEC should support the Interdepartmental 
Committee’s program so that civilian food could be tested. More than seeking to fill a 
hole in a research program, though, the AEC thought the food irradiation program fit the 
AEC’s mission (along with the Atoms for Peace program) of finding peaceful 
applications of atomic energy and also made sense for the AEC to pursue because of its 
“unique knowledge and competence” concerning the involved technology. The Army had 
                                                
98 NACP, RG 326 Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Entry A1 19, Minutes of the Meetings of 
the AEC, Box 13, Meeting No. 1595, 25 February 1960, 152-153.	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experienced storage and logistical issues with their irradiated foods, especially related to 
bacterial contamination of foods irradiated at high levels and then stored for extended 
periods. Canning had been necessary to solve this problem, but discussions did not seem 
to find this a particular problem for future AEC experiments. Eventually John McCone, 
the AEC Chairman, declared that the program “held promise for revolutionary 
developments for the food industries of the world.” The Commission then approved 
$115,000 in their budget for research in fiscal year 1960, with $500,000 planned for the 
fiscal year 1961 budget.99 
 About a month after that meeting of the AEC Commissioners, the AEC made its 
plans public when the Research and Development Subcommittee of the JCAE held a 
hearing on a food irradiation program. At that hearing, Richard Morse, Director of the 
Army Research and Development program, presented the Army’s revised research 
program on preserving food through irradiation. This program had seemed sensible and 
been well received, but focused on high-level radiation sterilization and preserving food 
for a year. In contrast, the AEC’s civilian program would emphasize low-dose 
“pasteurization” to extend the shelf life of perishable foods—civilians did not necessarily 
need meat that could sit in their pantry for a year at a time, but having fruits and 
vegetables stay fresh longer before spoiling would have been a nice benefit. After 
debating whether the level of funding assigned truly was appropriate (deemed it was), the 
one snag in the Commissioners’ plan seemed to be that low-dose radiation might not be 
commercially available for 5-10 more years. This seemed not such a problem, though, to 
either the AEC or the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee wanted to push the 
                                                
99 McCone’s sentiments were paraphrased in the notes, and therefore it is unlikely that the wording is a 
direct quotation of his. NACP, RG 326 Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Entry A1 19, Minutes 
of the Meetings of the AEC, Box 13, Meeting No. 1595, 25 February 1960, 153-154. 
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programs “because preservation of food by radiation was a dramatic program easily 
understood by the public.” The Commissioners agreed, and their only concern was how 
the program might appear to a public that had been promised rapid results—results that 
might be hard to deliver so quickly.100 The AEC did not stand alone in a desire to show 
the world the benefits of irradiation.  
 After the AEC decided to support irradiation research, scientists conducting the 
research also had an interest in seeing those programs succeed. Because of this, Dr. C. J. 
Spears of Oak Ridge Atom Industries, Inc., asked President Eisenhower to take some of 
his company’s irradiated flower and vegetable seeds to plant on the President’s farm. 
Spears’ representative explained that doing so would “awaken the people of the U.S. 
further to the many benefits that have been afforded them as the result of the efforts of 
the Republican Party in promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy.”101 As could be 
said for the program of using atomic energy to improve agriculture more broadly, 
irradiation of food and seeds meant more to its proponents than merely a way to better 
handle the nation’s food production.  
 By the end of Eisenhower’s second term, agriculture had deep roots as an 
important part of the nation’s atomic energy program. John McCone’s letter of 
resignation to Eisenhower just a few weeks before the end of Eisenhower’s presidency 
helps show this fact. McCone’s resignation letter included a statement titled “Eight Years 
of Progress in Atomic Energy,” and deemed the advancement of the nation’s nuclear 
programs “substantial.” In that statement, McCone addressed agriculture and its 
                                                
100 NACP, RG 326 Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Entry A1 19, Minutes of the Meetings of 
the AEC, Box 13, Meeting No. 1603, 1 April 1960, 221-223.	  
101 DDEL, White House Central Files, Official File, Cross Reference Sheets, Box 88, Folder OF 108 
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improvement, listing as successes radioisotope progress in fertilizers and weed killers, 
radiation in plant genetic improvement and pest control, and generally improved 
agriculture in general.102 Looking back at the end of his term as Chairman of the AEC, 
McCone counted atomic agriculture as one of the accomplishments of his tenure.  
 In the end, using atomic energy and its products to improve agriculture showed 
several things about the United States. First and most obviously, it functioned as a way to 
improve the nation’s agriculture, even though the United States clearly did not suffer 
when it came to food production—far from it. By the 1950s, one of the most serious 
problems the nation’s agriculturalists faced was how to deal with the incredible surpluses 
of food they already created. Therefore, helping the nation better produce greater 
amounts of food might have seemed inconsequential or even harmful. Yet atomic energy 
helped scientists uncover new ways to farm and raise livestock better, and this 
achievement proved important to policymakers. Also, those in power repurposed 
increased production as a way for the United States to feed a world that policymakers 
more and more conceived of as being filled with hungry people in need of U.S. aid (for 
both their own good and that of the United States). Particularly with radioisotope tracers 
that helped unlock many biological mysteries, U.S. agriculture harnessed the atom quite 
successfully. And yet using atomic energy did more than nobly ensure that food 
production passed “from trial-and-error to certainty” as the Dagwood cartoon claimed. 
 Perhaps even more important than its obvious purpose of improving farming, 
atomic agriculture functioned as an important way to show how splitting the atom could 
do more than unleash death and destruction. By emphasizing the peaceful applications of 
                                                
102 DDEL, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President, Ann Whitman File, Administrative Series, Box 5, 
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nuclear energy, programs that attempted to improve agriculture allowed the Atomic 
Energy Commission and the executive branch to say to the public, with good reason, that 
they desired peaceful applications of atomic energy. Clearly the first worldwide 
application of splitting the atom had been horrific—no matter your side during World 
War II, the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki terrified almost everyone to some 
degree. But through agriculture, something fundamental to modern human existence, 
policymakers hoped to reclaim nuclear energy from its more sinister applications. 
Showing that using atomic energy could be peaceful dramatically changed the AEC’s 
purpose and transformed the organization from death-bringing existence to one capable 
of great good. In this way, research into agriculture using atomic energy could be just as 
useful to the AEC as it was to fields and farms.   
 Atomic agriculture also opens a window into the perceived place of agriculture in 
both the United States and the world at the time. Agricultural modernization with 
mechanization and chemicals found its logical next step in atomic agriculture, as the atom 
truly only represented the newest technology that could be put to work for the good of 
farming. This let U.S. farmers produce their products ever more cheaply and efficiently, 
which meant that U.S. citizens got ever more bang for their buck in grocery stores, all 
while supporting the rise of agribusiness. Internationally, anxieties about feeding the 
world (necessitating increased food supplies) also meant that the United States could 
manufacture a new place for itself in the world—a role not only as world food supplier, 
but also as a distributor of knowledge proverbially teaching the world to fish rather than 
fishing for it. Both of these facets of food production—both at home and abroad—aided 
atomic agriculture in bolstering the nuclear complex and furthering its development, 
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which created a sort of feedback loop between the atom and agriculture. Supporting 
atomic research thus meant furthering agricultural modernization and the Green 
Revolution, and frequently the inverse of that held true as well as well. 
 Atomic agriculture also helps shed light into differences and similarities between 
the Truman and Eisenhower Presidencies. While Dwight Eisenhower is much better 
known for furthering non-military applications of atomic energy with his “Atoms for 
Peace” program, it is clear that policymakers during the Truman administration also 
intended the split atom for more than bombs. Truman’s 1946 proclamation about the 
importance of radioisotopes and AEC Chairman David Lilienthal’s 1947 speeches help 
show that Truman and his associates, even from early on in the atomic age, also wanted 
to support peaceful projects. The most significant difference between how the two 
programs related to atomic agriculture is that, very simply, knowledge about nuclear 
energy and agriculture was much more advanced during Eisenhower’s terms. Truman’s 
administration supported and furthered research until he left office in 1953, and this 
enabled Eisenhower to continue preexisting programs. In this case, the Eisenhower 
administration looks like the one more concerned about and with a better understanding 
of the environment—for example, nobody thought radiation might grow plants in 1955—
but this phenomenon is not necessarily due to any superiority in the Republican 
presidency in relation to his Democrat counterpart’s. 
 While bomb improvement and production may not have stopped at any time 
during either presidency, as long as research into agriculture continued the United States 
could maintain a much more moral position. Not everyone believed in the idyllic ends 
that such programs might achieve—helping the United States feed the world. And yet, 
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not everyone had to believe that. No matter the exact end point, the benefits to 
researchers and farmers seemed obvious and the research did allow the United States to 
advance its nuclear program under peaceful pretenses. Fundamentally, atomic agriculture 
held dual purposes—agricultural improvement and the advancement of an argument that 
nuclear energy should be considered a benign entity and not a harbinger of death. This 
doubly purposed research means we need to revise not only our understanding of what 
atomic research meant for the environment during the Cold War, but also recognize that 
many organizations might be willing to improve the environment if it also means 
improving their own public image. 
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Chapter Five 
From Affluence to Effluence: 
Nuclear Waste Disposal 
 
 In October 1947, Harvard University President J. B. Conant gave a speech 
entitled “The Atomic Age” at the National War College that focused on military matters, 
especially the idea of a “superblitz.” Near the end of that speech, however, Conant 
delivered a line that could almost be considered a “throwaway,” but one that nonetheless 
showed exactly what many decision makers thought about the eventual fate of radioactive 
materials. Discussing what to do when the world tried to rid itself of atomic weapons, 
Conant declared, “In the last stage all existing stocks of plutonium and U-235 [fissionable 
uranium] would be dumped into the sea or ‘denatured’ so that the material would not be 
available for atom bombs.”1 Hypothetically, this sounded like a fine idea. As long as 
fissionable materials had been “denatured” so that the ores could not be used in atomic 
weapons, these posed no military threat to humans. The second option, depositing all 
nuclear materials in the ocean, meant humans avoided dangerous radiation for the most 
part. In reality, this sentiment ignored that denaturing did not constitute a perfect solution 
and also discounted some of the very real political, social, and ecological realities of 
dumping nuclear waste into the oceans. 
 Historian Jacob Darwin Hamblin has chronicled the political, scientific, and 
diplomatic maneuverings of nuclear nations dumping their nuclear waste into oceans in 
the second half of the twentieth century. At one time, humans saw the environment as 
“sublime, powerful, eternal, and inexhaustible.” However, the natural world “became in 
the twentieth century a fragile entity apparently drained of is resources and life—a 
                                                
1 Conant was former Harvard chemistry professor and at the time of this speech president of the university. 
HSTL, Papers of Clark Clifford, Box 41, Folder Conant, J.B. ["The Atomic Age," a lecture at the National 
War College, October 2, 1947] 
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vulnerable earth greatly in need of protection or control.”2 When it came to waste 
disposal, this meant that humans previously thought that “dilution is the solution to 
pollution” and dumped copious trash of all sorts into the seas because they believed an 
all-powerful natural world could not be harmed—the oceans simply were too big to ever 
become truly polluted. After the rise of environmentalism, in contrast, humans began to 
view the environment in much more cautious ways, and a new status quo considered the 
natural world as a delicate balance that needed to be protected.3 As Hamblin wrote, “In 
the 1950s, leading oceanographers viewed the ocean as a sewer, using language that 
might have led to the professional ostracism of an aspiring marine scientist just a couple 
of decades later.”4 Thoughts about nuclear waste disposal during the Truman and 
Eisenhower presidencies thus reflect a position that would seem nonsensical in the 
political climates of later administrations—policymakers found the environment useful, 
                                                
2 Hamblin certainly was not the first to study this concept, as changing views of nature have their own 
historiography. His article on the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment that eventually 
produced the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 
(also called the London Dumping Convention) argued, “Regardless of whether those who protected 
dumping were gods or devils, they wielded their power and influence in the details—in the definitions, in 
the exemptions, in the complicated black and gray lists—rather than in the public acclaimed convention 
‘banning’ the disposal of waste at sea.” Jacob Darwin Hamblin, “Gods and Devils in the Details: Marine 
Pollution, Radioactive Waste, and an Environmental Regime circa 1972,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 32, No. 
4 (September 2008), 540, 542. 
3 In fact, a section in the July 1950 AEC Report to Congress described “Dilution as a Safeguard” when 
discussing airborne nuclear waste. Eighth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, July 1950, 
80. 
4 Hamblin contended that his book was “a history of the scientific, political, and diplomatic controversies 
connected to disposing radioactive waste at sea, told in the context of the democratic nuclear powers.” He 
further wrote, “The history of ocean disposal of radioactive waste is less about the triumph of 
environmentalism and more about science, politics, and diplomacy. […] The narrative is guided by four 
broad and interrelated themes, explained in detail below, each highlighting the fact that sea disposal 
policies hinged upon struggles for scientific authority—between governments, between institutions, and 
between groups of scientists vying for influence, patronage, or decision-making power.” Fundamentally, 
Hamblin questioned whether the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matter helped out the environment at all when he wrote this dualistic statement: “An 
environmentalist might rejoice at the London Convention, but a cynic might justifiably call it a legalistic 
chimera. It led nations to scrutinize even construction silt dumped far out at sea, but to stare unblinkingly at 
the continuous flow of waste emanating from nuclear reprocessing pipelines right offshore.” Jacob Darwin 
Hamblin, Poison in the Well: Radioactive Waste in the Oceans at the Dawn of the Nuclear Age (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2008), 2, 4, 254. 
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important, and worth understanding, but did so in the context of seeking how to best fill 
various land and seascapes with as much waste as possible without affecting the bodies of 
U.S. citizens.  
 This chapter delves into how the United States and its decision makers used the 
available environmental science to deal with one of the end results of many atomic 
processes—nuclear waste. Nearly every facet of the nuclear complex produced some sort 
of radioactive waste, from low-level wastes (like contaminated gloves or lightly 
radioactive coolant water) to very high-level radioactive wastes that contained a great 
amount of dangerous radioactivity, such as the very harmful Strontium 90. Decisions 
made by those in the U.S. government can help show how many policymakers thought 
about not only radiation from nuclear waste, but also the environment into which those 
waste products went. When making choices about disposing radioactive waste, decision 
makers had to balance human and environmental health with the very real need to deal 
with the radioactive byproducts produced by parts of the nuclear complex deemed 
necessary and vital to national security and the welfare of the country’s citizenry. In 
doing so, policymakers, especially at the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), treated 
radioactive waste just like they would any other trash, except with the added dimension 
of radiation. This meant any decision made started from a default position of dumping the 
waste where other rubbish might go and from there attempted to solve the problem of 
radiation. 
 Previous chapters ruminated on single aspects of the development of the nuclear 
complex and crafted an historical narrative about the thoughts and considerations of those 
in power on that subject. This chapter, however, is slightly different. While it also goes 
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mostly in chronological order, the chapter seeks less to tell a story than it does to explain 
a way of thinking that stayed more or less constant during the studied period. In essence, 
policymakers did not shift their way of thinking from older paradigms and instead 
attempted to shoehorn nuclear waste policies into already existing modes of thought. The 
chapter also highlights a fundamental fact about waste disposal that still exists in present 
ways of thinking. When humans put something in the garbage or otherwise dispose of it, 
that trash does not disappear—it just goes elsewhere. Nuclear waste is the same way, 
except it also has the added problem of radiation that might very easily leak into the 
surrounding environs, which reminds humans that they have not truly disposed of trash, 
merely displaced it. Policymakers never quite went beyond this “out of sight, out of 
mind” attitude, even though they had the necessary tools available to change the models 
they used to reach determinations about waste disposal—constantly improving 
understandings about the interaction between radioactive waste and the natural world. 
 During the early Truman presidency, policymakers paid very little attention to 
what might happen to nuclear products after their use. Perhaps the most powerful 
demonstration of that notion is the archival holdings in the Harry S. Truman Presidential 
Library, where the offhand quip in J. B. Conant’s speech was the only mention of nuclear 
waste disposal found by this author. The July 1949 Semiannual Report of the AEC to 
Congress contained little more than a page on the subject, with that page focused heavily 
on how radioactive waste might affect human bodies. The report claimed, “In setting the 
[safety level for humans], the problem was less that human drinking water might become 
contaminated than that people might eat animals that drank water in discharge streams or 
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fish that fed on micro-organisms that had absorbed radioactive material.”5 That statement 
gave a clear implication about how decision makers understood radiation in environments 
that was very similar to what Chapter Two showed about early understandings of 
radioactive fallout—the only real problem with radiation in the natural world was that it 
might eventually end up in human bodies. Polluted streams, fish, microorganisms, meat 
animals, and oceans only became a problem if humans might possibly ingest some of the 
radiation that had entered those biological and ecological systems. The AEC report six 
months later in January 1950 contained a mere paragraph on “Handling Radioactive 
Wastes” that mentioned a study at Mound Laboratory at Miamisburg, Ohio.6  
 The AEC did understand that its actions could have environmental consequences, 
however, and its July 1950 report to Congress, in a section on “Environmental 
Safeguards,” showed an evolving focus on dealing with radioactive waste and the 
recognition that the government needed more solutions. The AEC claimed that it 
considered safeguarding the areas surrounding atomic energy installations just as 
important as protecting AEC workers and said that it set the “Permissible levels of 
radiation released from routine operations into the environment [extremely low]—at or 
below the levels of background radiation under many natural conditions.”7 Again, 
however, the fear of environmental contamination remained firmly focused on possible 
threats to human bodies. And no matter the precautions, AEC actions frequently 
produced radiation and contaminated various products with that radiation, necessitating 
that the Commission do something to ensure the safety of humans and the environment.
 In 1950, the AEC considered only two methods of controlling radioactive wastes 
                                                
5 Sixth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, July 1949, 62. 
6 Seventh Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, January 1950, 124. 
7 Eighth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, July 1950, 98. 
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to be viable options (not producing the wastes in the first place was not one of the 
options). The first possibility involved concentrating radioactive products so that these 
could be stored in select places where humans might be least affected (for example, cast 
into concrete and then sunk deep into the ocean). The alternative involved “mixing the 
material with so much nonradioactive material (air, water, or a stable isotope of the same 
material) that it will be harmlessly dispersed.”8 In this scenario, radioactive effluence got 
treated just like many other pollutants—radioactivity could be put directly into the air or 
water so long as a sufficient enough supply of the diluting agent existed. This mindset 
portrayed radioactivity as being no different than other hazards and implied that as long 
as the AEC diluted radioactive wastes enough these presented no discernable harm to 
humans, just like a kettle of boiling water is safe so long as it is mixed with enough cold 
water from the tap. 
 On top of these general strategies, the AEC also carefully measured the environs 
surrounding its production facilities to ensure that disposal plans safely worked. Sites like 
Oak Ridge in Tennessee and Argonne Laboratories in Chicago needed careful monitoring 
so that the AEC could be sure it mediated any dangers. Of course, once dumped the 
radioactive waste had to be guarded to keep out anyone who might go near it and the 
local environments near the dumping site also had to be monitored. One of the best ways 
to prevent dangers, then, involved carefully choosing AEC sites to minimize the chances 
of any incident. When choosing a reactor location, “The AEC determined that such 
reactors should be tested on a large reservation of public land—preferably of submarginal 
value for faming and ranching and not suitable for future agricultural, mining, or other 
development—whose very extent would serve to guard the population of the surrounding 
                                                
8 Eighth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, July 1950, 98-99. 
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area against potential hazard. The geology of the site was of importance; the earthquake 
risk had to be small.”9 
 Yet AEC policies supported almost contradictory conclusions, as the Commission 
cared deeply about environmental contamination, but did not necessarily care if that 
contamination harmed the environment. That is to say, the AEC showed little early 
concern that its radioactive waste might harm the plants or animals in dumping 
environments—the biota normally considered when describing the natural world. The 
Commission did care, however, that if it polluted the natural world with radiation that 
such radioactivity might eventually make its way through natural systems into human 
bodies. Thus environmental contamination with radioactivity mattered a great deal to the 
AEC, but only for the sake of human health, not for the environment’s sake. For example, 
the AEC studied each site carefully to account for unique characteristics of each 
landscape—radioactive products surely would behave differently in a desert setting with 
underground water than at the Hanford plant on the Columbia River in Washington State. 
And yet, for all that careful monitoring, the most important measurements concerned how 
humans might be affected. For example, the subsection on “River Studies” held that for 
humans to be affected by excess radiation in fish, a person would have to eat a hundred 
pounds of these fish in one sitting, or ten pounds a day for a very long time “to get any 
appreciable dose of radioactivity.” The fact that the fish themselves were corrupted by 
radiation that might affect their own biological processes was inconsequential as in the 
                                                
9 The AEC seemed confident that testing showed no appreciable environmental harm from radioactivity. 
On Oak Ridge, the Commission claimed, “The U.S. Weather Bureau conducts thorough meteorological 
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flow and temperature in the broken ridge country surrounding the plants, including the behavior of the 
upper atmosphere.” About Argonne, the Commission asserted, “Here, as at other atomic energy centers, 
tests are conducted to make sure that plant, fish, and animal life downstream from the Laboratory are not 
reconcentrating extremely dilute radioactive wastes to any dangerous extent.” Eighth Semiannual Report of 
the Atomic Energy Commission, July 1950, 99-105. 
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final equation all that mattered was how humans might suffer from consumption of 
piscine bodies.10 
 Other plans, such as “releasing radioisotope wastes into public sewers,” showed 
that policymakers conceived of radioactive waste disposal very similarly to how they 
would traditional waste disposal at the time. In an AEC-supported project at New York’s 
Mount Sinai Hospital, a study looked into the hospital potentially disposing radioactive 
iodine and phosphorous—used in medical research—directly into the public sewer 
system. The study found “no danger to sewage disposal workers” because the sewer 
system diluted the radioactive products to a sufficient degree. The AEC further declared, 
“Plumbing fixtures through which isotope wastes had passed were dismantled, tested, and 
found below any degree of radioactive contamination that might be hazardous to 
plumbers working on the fixtures.”11  
Such a practice seemed fine on a conceptual level and research findings also 
found no detectable danger, but still causes pause because of the intellectual 
underpinnings involved. That the AEC even undertook such a study reflects a way of 
thinking that radiation was no different than any other pollutant. The Commission may 
have determined that the radioactivity remained at safe levels, but as Chapter Two 
showed, no one truly knew what safe levels were. Beyond immediate dangers, no data 
existed on what might happen if humans received low-level exposure over the course of a 
decade or two (indeed, how could such data exist considering the atomic age was less 
than a decade old?). The AEC brought into this situation, and others, a style of thinking 
                                                
10 The AEC was relatively secure in its assertions that it had everything under control, such as when the 
report stated, “From evidence now at hand there is no reason to believe that the operation of the Hanford 
piles will have any harmful effect on the natural balance of plant and animal life in the [Columbia] river.” 
Eighth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, July 1950, 105-118. 
11 Tenth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, July 1951, 42. 
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in keeping with contemporary scientists and government officials and proved unable to 
move beyond such thought patterns and appraise atomic energy as something new and 
distinct that required eschewing previous assumptions. Whether pouring radioisotope 
tracers into the sewers was ultimately safe or not, the AEC did not have a sufficient basis 
to make a judgment either way and yet still attempted the experiment. 
 Continuing AEC research showed that the Commission did not necessarily think 
that it had the problem under control, even if the organization did think its plans moved 
in the right direction. The July 1952 report to Congress sounded very positive and 
proactive, claiming, “Research, development, and investigations in sanitary engineering 
were advanced by AEC contractors during the first half of 1952 to obtain more efficient 
handling and disposal of wastes at lower cost and to secure better information on the 
environmental aspects of atomic energy operations.” In short, AEC research programs 
frequently studied whether traditional methods of waste disposal could be used to deal 
with radioactive wastes, particularly high-volume, low-level waste. For example, at Johns 
Hopkins University, experiments tested whether conventional incineration could safely 
dispose of wastes containing radioactive phosphorous. That study found ninety percent of 
the radioactivity went into the ash with the remainder depositing in the stack and in small 
particles in the smoke.12 Another evaluation declared that burning low level wastes in 
isolated areas seemed like a good idea and was the cheapest way to dispose of products 
                                                
12 Twelfth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, July 1952, 19-20. Various nuclear 
refinement processes also could produce radioactive “ash,” which also could cause concern. DDEL, 
Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President, Ann Whitman File, Campaign Series, Box 6, Folder Atomic 
Energy, Memo to Bernard M. Baruch from John M. Hancock, 29 September 1952, 4. 
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“without health hazard.”13 Burning might have worked for other industrial wastes, but all 
it likely did for radioactive wastes was spew radioactive ash into the air. 
 Plans still called for low-level radioactive waste to be put directly into bodies of 
water, but research attempted to improve how that took place and better understand what 
happened after the dumping. At the University of Texas, researchers tried concentrating 
liquid radioactive wastes into algae, which would then be removed from the water by 
rotary vacuum filters. This would not diminish the amount of radioactivity involved, but 
would reduce the amount of radioactive liquid to manage.14 Other work put radioactive 
tracers into water to determine how long the radiation lasted in rivers. For example, in 
New York’s Mohawk River, “Preliminary analyses indicated that, under the test 
conditions, in roughly 5,000 feet of stream travel, the radioactivity concentration at the 
outfall was diluted to essentially background or harmless levels.” Yet again, disposal 
plans drew upon the idea that “dilution is the solution to pollution.” Of course, none of 
this meant that the AEC necessarily had the issue under control. The January 1955 report 
to Congress declared, “The disposal of radioactive waste is a major problem in the atomic 
energy program.”15 
 High-level radioactive wastes constituted an even more significant problem. 
Chemical plants that processed irradiated fuel elements constituted the main source of 
such products. The AEC considered many different types of disposal, including ocean 
dumping, underground holding, pumping into wells, and incineration.16 Yet no matter 
how much scientific knowledge AEC research produced no perfect solutions existed. In 
                                                
13 Seventeenth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, January 1955, 53. 
14 Fifteenth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, January 1954, 26. 
15 Other “methods for the disposal of contaminated scrap include storage, burial, sea disposal and 
incineration.” Seventeenth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, January 1955, 30-31, 53. 
16 Nineteenth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, January 1956, 51-52. 
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general, the AEC took three primary approaches to disposing highly radioactive 
products—fixate the fission products in other mediums for easier storage; selectively 
remove the worst parts so that the bulk could be more easily handled; or discharge the 
highly radioactive wastes as they were into holding tanks or specially selected geologic 
formations.17 None of these options could do anything to actually diminish the amount of 
radioactivity contained in the effluence, even if the methods hopefully could avoid any 
potential damage to human health or landscapes outside of the dumping grounds. 
 In the latter few years of the 1950s, focus on dealing with radioactive wastes 
increased so much that the AEC declared, “The problem of handling and disposing of 
radioactive wastes runs through the entire fabric of nuclear energy operations.” 
Reminding readers that matter in any state—gas, liquid, or solid—could emit 
radioactivity, the January 1957 report to Congress summed up the issue clearly when it 
claimed, “Because of the long life of some radioactivity, the ability of radiation to cause 
injury to human, plant and animal life, and its potential danger as an environmental 
contaminant, the safe handling and final disposal of wastes is important to the successful 
application of nuclear energy to peaceful uses.” Thus the AEC had several objectives in 
dealing with the radioactive products: to develop better and cheaper ways to handle and 
dispose of the waste; determine how much natural systems would dilute wastes and 
lessen the required treatment; learn more about “fundamental phenomena”; aid 
integration of nationwide agencies; and assist concerned state and local officials.18 In 
short, though the whole program could be improved, from the nitty-gritty technical 
                                                
17 Twentieth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, July 1956, 60-62. 
18 Twenty-First Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, January 1957, 151-152. 
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aspects to the larger, structural features, but the AEC had recognized the challenges 
involved by 1957. 
 One thing the AEC made clear, however, is that once radioactive wastes had been 
disposed of out of sight, it still took a long time for these to be safely out of mind. For 
example, workers could bury radioactive wastes, but facilities still needed to erect fences 
to limit access and monitor nearby waters and soils. At the Hanford processing facility, as 
another example, after cooling water had been put in a storage basin to reduce some of 
the radioactivity and finally returned to the Columbia River to be diluted, that river 
needed continual study to ensure no ill effects occurred. At the Oak Ridge facility, 
workers excavated three pits “in the relatively impervious Conasauga shale” and between 
1951-1957 dumped more than four million gallons of low-level waste into “open seepage 
pits,” necessitating downstream monitoring to ensure drinking water safety. Since the 
production of every gallon of processed uranium also created between one-tenth and one 
gallon of high-level liquid waste, merely storing such liquids in tanks was not “a final 
economical answer. On the other hand, sufficient dilution probably is not available in 
nature for any safe, continuing dispersal to the environment.” Thus researchers attempted 
to find other solutions, such as heating the liquids to very high temperatures until these 
became a dry oxide powder (which could be packaged as a solid or mixed with clay and 
fused in a kiln to form a ceramic mass). Other possible solutions included discharging the 
liquid into subterranean salt beds or salt domes between 5,000 and 15,000 feet in depth or 
pumping the liquid deep into the sea where planners and scientists thought that little sea 
life and slow circulation would prevent damage to humans.19 Either way, waste disposal 
remained an unresolved issue in 1957. Moreover, policymakers realized that their choices 
                                                
19 Twenty-First Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, January 1957, 156-158. 
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could have serious ramifications and thus required frequent reevaluations to be sure that 
no problems arose. 
 Even though it seems now that nuclear waste constituted a serious problem in the 
nuclear complex, not all wastes were created equally, as whether nuclear waste was 
liquid or solid, high or low level could make a significant difference. In 1957 the 
Commission declared, “The handling and disposal of solid wastes have at no time 
constituted a serious technical problem.” To justify such a claim, the AEC reported about 
test dumping thirty miles off of San Francisco’s coast. The Scripps Institute for 
Oceanography studied that site and “tended to confirm that waste disposal there has 
produced no harmful effects.” Liquid wastes, however, especially of high-level radiation, 
“remained the major technological problem in disposal.” The best the AEC could do with 
that fluid was to store it in tanks, and to that date the Commission had placed 65 million 
gallons containing millions of curies of radioactivity in tank storage.20 Thus while the 
AEC may have “solved” some of its radioactive waste problems, others remained 
significant hurdles. 
 The January 1958 AEC report to Congress contained a section on “Sanitary 
engineering research” that said research primarily focused on waste handling and 
disposal, the water supply, and environmental sanitation. For low level wastes, 
researchers tested biologic sewage treatments, and results indicated that 70-90% of “low-
level mixed fission products can be removed.” And even easier than disposing of low-
level radioactive wastes itself, the AEC had licensed seven commercial firms to do the 
disposal for the U.S. government. Such disposal was “generally limited to handling small 
quantities of radioactive waste material. The wastes are disposed of at sea, are stored, or 
                                                
20 Twenty-second Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, July 1957, 69-70. 
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in some instances are returned to the Commission for permanent burial. The hazards, 
both operational and long term, are comparatively slight.” Such solutions would not work 
on “High-level residues,” of course, and the previous tripartite research into fixation into 
an inert solid, selective removal of specific isotopes, and direct discharge to selected 
geological formations continued. Most of that research, however, was not entirely viable 
so most high-level liquid waste went directly into underground storage tanks.21 Even with 
plans for either drying radioactive liquid waste to “a less hazardous, noncorrosive solid 
product” or possibly drilling into a salt formation at the Naval Air Station at Hutchinson, 
Kansas, high-level radioactivity products remained a serious problem.22 
 The Commission did continue to develop different ways to deal with low-level 
disposal, including furthering relationships with other organizations. In 1958, the AEC 
formed a special subcommittee to work under the auspices of the National Academy of 
Sciences’ Committee on Oceanography. That subcommittee examined “the feasibility of 
establishing a limited number of new sea disposal sites in the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of 
Mexico for use in commercial disposal of low-level radioactive wastes. If feasible, new 
sites will be recommended closer to the coast-line than the presently recommended 100 
miles or more offshore.”23 In addition to farming out research, the Commission also 
continued to distribute licenses for waste disposal, and as of 31 December 1958, “8 
licenses were in effect, 6 for waste disposal in the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans, 1 for 
storage, and 1 for packaging and returning wastes to the Commission.” The AEC decided 
not to spell out “precise details for waste disposal” in guidelines to these companies 
                                                
21 Twenty-third Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, January 1958, 133-151. 
22 Twenty-fourth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, July 1958, 101-102. 
23 Italics are in original. Twenty-fourth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, July 1958, 
103. 
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because there are so many “varied and complex technical problems” that giving leeway 
seemed more appropriate. The application process for ocean disposal did require a great 
deal of information, however, which gave the AEC the at least the illusion of control 
even if it took a fairly laissez-faire approach after it had distributed a license.24 
 In July 1959, the AEC’s assurances were not enough to placate the nation’s 
citizenry, and a newspaper article on radioactive waste contamination in rivers caused the 
Commission concern. That article reported that the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW) sought to end radioactive contamination of U.S. rivers and streams by 
uranium refineries. It claimed that about “half of the 28 ore-processing plants now in 
operation are dumping radium and other waste products into rivers in the West,” with 
some levels as much as twenty-two times the maximum permissible radiation levels. 
Arthur S. Flemming, the HEW secretary, had scathing criticisms for the AEC and vowed 
that rivers needed to be both cleaned up and studied.25  
AEC Chairman John McCone referenced that article in a Commissioners’ meeting 
on the day the article ran and said he was “seriously concerned about the growing volume 
of criticism AEC was receiving on the problem of radiation contamination.” Reports at 
that meeting claimed that the AEC had essentially been doing its due diligence by 
inspecting uranium milling operations and sending out notifications of noncompliance 
when necessary. Moreover, the Commissioners noted two different factors at play in the 
                                                
24 The January 1959 AEC report to Congress stated, “An application for a license to dispose of radioactive 
waste in the ocean must include a detailed description of the quantities and kinds of material and the 
proposed manner and conditions of disposal. The applicant must give detailed information on container and 
packing specifications, processing facilities, transportation, instrumentation for measuring radiation levels 
and contamination, radiation safety procedures to be followed in collecting, storing, packaging, and 
transporting the material; site of disposal, including depth of water at the proposed site, and the records of 
disposal that will be maintained.” Twenty-fifth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, 
January 1959, 13-14. 
25 Edward Gamarekian, “HEW Acts to End A-Contamination of Rivers,” The Washington Post and Times 
Herald, 15 July 1959, A7. 
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situation. First, they claimed that river contamination does not tell the whole story, as 
duration of exposure mattered, and if the rivers were cleaned up soon “no harmful effects 
will result.” The second point, in a bit of political maneuvering, was that while AEC 
responsibility covered regulating the radioactive level of effluent and dust the mills 
produced, “condition of the rivers as a whole is the responsibility of the Public Health 
Service.” Again, the AEC viewed its dumping mostly through the lens of human health 
and not environmental health—only when human bodies were threatened did 
environmental contamination become a significant problem. Other fears concerned 
“public misunderstandings concerning AEC policies on ocean disposal of radioactive 
waste.” In the end, the Commissioners decided that they needed an integrated 
organization within the AEC to efficiently administer the entire waste disposal program 
and to be capable of effectively allaying the mounting public fears about this situation.”26 
An event a few days later would show that the AEC did indeed have reason to fear public 
concern. 
 In mid-July 1959, the Providence Evening Bulletin reported on “tentative plans 
for disposal of quote low intensity atomic waste unquote close to Rhode Island Coast.”27 
Christopher Del Sesto, Rhode Island’s governor, wrote to President Eisenhower and 
expressed concern. He thought, “Any action of this kind would seriously affect Rhode 
Island’s attraction as a vacation area and might also endanger the marine life for which 
the state is renowned.” Del Sesto continued, “I feel that too little is presently known 
about nuclear waste to accept a proposal such as the committee on Oceanography has 
                                                
26 NACP, RG 326 Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Entry A1 19, Minutes of the Meetings of 
the AEC, Box 13, Meeting No. 1528, 15 July 1959, 446-447. 
27 DDEL, White House Central Files, General File, Box 1214, Folder 155, 1959-60, Telegram from Robert 
G. MacLaughlin of Westkingston, RI to the President, 17 July 1959 
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offered, and I therefore respectfully request that you intercede in behalf of Rhode Island” 
and stop the program.28  
The AEC response to Governor Del Sesto clamed that the Commission had 
“direct responsibility for control of this activity” with no present plans for using or 
approving the sites without more research by a variety of groups. It ended, “Please be 
assured that in our consideration of these matters, protection of the public health and 
safety, and conservation of our natural resources will always be of paramount 
importance.”29 Another concerned citizen called the plans a “patent disregard for the 
welfare of humanity.” He argued, “If the government of this country can expend billions 
of dollars on the development of atomic weapons and processes it can and must include 
in that budget funds for safeguard against a fate more horrible than most men can 
imagine, which can and probably will result from those weapons and processes.” That 
man concluded his message to the President by saying, “Contamination of Earth is a one 
way street.”30 These letters emphasize not only public worry about dumping plans, but 
also how such activities might affect the natural world—and through it affect human 
health. Particularly, they highlight citizens concerned about the state of scientific 
knowledge and whether the AEC knew enough to follow through with its plans. 
 The AEC, however, continued its plans for ocean dumping, which shows that 
public concern could only go so far and that the seas still represented one of the best 
places to dump. On 25 July 1959, a special legislative note from the AEC to the White 
                                                
28 DDEL, White House Central Files, Official File, Box 450, Folder 4, Letter Christopher Del Sesto to 
President, 20 July 1959 
29 DDEL, White House Central Files, Official File, Box 450, Folder 4, Letter William B. Persons to 
Christopher Del Sesto, 3 August 1959 
30 DDEL, White House Central Files, General File, Box 1214, Folder 155, 1959-60, Telegram from Robert 
G. MacLaughlin of Westkingston, RI to the President, 17 July 1959 
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House highlighted a hearing the following week by the Congressional Joint Committee 
on Atomic Energy (JCAE) on a National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report titled 
“Radioactive Waste Disposal Into Atlantic and Gulf Coast Waters.” The Commission 
claimed that, particularly, “The JCAE is concerned over Congressional and public 
apprehension generated by this report and also anxious to preserve its jurisdiction in the 
field of atomic waste disposal.”31 That report was from the NAS’ Committee on 
Oceanography, whose general objectives were “to assist in the development of the marine 
sciences, to encourage basic research and to advise the government agencies on various 
oceanographic problems.” Thus “the problems of disposal of low level radioactive 
wastes” into ocean waters fit well within that committee’s base of expertise and made it a 
logical choice for the AEC, Office of Naval Research, and Bureau of Commercial 
Fisheries to request investigation.32 
 The report attempted “to provide an estimate of the rate of return of radioactive 
substances to man, arising from stated rates of disposal into the coastal areas,” which 
again emphasizes a focus on human health. The NAS committee said that the current 
practice of mixing low-level wastes with concrete and storing it in a 55-gallon drum 
would only provide containment for about ten years, but that this should be long enough 
for the products to lose all radioactivity. No matter how safe the practice, the report 
declared that some sites would not be suitable (such as coastal estuaries, bays, and 
regions immediately seaward of these areas) and recommended more studies of coastal 
circulation and especially circulation of bottom waters. All in all, it claimed the dumping 
                                                
31 DDEL, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President, Ann Whitman File, Diary Series, Box 42, Folder 
Toner Notes July 1959, Special Legislative Note, 25 July 1959 
32 National Academy of Sciences—National Research Council, Publication 655, 1959, “Radioactive Waste 
Disposal into Atlantic and Gulf Coast Waters,” i-vii. 
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practice should be safe, unless shellfisheries were nearby as radioactivity very possibly 
could sink into bottom sediments, get taken in by shellfish, and then consumed by 
humans. The report perceived this potential radioactive shellfish problem as the most 
serious danger of the radioactive dumping, again not because of the damage the shellfish 
might incur, but because humans might eat some of them. No matter the risks involved, 
as its final recommendation the report suggested, “The panel is of the opinion that certain 
Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico coastal areas can be used as receiving waters for the 
controlled disposal of packaged, low level, radioactive wastes.”33 
 More interestingly, the ways the report went into a great level of detail reflected a 
different position than decision makers had taken previously—nuclear waste became a 
bigger problem with each passing year due to increasing peacetime nuclear production, 
and the resulting wastes could not be disposed by conventional methods (municipal 
incinerators, sanitary landfills, etc.). In all, the AEC dumped less than 6,000 curies of 
products between 1951-1958 in Atlantic waters, mostly in the form of “solid materials 
such as paper wipes, rags, mops, ashes, animal carcasses and contaminated laboratory 
paraphernalia.” Of course, playing back to the point that disposing of nuclear waste was 
fundamentally different than conventional wastes, the report pointed out that the type of 
isotope being dumped (ex. strontium vs. something less harmful like tritium) played a 
huge role in the environmental effects. Moreover, putting these products in the ocean 
differed a great deal from storing other wastes in landfills. For example, at a depth of a 
                                                
33 It clarified this larger recommendation by saying before any final site was selected, five conditions had to 
be met: (1) a survey of the area must be conducted “to determine details of local circulation and an 
inventory of the biota, especially of bottom-living organisms”; (2) only so much could be dumped 
(radioactivity wise); (3) sites needed to be at least 75 miles apart and no 300 mile stretch of coastline 
should have more than 3 sites; (4) containers should be designed so that if a container breaks no part of it 
should float to the top; (5) area should be monitored periodically. National Academy of Sciences—National 
Research Council, Publication 655, 1959, “Radioactive Waste Disposal into Atlantic and Gulf Coast 
Waters,” 1-3. 
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thousand fathoms (a little over a mile), disposal canisters encountered over 3,000 pounds 
per square inch of pressure, and any rupture of those vessels would release radioactive 
products into the natural circulation of ocean waters. This would dilute the radioactive 
waste, but also allow it to enter ecosystems. Apart from such known factors, a great many 
unknown issues—absorption factors and previously mentioned ocean circulation 
patterns—also played important roles. Thus no matter the environmental and scientific 
knowledge accumulated, the report summarized, “A precise evaluation of the quantity of 
radioactive substances that will be returned to man as the result of a stated rate of 
disposal into any one of the selected areas cannot be given.”34 Nevertheless, this did not 
stop the NAS committee from making pro-dumping recommendations and policymakers 
from making decisions that implicitly assumed that they knew enough to go forward with 
dumping plans. 
 Moreover, after dealing with nuclear waste for over a decade, U.S. lawmakers 
worked to decrease federal responsibility for certain nuclear wastes. On 23 September 
1959 President Eisenhower signed Public Law (P.L.) 86-373 as an amendment to the 
Atomic Energy Act. The intention behind P.L. 86-373 was to allow the AEC to shift 
authority for disposing of nuclear waste over to state control, so long as the nuclear 
materials were “of less than a critical mass” (that is to say, could not be used to make a 
nuclear bomb). If a state’s governor agreed and the AEC thought the state had an 
adequate program to deal with such wastes, the AEC would delegate some of its 
                                                
34 In one place, the report claimed: “Although impossible to evaluate quantitatively, it seems certain that 
sorption processes will play a major role in controlling the dispersal of radioactive wastes once they are 
free of the canister.” In the end, the committee did not even include sorption factors into their calculations 
because they could not calculate it, but believed that this meant recommendations should “include a safety 
factor of at least 10, and possibly more.” Clearly, in some instances they were just guessing. . National 
Academy of Sciences—National Research Council, Publication 655, 1959, “Radioactive Waste Disposal 
into Atlantic and Gulf Coast Waters,” 4-35. 
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responsibility. Moreover, the AEC wanted the states to get behind P.L. 86-373 as quickly 
as possible, and as quickly as a state regulatory programs could be “designed to protect 
the health and safety of the people against radiation hazards and to encourage the 
constructive uses of radiation.” In doing so, the Commission approved that when 
disposing such radioactive materials, “certain limited quantities may be safely discharged 
into the air, water, and sewers, and buried in the soil.”35 This law was all a part of 
normalizing nuclear waste products and likely as much about reducing public fears as 
helping the AEC reduce its workload. With this move, the Commission showed that if it 
was willing for the states to handle such products, surely these wastes could not be 
terribly dangerous or worth much anxiety. 
 No matter how hard the AEC worked to dispel worries about disposal, its policies 
still could engender great fear, such as the minor international incident generated in late 
1959 when the United States proposed granting a license to dump radioactive waste in the 
Gulf of Mexico. The license would let the waste be placed in the ocean equidistant from 
both U.S. and Mexican territories, and the Mexican Embassy at Washington “expressed 
its opposition to the proposed license for unspecified scientific and technical reasons and 
for reasons of a political and public relations nature.” Moreover, the Mexican government 
                                                
35 The AEC thought that states could acceptably dispose of wastes in a variety of ways: burial, limited 
disposal into sewers, river dumping in low concentrations, incineration, ocean disposal, or even transfer to 
another licensed disposal agency. Or, states could reuse the products, and “A Limited number of licenses 
have been issued for studies involving the controlled release of radioisotopes into the environs. Examples 
of such field uses include fluid flow studies in oil wells and in streams. The quantities and dilutions 
involved in most field studies usually provide for radiation concentrations which are sufficient for technical 
measurements but which are a very small fraction of permissible levels.”  DDEL, White House Central 
Files, Official File, Box 454, Folder OF 108-F Atoms For Peace (12), Proposed Criteria for Guidance of 
States and the AEC in the Discontinuance of AEC Regulatory Authority Over Byproduct, Source and 
Special Nuclear Materials in Less Than a Critical Mass and the Assumption Thereof by States Through 
Agreement. The act itself said its first purpose was, “to recognize the interests of the States in the peaceful 
uses of atomic energy, and to clarify the respective responsibilities under this Act of the States and the 
Commission with respect to the regulation of byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials.” DDEL, 
White House Central Files, Official File, Box 454, Folder OF 108-F Atoms For Peace (12), Public Law 86-
373, 86th Congress, S. 2568, 23 September 1959. 
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believed dumping so close to Mexican shores represented “a unilateral and arbitrary act 
on the part of the United States, any adverse results from which would present virtually 
identical hazards to the residents of the two countries.” Mexican officials also declared 
that, although the U.S. government had allowed them to attend the licensing hearings, 
they believed if the situation had been reversed the United States would not feel it had 
received an appropriate say in the matter. Concerns also existed over why the selected 
site was 180 miles from both shores, “particularly as so little can be known with certainty 
in Mexico regarding the possible adverse effects oceanic waste disposal might have over 
a long period of time.”36 A later AEC memo decreed that the United States should deny 
the dumping license because of the potential adverse affect on foreign relations with 
Mexico.37 Early in 1960, a White House memo declared, “As a result of protests from 
Mexico, backed by the Department of State, the Atomic Energy Commission is 
considering denying a license for disposal of radioactive industrial wastes in the Gulf of 
Mexico.”38 Clearly, even though the AEC tried to mitigate any worries about disposal 
plans, AEC dumping still engendered palpable fear among many, both in and out of the 
United States. 
 Moreover, the AEC knew that the public frequently disapproved of dumping 
decisions and intentionally tried to mask these as much as possible. A mid-December 
                                                
36 DDEL, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant, OCB Series, Subject Subseries, Box 5, 
Folder Nuclear Energy Matters (8) [Sept 1959-Mar 1960], Letter R. R. Rubottom, Jr. to John A. McCone, 
18 November 1959. Rubottom was Assistant Secretary of State. 
37 DDEL, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant, OCB Series, Subject Subseries, Box 5, 
Folder Nuclear Energy Matters (8) [Sept 1959-Mar 1960], Memorandum for the Executive Officer, Subj: 
Industrial Radioactive Waste Disposal in the Gulf of Mexico 22 December 1959. By Richard Hirsch. 
38 However, the memo continued, “Since the method of disposal is considered safe, the licensee may seek a 
judicial review. The [Operations Coordinating Board] has been alerted to the situation, and will attempt to 
deal with problems as they arise.” DDEL, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant, OCB 
Series, Administrative Subseries, Box 2, Folder Chronological - Karl G. Harr January 1960 - January 1961 
(1), Memo from J. I. Coffey to Toner, 5 January 1960 
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1959 meeting of the AEC Commissioners discussed the establishment of land disposal 
sites for radioactive wastes. At that meeting, the Commissioners approved creating 
permanent land disposal sites on government-owned land (either federal or state), and 
authorized Oak Ridge in Tennessee and a site in Idaho as interim disposal sites pending 
study and evaluation of other sites. However, in studying and approving those other sites, 
the Commissioners declared at their meeting, “in accordance with past AEC practices 
when site selections were being made, site selection activities will be conducted with as 
little publicity as possible but that appropriate and useful public relations activities will 
be undertaken at the time of selection of sites to help assure public acceptance.”39 In very 
open language, then, the AEC’s top policymakers agreed that plans for creating nuclear 
waste grounds should be withheld from the public whenever possible, with only very 
certain types of public relations spin even attempted. Whether decision makers truly 
thought that no problems existed with their dumping plans or not, they certainly knew 
that the general U.S. public certainly would have significant concerns. 
 The AEC did attempt to dispel concerns when it could, however, such as when 
Commissioners met with representatives from the State of New Jersey on 11 February 
1960. Particularly, the Garden State’s representatives cited the previously mentioned 
National Academy of Sciences study on “Radioactive Waste Disposal Into Atlantic and 
Gulf Coast Waters,” which had indicated the possibility of inshore dumping. Such 
concerns existed even though the New Jersey Department of Health representative 
claimed that he knew of no health problems with any of the present disposal sites. The 
AEC responded, contrary to the NAS report’s claims, that while the Commission had 
                                                
39 NACP, RG 326 Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Entry A1 19, Minutes of the Meetings of 
the AEC, Box 13, Meeting No. 1573, 15 December 1959, 670. 
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plans for disposing wastes 150-230 miles off of Sandy Hook, New Jersey, it had no plans 
for inshore sites off of the New Jersey coast. Moreover, both the AEC and New Jersey 
representatives realized that if the state officials had such problems with potential inshore 
disposal sites, then they “would have a major public relations problem in convincing the 
public that chemical processing plants handling significant quantities of radioactive 
materials could be operated safely within the state.”40 Worries about ocean disposal did 
begin to cause changes in decision-making. 
 In some ways, the AEC of 1960 began to consider whether ocean dumping should 
be used less in favor of land disposal. One study showed that in most cases, land disposal 
“would be both feasible and less expensive than sea disposal.” Reports claimed that if the 
AEC had pursued such a plan at the time, the temporary sites at Oak Ridge and in Idaho 
would be capable of handling all low-level radioactive waste produced by the United 
States until 1965. That study only focused on low-level wastes, however, since 
transportation costs for such was low because those nuclear products required no special 
shielding. AEC Chairman John McCone did ask whether there was a “danger of buried 
waste material leaching radioactivity into the earth and eventually reaching rivers and 
streams,” which demonstrated an understanding of how the natural world and its systems 
work. On top of the cheaper cost, however, “the risk of accidental release from the burial 
ground would not be significantly increased by burying a large amount of waste since 
there is adequate control of the burial ground.”41  
                                                
40 NACP, 326 Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Entry A1 19, Minutes of the Meetings of the 
AEC, Box 13, Summary Notes of Meeting with Representatives of the State of New Jersey, 11 Feb 1960 
41 The study did conclude that, “However, highly radioactive wastes from plants located near the coast and 
requiring concrete shielding probably could be disposed of more cheaply at sea.” NACP, RG 326 Records 
of the Atomic Energy Commission, Entry A1 19, Minutes of the Meetings of the AEC, Box 13, Meeting 
No. 1617, 6 May 1960, 325-327. 
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Later on, the Commissioners discussed a letter to the Earth Sciences Division of 
the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council. The letter was designed to 
reply to concerns held by the Earth Sciences Division about waste disposal, but internal 
discussion emphasized that the Commissioners believed the NAS committee only held 
competence on geological aspects and any discussion about waste disposal more 
generally was outside its field of knowledge. Moreover, the Commissioners decided that 
their letter to the Earth Sciences Division should say, “However, we assume you do not 
mean that zero radioactivity should be allowed to reach man’s environment. This would 
raise fundamental questions including those of a biological and medical nature that are 
very broad.”42 This response to members of the scientific community showed that 
scientific advice did not always receive the warm welcome it had when the NAS issued 
its longer report just a year earlier. It also illuminated an assumption that there was 
nothing inherently wrong with releasing radiation into the natural world, so long as it was 
done in a controlled manner. The AEC thus recognized that its actions demonstrated that 
there frequently is very little difference between waste disposal and controlled pollution. 
 The AEC report to Congress for 1959 provides a good endpoint for understanding 
AEC opinions on dumping during the Truman and Eisenhower presidencies. That report 
contained over seventy pages (nearly a fifth of the document) on nuclear waste disposal 
and contained the most expansive treatise on the Commission’s positions and activities 
on the subject to date. The section claimed, “The major objective of waste management 
in atomic energy operations is control over the radiation hazard that might be produced 
by these wastes, either in storage or in nature.” To this end, two basic disposal concepts 
                                                
42 NACP, 326 Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Entry A1 19, Minutes of the Meetings of the 
AEC, Box 14, Meeting No. 1675, 23 November 1960, 878-879. 
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existed—either concentrate wastes so these could be contained or dilute wastes so these 
could be dispersed. The section then proceeded to describe the “waste management 
methods” at several different AEC installations—a nuclear power plant (the 
Shippingport, PA Atomic Power Plant), a production and processing installation 
(Hanford Works, Hanford, WA), a development laboratory (Brookhaven, NY), and also 
disposal methods by sea and land burial.43 Examining these three facilities sheds light on 
the overall thought patterns of the AEC. 
 The Shippingport facility, located on the Ohio River in Pennsylvania, is credited 
as the first nuclear power plant devoted solely to peaceful production of atomic power. 
The 400-acre site used pressurized water as a reactor coolant and in the process built up 
low-level radioactive waste from both corrosion processes and from fission products 
produced by occasional fuel ruptures, and it also produced high-level wastes from the 
actual nuclear fuel. High-level wastes were shipped to an unnamed AEC site, and low-
level wastes got reduced in concentration and discharged directly into the Ohio River, 
supposedly not to exceed one-tenth the maximum possible concentration. To ensure that 
the radioactivity of these lower level wastes did not excessively pollute the river, the 
facility stored the liquids in large underground tanks for around forty-five days. The total 
“reactor-waste effluent” was about 23,000 gallons per month with radiation around three 
microcuries per milliliter. In 1956 the Commission began an off-site monitoring program 
for changes in air, soil, and vegetation in the area and also monitored well water within a 
mile of the site.44 As at other sites, whenever possible the AEC discharged radioactive 
                                                
43 On top of disposal at these facilities, the AEC also licensed nine total companies, four for the first time 
that year, all for “disposal of low-level waste commercially.” Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic 
Energy Commission for 1959, January 1960, 124, 304-306. 
44 Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy Commission for 1959, January 1960, 306-308. 
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products directly into the local environment, and when this was not possible stored that 
waste until such a time as it could be directly deposited into the environs, even if that day 
would never come. 
 The Hanford Site was 650 square miles in 1960, “located in a saucer-like basin 
surrounded by hills and mountains up to 3,600 feet above sea level” on the Columbia 
River in Southeastern Washington.45 One press release described Hanford as “constructed 
in this isolated expanse of wasteland” (yet, on the next page it described the people who 
lived near the plant).46 There is a plateau in the basin where most of the plant is located, 
and the semi-arid area was lightly populated at the time. A good thing, too, because as of 
January 1960 the Hanford plant had “discharged to the environment about 95% of all 
low- and intermediate-level radioactivity so disposed of in the United States through 
atomic energy operations,” making it a natural choice for study in the report. One of the 
interesting things about Hanford, though, is that the disposal techniques used there 
depended on the site’s unique location and geography, and as such would not necessarily 
work elsewhere. Eight reactors at Hanford produced plutonium for nuclear weapons, and 
those reactors had to be cooled by water from the Columbia River that became 
contaminated by ambient radiation in the reactors. Prior to being released back into the 
Columbia River, the facility held the effluent in tanks for one to three hours, which 
                                                
45 One of the more interesting maps of Hanford is located on the back of a letter sent to President 
Eisenhower. It not only shows Hanford situated between the Yakima and Columbia Rivers, but also 
includes lots of agricultural drawings, such as tractor, barn, wheat, cattle, fruit, etc. In addition, the map 
also portrays the Phillips Chemical Anhydrous Ammonia plant, the Boise-Cascade Co. Container Plant 
Pulp & Paper Mill, a Junior College, dams, and oil pipelines. In this way, the map depicts a melding of 
natural and hummanmade parts of the local environment very reminiscent of Richard White’s Organic 
Machine, also about the Columbia River. Obviously this map came decades before White’s book. DDEL, 
White House Central Files, General File, Box 1214, Folder 155, 1958, Map of Hanford. Richard White, 
The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995) 
46 HSTL, Papers of Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files, Box 174, Folder Atomic Bomb, Press Releases 
[1 of 3], War Department Press Release on Hanford Engineer Works, 1-2. 
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reduced the radioactivity by 50-70 percent. The report claimed, “By the time the effluent 
has traveled to the vicinity of Pasco, 35 miles downstream, and the first point of 
substantial use, further radioactive decay has reduced the gross activity by a total of about 
90 percent and well below the permissible limits for safe consumption.” Since the 
dilution of the Columbia is over 1.4 million gallons per second at places, this is 
unsurprising, but as Chapter Two demonstrated, determining “permissible limits” could 
be quite difficult and imprecise. Low-level cooling water with only minor radioactivity 
accounted for thirty billion gallons of the total waste produced, but other waste existed 
with potentially far more harmful effects.47 
 The Hanford site produced a great many other radioactive wastes, some of them 
solids and others highly toxic liquids. Solid wastes like “contaminated paper, boards, 
worn out tools, construction items, and aluminum spacers” were buried in trenches, 
isolated from the environment with very little perceived risk of affecting the water table. 
Bigger solid items were buried in very deep pits or stored in large concrete-lined tunnels. 
Perhaps more importantly, Hanford had produced fifty-two million gallons of high-level 
radioactive waste, stored indefinitely in underground tanks of between one-half to one 
million gallon capacity. The report asserted, “No environmental hazard exists as long as 
the tanks maintain their integrity.” The site also created around three billion gallons of 
intermediate-level waste, “deposited to the ground under carefully controlled conditions.” 
For these, “Favorable geological and hydrological conditions in the area, and the capacity 
of the soil to absorb isotopes, make it possible to hold the vast majority of the radioactive 
materials in a thick layer of sediments. Thus, the wastes are essentially ‘stored’ in the 
ground, and any water percolating through to the water table is purified by time and the 
                                                
47 Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy Commission for 1959, January 1960, 308-312. 
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action of the soil.”48 Even though the local environmental conditions may have mediated 
the ways in which radioactive wasted disposal occurred at Hanford, the site still suffered 
from the same problems as anywhere else—the AEC produced a great deal of waste that 
had to go somewhere, and this meant that if it could not be put back into the natural 
world it had to be stored until such a time came (or never came) that the waste could be 
safely put back into the environment. 
 Finally, the report surveyed waste disposal at Brookhaven National Laboratory, a 
3,600-acre site located at the center of Long Island, New York devoted to nuclear 
research. Most of the waste the laboratory produced came either directly or indirectly 
from the large air-cooled research reactor on site. “The off-gases from the hot laboratory 
are cleaned by filters and scrubbers and released through a pipe going up the center of the 
310-foot stack provided for the reactor cooling air.” Radioactive argon 41 was the most 
significant radioactive product in the cooling air, but the stack spit the gas up very high, 
where presumably the radioactivity would not affect humans and could be diluted by the 
general air. Any liquid wastes were of a low level and “discharged to a sewerage system 
installed when the site was used for a large Army camp. The effluent passes through an 
Imhoff tank that removes most of the solids and then is discharged to a large sand filter, 
collected by an underlying tile field, chlorinated, and discharged to a small stream.”49 
Like at other sites, the AEC produced significant radioactive waste and thus had to 
disperse that radiation into the natural world, planned as carefully as possible so that such 
dispersal hopefully would not affect humans. 
                                                
48 Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy Commission for 1959, January 1960, 313-317. 
49 Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy Commission for 1959, January 1960, 317-320. 
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 Apart from these three sites, more general waste disposal occurred both by land 
and sea burial. The report for 1959 stated, “Except for storage in rigorously maintained 
tanks, there is no waste management method that withholds radioactive wastes from the 
environment on an essentially permanent basis.” However, the AEC did not consider 
indefinite storage necessary for most wastes, as these would lose all radioactivity in a few 
years. “Land and sea burial are means of disposal intermediate between long-term storage 
and diluted release to the environment,” even if only low-level wastes can be buried in 
the ocean. Brookhaven, for example, did some sea burial. The laboratory reduced some 
of its wastes to solid form, sometimes with a solidifying agent like concrete, and from 
there essentially loaded the waste into fifty-five gallon drums, had trucks drive these to a 
wharf where the drums could be loaded onto ships and taken out 250 miles to sea and 
dumped overboard at depths of more than a mile. While other countries may have 
dumped liquid wastes directly into the sea, the AEC did not license such practices (even 
if waste could be unloaded directly into streams and rivers that flowed to the ocean). All 
told, tens of thousands of drums and hundreds of concrete boxes found a watery resting 
place this way.50 
 Of course the AEC did not find waste disposal sufficient in its then current state, 
so the Commission enacted an “extensive, coordinated research and development 
program in all phases of waste control operations.” That research program’s three 
objectives were: “develop practical systems for the final disposal, or long-term 
management, of highly radioactive wastes associated primarily with the chemical 
reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuels”; “evaluate quantitatively the dilution or 
concentration factors in nature in order to determine the degree of treatment required 
                                                
50 Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy Commission for 1959, January 1960, 321-329. 
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prior to release of low-level wastes to the atmosphere, ground, or waterways”; and 
“obtain increased knowledge of the fundamental phenomena and processes involved in 
handling and disposal of radioactive wastes so that more efficient and economical 
systems may be devised.” The Commission recognized that high-level wastes would 
plague humans for hundreds of years, and thus needed to “be contained essentially at the 
point of disposal so that man, his environment, and his resources are not adversely 
affected.” Tank storage may have worked for fifteen years, but obviously did not 
represent true disposal “in the ultimate sense.” The Commission also recognized that its 
knowledge of “oceanic behavior” was inadequate, “and attendant engineering problems 
appear so complex for high-level wastes, that alternate systems that are easier to control 
directly are the most likely solution.” Other research existed as well into every different 
type of wastes at all radioactivity levels.51 
 Thus the 1959 AEC report to Congress showed two things—the Commission 
cared a great deal about how disposal happened and sought to improve that, and yet, for 
all the research and care paid to such matters it still lacked practical solutions for some 
wastes with the realization that such answers might never exist. The AEC report to 
Congress for 1960 reported that, in 1959, the United States had produced fifty-four 
million gallons of high-level wastes.52 Considering that no solution yet existed for high-
level wastes other than storage, this represented an incredible liability for both the AEC 
and the United States. Moreover, those many millions of gallons of deadly sludge serve 
as a fitting symbol for the conundrum that is nuclear waste disposal. Many fantastic and 
incredible feats can be accomplished through nuclear technology, but almost all of them 
                                                
51 Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy Commission for 1959, January 1960, 335-339. On the 
other types of research, see 339-367. 
52 Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy Commission for 1960, January 1961, 86. 
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produce nuclear wastes that range from mildly dangerous to horribly toxic. Once the 
wastes are produced, there is nothing humans can do to reduce the inherent radiation 
other than wait for it to decay over several half-lives, some of which can take much 
longer than any human lives.  
 It is fitting, then, if incredibly unfortunate, that the legacy of nuclear waste 
disposal policies has outlived essentially every policymaker from the early Cold War era. 
In February 1986 the U.S. public learned through a Freedom of Information Act request 
that the Hanford facilities in southeastern Washington State had pumped millions of 
curies of radiation into the local environment. Hanford was created to help produce the 
plutonium deemed necessary for the atomic bombs used to win World War II and the 
Cold War—to safeguard the United States and its people. It clearly, at times, had the 
opposite effect. And in a situation reminiscent of the decisions of even AEC 
Commissioners, Hanford’s top decision makers sometimes intentionally sacrificed human 
safety for the sake of easier public relations.53 At another site, the Lake Ontario Ordnance 
Works in western New York State, “a spirit of patriotic sacrifice, combined with a culture 
of secrecy, overrode concerns about safety.” The site was a TNT plant during World War 
II, converted to a radioactive dumping ground in 1944, and variously sold back in pieces 
to both public and private entities in the 1950s and 1960s. All the while, contamination 
                                                
53 “Hanford’s chief health physicist Parker repeatedly advised against closing public fishing and hunting 
near the reservation [even when tests showed potential dangers from radiation]. ‘The possibility of damage 
exists,’ he said [in 1954]. However the potential hazards were ‘overshadowed by the public relations 
effect… The relations situation is always potentially dangerous, and it will be severely taxed if and when 
actual restrictions…on sport fishing are recommended.” Michele Stenehjem wrote that scholars particularly 
needed to pay attention to this story, because “If we do not look clearly at the terrible environmental 
contamination generated at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation, then our nation may remain vulnerable to the 
poisonings and pollution of other projects and technologies born and carried on under the cloaks of secrecy 
and national security.” Michele A. Stenehjem, “Pathways of Radioactive Contamination: Beginning the 
History, Public Enquiry, and Policy Study of the Hanford Nuclear Reservation,” Environmental Review, 
Vol. 13, No. 3/4 (Autumn-Winter, 1989), 105-106, 109-110. 
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by nuclear waste created incredible human and environmental health dangers that last 
even through current-day cleanup operations.54 
 Typically waste disposal in the United States, during both the early Cold War and 
current times, has produced an “out of sight, out of mind” mentality among U.S. citizens 
and policymakers, but such a mindset clearly does not make sense when applied to 
nuclear waste. The country’s top decision makers relied on scientific knowledge to deal 
with the sizeable problem of radioactive waste disposal. Tens of billions of gallons of 
low-level waste represented no significant obstacle, but still polluted the nation’s rivers 
and soils and the global oceans. All the country had was hopes and assurances (not all 
born out or true) that such contamination would not permanently harm U.S. environments 
or peoples. The other tens of millions of gallons of waste—high level contaminated 
waste—could be stored more or less safely in gigantic vats, but required complete 
removal from the environs or else great biological destruction would occur. Previous 
ways of thinking about trash may have worked for previous types of trash (or at least 
caused less acute problems), but when applied to nuclear waste caused problems. The 
AEC consistently talked about the limits to how much radiation could and could not be 
placed into the natural world, but perhaps a better way of thinking would have been to 
question whether any extra radiation should be permitted into the lands and bodies of 
U.S. peoples. But doing so would have necessitated reconsidering the activities that 
produced such radiation; something the AEC was not willing to do. 
 
                                                
54 Andrew Jenks, “Model City USA: The Environmental Cost of Victory in World War II and the Cold 
War” Environmental History, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Jul., 2007), 552. 
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Conclusion: 
The Nuclear Complex, Decision Making, and Environmentalism 
 
 “Environmentalism,” Historian Hal Rothman contended, “is one of the most 
important new dimensions to appear in American society in the post-1945 world. Part 
social movement, part manifestation of the increasing affluence and privilege of 
American society and different from the conservation movement that preceded it, 
environmentalism took center stage in the transformation of the values and mores of the 
second half of the twentieth century.”1 And yet, even though environmentalism has 
clearly played an important role in postwar United States society, both popular and 
scholarly understandings of the idea are imperfect. Cultural scholar Raymond Williams 
defined environmentalism as “concern with the human and natural habitat” or “the 
doctrine of the influence of physical surroundings on development.”2 Yet more common 
definitions eschew such a value-neutral characterization and place emphasis on protecting 
the environment at the expense (or detriment) of other considerations, such as economic 
or political concerns.3 
This conclusion asserts that perhaps our understanding of what 
“environmentalism” is and who should be considered “environmentalist” has skewed 
                                                
1 In The Greening of a Nation?, Rothman chronicled the transition in the United States from a 
conservationist perspective into an environmentalist one, and then ruminated on what environmentalism 
had meant and could mean for the country. Hal K. Rothman, The Greening of a Nation? Environmentalism 
in the United States Since 1945 (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1998), XI. 
2 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1976, 1983), 111. 
3 Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus have criticized this aspect of environmentalism and called for a 
reexamination of what it means to be an environmentalist in their article, “The death of environmentalism.” 
They contend, “the environmental community's narrow definition of its self-interest leads to a kind of 
policy literalism that undermines its power.” Similar to what this essay attempts to do, yet for very different 
reasons, Shellenberger and Nordhaus attempted to redefine what should be considered “environmentalist.” 
Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus, “The Death of Environmentalism: Global Warming Politics in a 
Post-Environmental World.” The essay was first released at an October 2004 meeting of the Environmental 
Grantmakers Association and can be found online here, for example: 
http://www.thebreakthrough.org/PDF/Death_of_Environmentalism.pdf 
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how we evaluate the environmental records of those in political power.4 Government 
officials during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations frequently prioritized 
scientific understandings about the natural world when making policy decisions about the 
nuclear complex, but did not do so in ways that would be recognized as 
environmentalism by most people. Neither scholars nor the general public have 
appreciated this attention to environmental considerations exhibited by these early Cold 
War decision makers. The studied policymakers did make decisions that caused a great 
deal of harm to the environment. They also, however, continuously integrated 
environmental science into their decisions and used their ever-improving knowledge 
about the environment to help them make what they considered to be the best possible 
choices for their nation and the people in it. This thoughtfulness about environmental 
issues has been unrecognized by scholars and, if considered relative to Raymond 
Williams’ definition of environmentalism as “concern with the human and natural 
habitat” or “the doctrine of the influence of physical surroundings on development,” 
could be called a sort of environmentalism (or proto-environmentalism, considering they 
held office before the advent of the environmentalist movement). 
                                                
4 On the environmental records of presidents, especially Truman and Eisenhower, see: Byron W. Daynes 
and Glen Sussman, White House Politics and the Environment: Franklin D. Roosevelt to George W. Bush 
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2010); Riley E. Dunlap and Michael Patrick Allen, 
“Partisan Differences on Environmental Issues: A Congressional Roll-Call Analysis,” The Western 
Political Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Sep., 1976); Elmo Richardson, Dams, Parks & Politics: Resource 
Development and Preservation in the Truman-Eisenhower Era (Lexington: The University Press of 
Kentucky, 1973); Roderick Nash, Review of Dams, Parks & Politics: Resource Development and 
Preservation in the Truman-Eisenhower Era by Elmo Richardson. The American Historical Review, Vol. 
80, No. 2 (April 1975); Susan Hunter and Victoria Noonan, “Energy, Environment, and the Presidential 
Agenda,” in The Presidency Reconsidered, Richard W. Waterman, ed. (Itasca, F.E. Peacock Publishers, 
Inc., 1993); Dennis L. Soden, “Presidential Roles and Environmental Policy,” in The Environmental 
Presidency, Dennis L. Soden, ed. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999); Carolyn Long, 
Michael Cabral, and Brooks Vandivort, “The Chief Environmental Diplomat: An Evolving Arena of 
Foreign Policy,” in The Environmental Presidency, Dennis L. Soden, ed. (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1999); Dennis L. Soden and Brent S. Steel, “Evaluating the Environmental Presidency,” in The 
Environmental Presidency, Dennis L. Soden, ed. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999); 
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Environmentalist-like care for the environment in the United States was nothing 
new by the mid-twentieth century. From efforts to save the American bison in the fin-de-
siècle era to Progressive Era conservationism, explicit concern for the environment 
increased dramatically from the late nineteenth century to World War II (WWII).5 In 
historian Donald Worster’s estimation, a particular moment during WWII—the 
detonation of the world’s first atomic bomb on 16 July 1945 in the New Mexico desert—
marked the beginning of the “Age of Ecology.”6 And just a few years after that, in 1949, 
famed forester and environmental thinker Aldo Leopold’s seminal A Sand County 
Almanac posthumously appeared a year after his death.7 By many accounts, however, the 
environmental age truly began sometime around the 1962 publication of Rachel Carson’s 
Silent Spring, the text that served as a call to action for many budding environmentalists 
of the 1960s.8 Taking after the lessons provided by Carson and previous thinkers, 
                                                
5 On efforts to save the American Bison, particularly by the American Bison Society, see Chapter Six, “The 
Returns of the Bison,” in Andrew C. Isenberg, The Destruction of the Bison: An Environmental History, 
1750-1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). On Progressive-Era conservation, though it is 
more of a work on politics at the time than environmental understandings, see: Samuel P. Hays, 
Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920 
(Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1959, 1999). And many workers knew for years in their 
bodies the importance of the environment and its health to the health of their own bodies. Linda Nash, 
Inescapable Ecologies: A History of Environment, Disease, and Knowledge (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2006) 
6 In Nature’s Economy, Worster quoted the “father” of the atomic bomb, J. Robert Oppenheimer, as 
quoting the Bhagavad-Gita at that moment, “I am become Death, the shatterer of worlds.” Donald Worster, 
Nature’s Economy (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1977), 339. 
7 Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac, And Sketches Here and There (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1949, 1987) 
8 Al Gore wrote in the introduction to the 1994 reprint of the book, “Silent Spring came as a cry in the 
wilderness, a deeply felt, thoroughly researched, and brilliantly written book that changed the course of 
history. Without this book, the environmental movement might have been long delayed or never have 
developed at all.” Al Gore, “Introduction,” in Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1962, 1994), xv. For an example of the importance of Silent Spring, historian Edmund Russell 
wrote that Carson’s work “helped catalyze the modern environmental movement by characterizing pest 
control as a self-defeating form of warfare.” Russell even used Silent Spring as the endpoint for his 
historical study. Edmund Russell, War and Nature: Fighting Humans and Insects with Chemicals from 
World War I to Silent Spring (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 7. Ted Steinberg, as another 
example, said Carson changed “the terms of the debate over environmental reform” and “helped to 
transform ecology into the rallying cry of the environmental movement.” Ted Steinberg, Down to Earth: 
Nature’s Role in American History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 246-247.  
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ecological thinking and a desire to protect the environment have typically defined modern 
environmentalism as emerging sometime soon after the publication of Silent Spring.  
 This dissertation, however, has shown a much more nuanced notion of what 
concern for the environment might look like and perhaps also calls us to reevaluate who 
we might call environmentalist and who we should not. Presidents Truman and 
Eisenhower would rarely, if ever be called environmentalists by current definitions. 
Moreover, since they lived before the environmental movement began, deeming either an 
environmentalist is probably anachronistic. Top policymakers from their administrations, 
however, spent a considerable part of their time thinking about the natural world while 
making decisions about the nuclear complex. Sometimes those decisions, such as 
dumping nuclear waste into the global oceans, were harmful for the natural world. At 
other times, these men made decisions with the express intent of trying to protect the 
environment, such as nuclear test cessation talks during Eisenhower’s second presidential 
term. Either way, many of their choices reflected not only a deep recognition of the 
power humans hold over the environment, but also a perception of how the natural world 
affects human plans and desires. These understandings were not always conscious or well 
thought out, but policymakers nonetheless took the environment into account when 
evaluating the best ways to develop the nuclear complex. 
 Deliberations by policymakers on the interaction between the environment and 
the nuclear complex occurred in many different ways. During nuclear tests, weather 
proved influential in determining when tests occurred and what happened when these did. 
Nuclear weapons also could have incredible effects on the natural world, and studies and 
surveys of the environs surrounding bomb test sites show that testers did develop a 
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comprehension of that. After tests, scientists gained an evolving knowledge of the 
radioactive fallout produced, and the ways decision makers used these scientific 
understandings of fallout reflect a developing but innate understanding of an 
interconnection between human health and the environment. That comprehension proved 
crucial in the later years of Eisenhower’s presidency when he and others sought to end 
nuclear weapons tests, as concern for the natural world and knowledge of it were critical 
to those talks. Atomic agriculture and nuclear waste disposal practices provide further 
evidence for the interconnected nature of decision making, environment, and the nuclear 
complex. We cannot understand the nuclear complex without understanding how the 
natural world affected its early development, whether policymakers held an 
environmentalist sentiment to protect the natural world or not. 
 This is, of course, not to say that involving the natural world and understandings 
of it into nuclear policymaking meant protecting the environment at all costs. 
Geopolitical and natural security priorities caused top decision makers to weigh their 
concerns for the nation and decide what they thought was in the country’s best interest. 
Sometimes protecting the nation meant developing natural resources or preserving human 
health via keeping the environment free from nuclear pollutants. At other times, however, 
fear of Soviet military aggression meant such environmental concerns should be 
sacrificed in the name of national security. Moreover, many examples throughout the 
dissertation of how nuclear waste dumping went into Mexico or how radioactive fallout 
affected non-U.S. peoples clearly demonstrate that U.S. policymakers almost always 
cared overwhelmingly and only about the United States and its environments (or, more 
likely U.S. citizens, residents, and voters). And since tropospheric fallout tends to stay in 
 
 275 
similar latitudes, tropical peoples tended to suffer disproportionately from the fallout 
produced by tropical nuclear tests at the Pacific Proving Grounds. 
 Even considering the holes in their concern for the environment and its peoples, 
Truman and Eisenhower-era officials did understand that the natural world affected their 
plans, aims, and goals and incorporated environmental knowledge into their 
policymaking. In its own way, is this not a form of environmentalism? Perhaps we need 
to redefine environmentalism into more neutral terms that do not ascribe certain policy 
goals and also allow for other concerns to sometimes take precedent over protecting the 
environment. In 2012, Roger V. Scruton argued that conservatives and Republicans in the 
United States represented the nation’s true environmentalists and thus needed to resurrect 
their environmentalist credentials and reclaim that moniker from liberals and Democrats.9 
And yet, a February 2013 Google search of “EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] 
job killing regulations” yielded almost 1.4 million hits, with the top hits all either being 
from a conservative perspective or responding to one. Considering such viewpoints, 
perhaps conservatives should not look to Scruton’s arguments for ways that conservatives 
can be environmentalists, but instead look to the practical environmentalism displayed by 
Dwight Eisenhower, whose policies did not demonstrate thinking based on a zero-sum 
dichotomy between environment and economics. 
 While conservatives might be able look to Eisenhower as a model for how to 
incorporate the environment into their politics, perhaps most liberal environmentalists 
can learn that the integration of environmental knowledge and understandings into policy 
                                                
9 Scruton, a former professor of aesthetics at Birkbeck College, London, wrote a text on the issue titled 
How to Think Seriously About the Planet: The Case for Environmental Conservatism. Paul Basken, 
“Scholar of Aesthetics Hopes to Show Conservatives Their Inner Environmentalist,” The Chronicle of 
Higher Education, 5 June 2012. 
 
 276 
will not always yield the results they hope. The inclusion of environmental knowledge 
into policy will not, as this dissertation has shown, necessarily lead to increased 
protection of the natural world. Policymakers are forced, by the nature of their positions, 
to balance a great many concerns at once. Just because they spend more time thinking 
about the interaction between their plans and the natural world it does not mean they will 
take a stance that would be commonly perceived as environmentalist.   
 Perhaps the greatest conclusion to be taken from this dissertation, then, is a call 
for scholars and the public alike to rethink the utility of our current definitions of 
environmentalism, especially in a policy context. Early nuclear complex policymakers 
started off thinking about the natural world's importance to the nuclear complex for 
principally non-ecological reasons—human health, effects on military operations, how 
agriculture could be improved, etc. Eventually, however, more of an environmentalist 
perspective developed in U.S. policymakers, even if that new ethos had to be placed 
within a geopolitical context of protecting the nation. The nuclear complex, like many 
parts of human society, owes a great deal of its development to the natural world. 
Policymakers who made decisions about the nuclear complex also understood this, even 
if frequently only on an unconscious level. Some of them, on the other hand, expressed 
similar ideas quite explicitly. In 1953, Commissioner Thomas E. Murray spoke at the 
Seattle University Commencement and said:  
Tornado and earthquake and resulting conflagration have long been called acts of 
God because man, humble in the consciousness of his own limitations, has until 
this decade recognized them as beyond his capacity to produce or control. […] 
Today man is more powerful. He can, as it were, generate hurricanes, 
earthquakes, and consuming fires. He can today open the tight doors of the atom 
and let forth all three – wind, earthquake, and fire – in such a manner as to make 
Hiroshima’s atomic attack look like a Civil War bombardment. Because of the 
limitless nature of our destructive potential power we must moderate our forceful 
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capabilities with something of the meekness and patience of the Saints. We must 
learn something of God’s contempt for the great and the mighty – something of 
His preference for His little ones.10 
 
Even ignoring the religious overtones and delusions of grandeur, Murray clearly saw 
humans as occupying a strange place between controlling the natural world, being more 
powerful than it, and yet still being subject to the whims of environmental vagaries.  
 The nuclear complex and decision making from 1945-1960 provide clear 
examples of the importance of the environment to politicians from all sorts of political 
perspectives. The case at hand thus not only reminds us that the environment is more 
important to societal structures than is commonly realized, but also demonstrates that 
policymakers from all walks can legitimately incorporate concerns about the natural 
world into their policy considerations and still hold firm to their most important political 
and economic values. In fact, caring about the environment often can be an important part 
of staying true to such ideals. If we can learn from the example of policymaking about 
the nuclear complex and the environment then perhaps we can better understand how we 
should, as conscientious, thinking humans, interact with the environment when we build 
our societies and try to live good lives. 
                                                
10 DDEL, White House Central Files, Official File, Box 213, Folder 8, Commencement Address by Thomas 
E. Murray at Seattle University, Seattle, WA, 29 May 1953, 3-4. 
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Appendix One: 
AEC Commissioners, 1946-19601 
 
AEC Chairmen  Dates Served 
 
David E. Lilienthal   (1 November 1946 – 15 February 1950) 
Gordon E. Dean   (11 July 1950 – 30 June 1953) 
Lewis Strauss   (2 July 1953 – 30 June 1958) 
John A. McCone  (14 July 1958 – 20 January 1961) 
 
Other Commissioners Dates Served 
 
Robert F. Bacher   (1 November 1946 – 10 May 1949) 
Sumner T. Pike   (31 October 1946 – 15 December 1951) 
William W. Waymack  (5 November 1946 – 21 December 1948) 
Lewis L. Strauss2   (12 November 1946 – 14 April 1950) 
Gordon E. Dean3   (24 May 1949 – 11 July 1950) 
Henry D. Smyth   (30 May 1949 – 30 September 1954) 
Thomas E. Murray   (9 May 1950 – 30 June 1957) 
T. Keith Glennan  (2 October 1950 – 1 November 1952) 
Eugene M. Zuckert   (25 February 1952 – 30 June 1954) 
Joseph Campbell  (27 July 1953 – 30 November 1954) 
Willard F. Libby  (5 October 1954 – 30 June 1959) 
John Von Neumann  (15 March 1955 – 8 February 1957) 
Harold S. Vance  (31 October 1955 – 31 August 1959) 
John S. Graham  (12 September 1957 – 30 June 1962) 
John F. Floberg  (1 October 1957 – 23 June 1960) 
John. H. Williams  (13 August 1959 – 30 June 1960) 
Robert E. Wilson  (22 March 1960 – 31 January 1964) 
Loren K. Olson   (23 June 1960 – 30 June 1962) 
 
                                                
1 Adapted from: Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield, 1947/1952: Volume II of A 
History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (University Park: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1969), 664, and Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-
1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 
569. 
2 Came back in 1953 as Chairman. 
3 Served this time as a Commissioner before becoming Chairman on 11 July 1950. 
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Appendix Two 
Selected Timeline of Early International Test Ban Events 
(Adapted from the Federation of American Scientists1) 
 
1945  
 
16 July: The United States conducted the world's first nuclear weapons test, code-named 
Trinity, at Alamogordo, New Mexico. 
 
1949 
 
29 August: The first Soviet nuclear test is conducted at a test site near Semipalatinsk in 
Kazakhstan  
 
1954 
 
1 March: The United States conducted a massive hydrogen bomb test that released 
previously unfathomable amounts of radioactive fallout into the Earth’s atmosphere. The 
incident particularly drew international attention because fallout rained over the Japanese 
fishing vessel Lucky Dragon and also inhabitants of the Marshall Islands. After this 
moment, the world became more attuned to issues of fallout in the atmosphere.  
 
1957 
 
21 August: U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower announced that the United States 
would be willing, as part of a first-step disarmament agreement, to suspend testing of 
nuclear weapons for up to two years under certain conditions and safeguards. These 
included Soviet acceptance of the U.S. call for a permanent cessation of the production of 
fissionable materials for weapons purposes and the installation of inspection systems to 
ensure compliance.   
 
1958 
 
31 March: The Soviet Union announced that it would unilaterally halt all nuclear tests 
provided Western nations also stop testing. 
 
8 April – 21 August: President Eisenhower proposed a Conference of Experts to examine 
the issues involved in verifying a nuclear test ban. The conference convened on 1 July in 
Geneva with scientists from the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, France, Canada, 
Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Poland. On 21 August, the conference released a report 
indicating that a comprehensive nuclear test ban could be verified through a network of 
160 monitoring stations and that nuclear tests in space out to 50 kilometers also could be 
verified, but that current technology could not detect tests in deep space.   
 
                                                
1 “Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Chronology,” Federation of American Scientists’ website, 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/chron1.htm, accessed 13 February 2012 
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22 August: President Eisenhower announced that the United States was prepared "to 
negotiate an agreement with other nations which have tested nuclear weapons for the 
suspension of nuclear weapons tests and the establishment of an international control 
system." If this proposal were accepted in principle by the other nations that have tested 
nuclear weapons, "then in order to facilitate the detailed negotiations, the United States 
[was] prepared, unless testing [was] resumed by the Soviet Union, to withhold further 
testing on its part of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a period of one year from the 
beginning of the negotiations."  
 
31 October: The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union began negotiations on a 
comprehensive nuclear test ban at the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of 
Nuclear Weapons Tests. The United States and Britain began a one-year testing 
moratorium, which the Soviet Union joined a few days later.    
 
1959 
 
13 April: In a letter to Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, President Eisenhower offered 
an alternative approach to a nuclear test ban: If the Soviet Union insisted on a veto over 
an on-site control system to monitor underground detonations, the two sides could 
implement a test ban in phases, starting with a prohibition of nuclear weapons tests in the 
atmosphere up to 50 kilometers. Meanwhile, the negotiations could continue to resolve 
the political and technical problems associated with control of underground and outer 
space tests.   Premier Khrushchev rejected the proposal ten days later and suggested 
instead a complete test ban with a predetermined number of on-site inspections.    
 
5 May: In another letter to Premier Khrushchev, President Eisenhower urged technical 
discussions on the possibility of banning nuclear tests to a greater atmospheric height 
than that mentioned in his 13 April letter. The president again urged the Soviet Union 
either to accept the control measures that would make possible a complete ban on nuclear 
weapons tests or to agree to the U.S. proposal for a partial ban.   The president stated that 
the United States was prepared to explore Premier Khrushchev's proposal for a 
predetermined number of inspections in the territory of the United States, Britain, and the 
Soviet Union, but added that the number should be related to scientific facts and 
detection capabilities.   
 
26 August: President Eisenhower extended the voluntary one-year suspension of nuclear 
weapons testing by the United States to 31 December 1959.   
 
28 August: The Soviet Union stated that it will not resume nuclear testing provided the 
Western powers continue to observe a moratorium.   
 
29 December: President Eisenhower announced that when the U.S. nuclear testing 
moratorium expired at the end of 1959, the United States would "consider ourselves free 
to resume nuclear testing," but would not resume testing without advance notice.   
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1960 
 
1 May: U-2 reconnaissance plane was shot down over Sverdlovsk in the Soviet Union. 
Premier Khrushchev canceled a scheduled four-power Paris summit, and no further 
progress was made in the complete test ban negotiations for the balance of the 
Eisenhower administration.   
 
1963  
 
15 July – 5 August: The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union negotiate and sign 
on 5 August the Limited Test Ban Treaty outlawing nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in 
outer space, and underwater. Underground tests are also outlawed if they result in 
spreading radioactive debris outside the territorial limits of the state where the explosion 
is conducted. The treaty enters into force on 10 October 1963. 
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